Re: nature as analogy

[Jack Park <***>]

Yet, I wonder if it really is analogy or something else. Let me
revisit my own experiences jumping over gaps in the terra firma. Doing
so, I'm inclined to think that I'm using a kind of recall that might,
or might not be related to analogy. In analogical reasoning, I might
be transferring information gained in one, say, domain, to another. Is
that what I am doing when running really fast and deciding whether to
leap or to turn one way or the other and try to find a bridge?
Intuition says that's not what I'm doing. Rather, I'm doing what I do
best: flashing a wild-ass guess whether I have the strength to make
such a leap, and that guess will likely be based on recollection of
leaps made in the past, mostly successful leaps. That's what I think
is going on in that particular example.

The word better taunts, I think, the recursive waltz to hell. In
computing, we call such things a loop that risks no stopping rule
firing, in which case, the computer does what we affectionately call a
"branch to south succatash." (We use other endearments depending on
mood). What means better? You say "serves some function better". I
ask: "how so?", you say ..., I ask "how so?" and so on. I am playing
with this subject because I am of the opinion that we need a better
(just had to use that word ;( way to describe various modeling tools.
Substituting "works better" for "more efficiency" doesn't paint a more
useful picture, I think. Your mileage might vary, of course.

Jack

On 12/29/05, John <***> wrote:
> Jack, thanks so much for the references. I think in particular I'd like
> to look at Lakoff's books and cite that as some theory precedent.
>
> OK, I'm being pushed farther out on the limb. What does "works better"
> mean? I dropped the idea of efficiency because it has quantitative
> definitions and I didn't mean that. "Better" in evolution is almost
> always equated with gene pool success of some form. I don't mean that. I
> have to go  back to my central thesis, which I believe comes out of RR's
> work, that formal systems can  provide functional specifications
> (decoding) and are as real as material structures in nature. Call them
> "functions," overlooking the confusion between this concept of a
> function and the mechanistic idea of processes or the mathematical idea
> of a function, which is actually a transformation. By function here, i
> mean purpose. Now, I'm open to accusation of being teleological, but it
> need not be so except in the extrapolation of an internally defined
> function to larger systems, where they then appear to be general. To me,
> function results from one system taking up a role in another system.
> Once it does that, it has a "function" in the other system. So the heart
> has a function of pumping blood in the human body. A river has a
> function of transporting water on a landscape, etc. (and the landscape
> has a function of channeling the water - a modeling relationship between
> landscape and river). So, it need not even be biological. However, when
> functions become related within an organism that has significant
> "efficient closure," Aristotle's 2nd causal/explanatory level, then
> functions look like purpose, and they are indeed purpose when cognized
> as such (by means I don't know). The impression of teleology is because
> of the anticipatory nature of systems that close around the relationship
> between functions and structues in some important way to the definition
> of the new system. Evolution does this, even operates on this principle,
> so evolution is very anticipatory despite the mechanisms of selection
> which are retrospective.
>
> Now that't a lot of wind to get to your question of what I mean by
> "works better." I mean fulfills a function. In the runner example it is
> leaping over the ravine. One accomplishes this task better by use of
> analogs than could be done resorting to quantitative models and
> calculation, which would land you in the river or with a broken leg as
> you missed the rock on the other side. Athletes know this very well from
> training. If they can stop their mind from figuring and calculating and
> just "be" part of the motion, they will perform flawlessly, but one
> analytical thought enters and the performance is shot - at least for
> some sports that don't involve numbers. It has to be "felt" not produced
> from thinking. Musicians also loose themselves in the music and then
> discover capabilities they could not have forced by thinking about it.
> the thinking mind seems to like quantities because that is what is
> presented to it, but it seems to be rather bad for actually doing
> anything besides think. Now, I'm sure there is a 'function" for
> thinking, in which a new behavior can be invented, and then practised
> until it becomes analogical. All the trials and errors provide the
> analogs. James Mark Baldwin was onto this, but hardly anybody paid
> attention to him until very recently.
>
> Anyway, I'm sure that introduces more questions than it answers, but it
> is what I mean by "works better."
>
> Cheers,
> John
>
> Jack Park wrote:
>
> >Thank you, John!
> >
> >Especially for the name Glantz [1] & [2]. Here's why. For a zillion
> >years (it seems), I've been following the writings of Iben Browning
> >(_Climate and the affairs of men_) which was based on papers he wrote
> >for the CIA while at Sandia Labs and later wordsmithed into the book
> >by Nels Winkless after the papers became unclassified. Iben took all
> >the math he could find and computed a long history of tidal stress.
> >After he put a small white noise wash on that data, a signal regarding
> >major volcanic events and major geosocial events in humanity stood
> >out. I am now beginning to find out that more and more people are
> >realizing that climatology plays a larger role in the affairs of
> >humankind than once thought, certainly more than those history books
> >we were spoon fed in highschool would have us believe.
> >
> >Returning control to your tv, I'm back to how it is that organisms
> >might reason by analogy. Were I blessed with Judith's memory, I'd
> >probably be able to point to something that RR wrote about it, but I
> >can't.  In computing, one of the more important theories on reasoning
> >by analogy comes from Dedre Gentner, with her "structure mapping
> >engine." The notion of analogy, again, in computing, is closer to the
> >notion of structural similarity, where structure, in this case, refers
> >to the shape, perhaps the topology of some relationally-represented
> >information. Graphs. That's where Rashevsky started: graph theory was
> >going to be able to let him describe the canonical organism. Graph
> >theory was weak, as he found out; he then proceeded to invent
> >"organismic set theory", and RR later came along with category theory,
> >which, at that time, was not an ancient methodology in its own right.
> >The structure of graphs plays to the notion of analogy. That's what
> >Dedre Gentner says. She's not alone in taking that approach. In this
> >particular case, if you substitute the word "relationships" for the
> >word "structure", you're pretty much back to relational biology.
> >Structure is a word used by CS jockeys, but, I think in this case, it
> >means the shape of a relationship graph.
> >
> >One wonders how it is that the "neural networks" of our brains do
> >analogy. An interesting "framework" is hypothesized and described in
> >Jeff (Palm Pilot) Hawkins' book _On Intelligence_, where his primary
> >focus is on the nature of  canonical patterns, recognition elements
> >which can spot your grandmother, no matter which way you view her.
> >Might be something in there. Who can say? That idea bloomed, then
> >faded, in artificial intelligence circles many years back. George
> >Lakoff takes things further: metaphors are the canonical means by
> >which we reason. See _Metaphors We Live By_ and _Philosophy In The
> >Flesh_.
> >
> >I'm out of ideas. What means "works better"?
> >Cheers,
> >Jack
> >[1] http://www.ccb.ucar.edu/glantz/
> >[2] http://www.ccb.ucar.edu/cxa/index.html
> >
> >On 12/27/05, John <***> wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Thanks Jack,
> >>
> >>You make a good point. Perhaps the word 'efficient' should not be used
> >>because of these implications.
> >>
> >>What I really mean is that it works better than it would if there were
> >>in fact some internal accounting of actual numbers - i.e., a process
> >>facilitated by calculation. I think what is going on is processes
> >>facilitated by analogy. Its the comparison between reasoning
> >>quantiatively and acting on the result, vs. reasoning by analogy and
> >>acting on the result. There is a really great environmental/social
> >>scientist I know, Mickey Glantz, who has proposed "reasoning by analogy"
> >>for environmental and ecosystem management. It has a lot of merit and
> >>points out the shortcomings of our propensity to reason analytically and
> >>quantitatively. I think he's right about management, and it got me
> >>thinking that pehaps this is exactly what nature does too. I'd love to
> >>find some references saying so. I get these ideas that seem so right to
> >>me, and I want to include it in a paper, but now I'm trying ot be
> >>rigorous and I have to ask what support the idea really has. On the
> >>other hand, I can't think of any evidence supporting the idea that
> >>organisms use some kind of internal calculation in their processes - is
> >>there any?
> >>
> >>John
> >>
> >>Jack Park wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>>John,
> >>>
> >>>My 0.0012 EUROs: I like the closing sentence, but it's not at all
> >>>clear to me that a much more accurate mechanism is at work when a
> >>>runner jumps a ravine, or that nature is necessarily efficent in
> >>>transfering information. I say that while carrying the same
> >>>assumptions many have that evolutionary pressure would drive
> >>>biological systems to be as efficient as possible; indeed who would
> >>>have thunk to place a sewage disposal system in the same location as a
> >>>playground? Right? But, what about the spread of cytokines when under,
> >>>say, viral attack? Is that necessarily efficient? Accidentally
> >>>efficient? Efficient at all? What means efficient? On the surface, it
> >>>seems efficient given that it works, but consider this (numbers I
> >>>learnt when chasing a Leukemia germ): when you come under attack,
> >>>there is a process whereby your lymphatic system responds by dumping a
> >>>massive dose of white cells into the blood stream. A CBC done on
> >>>someone who just discovered an infection might show 20 to 30 thousand
> >>>whites per dl; way more than the usual 4 to 5 thousand. Is that
> >>>efficient? It would seem to be so to the extent that it often works.
> >>>What means efficient?
> >>>
> >>>I'm out of EUROs now.
> >>>Cheers and happy new year!
> >>>Jack
> >>>
> >>>On 12/27/05, John <***> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>Hi,
> >>>>
> >>>>I'm drafting a paper for a conference and I want to say something about
> >>>>the way information is used in nature without getting too into it, since
> >>>>the paper is ultimately about information system design.
> >>>>
> >>>>Here's a paragraph I wrote. What I would like to know from my esteemed
> >>>>colleagues, is if the statements here are supported well enough in the
> >>>>literature for me to just say this and move on, or am I being wierd
> >>>>again by suggesting that nature operates on mimicry and analogy??? If
> >>>>someone would like to contribute a seminal reference I would appreciate
> >>>>it. I'm not sure RR addresses this directly in his mimicry paper - its
> >>>>been a while since I read that, but I'm betting it should be referenced.
> >>>>
> >>>>Title: Information as Communication
> >>>>
> >>>>The human body functions on the transfer of information between critical
> >>>>components. It does this seamlessly and efficiently. Information storage
> >>>>is a part of its use and all indications are that natural biological
> >>>>information is relational and analogical, not quantitative or
> >>>>analytical. This can be imagined in an example of a runner. On reaching
> >>>>a ravine the runner quickly leaps across and lands accurately on the
> >>>>other bank, continuing to run without missing a stride. If asked later
> >>>>to look at the ravine and estimate its width, he may guess within a foot
> >>>>or two. Clearly, a much more accurate process was available to the
> >>>>runner naturally in the moment of need. It seems unlikely that a more
> >>>>accurate quantitative capability would exist out of reach of the
> >>>>conscious mind. It is more likely that the actions are determined
> >>>>mimetically, by analogy to past experience, and that this is a faster
> >>>>and more accurate process for anticipation in complex systems.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>Thanks for your comments,
> >>>>John Kineman
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
>