Thank you, John!
Especially for the name Glantz [1] & [2]. Here's why. For a zillion
years (it seems), I've been following the writings of Iben Browning
(_Climate and the affairs of men_) which was based on papers he wrote
for the CIA while at Sandia Labs and later wordsmithed into the book
by Nels Winkless after the papers became unclassified. Iben took all
the math he could find and computed a long history of tidal stress.
After he put a small white noise wash on that data, a signal regarding
major volcanic events and major geosocial events in humanity stood
out. I am now beginning to find out that more and more people are
realizing that climatology plays a larger role in the affairs of
humankind than once thought, certainly more than those history books
we were spoon fed in highschool would have us believe.
Returning control to your tv, I'm back to how it is that organisms
might reason by analogy. Were I blessed with Judith's memory, I'd
probably be able to point to something that RR wrote about it, but I
can't. In computing, one of the more important theories on reasoning
by analogy comes from Dedre Gentner, with her "structure mapping
engine." The notion of analogy, again, in computing, is closer to the
notion of structural similarity, where structure, in this case, refers
to the shape, perhaps the topology of some relationally-represented
information. Graphs. That's where Rashevsky started: graph theory was
going to be able to let him describe the canonical organism. Graph
theory was weak, as he found out; he then proceeded to invent
"organismic set theory", and RR later came along with category theory,
which, at that time, was not an ancient methodology in its own right.
The structure of graphs plays to the notion of analogy. That's what
Dedre Gentner says. She's not alone in taking that approach. In this
particular case, if you substitute the word "relationships" for the
word "structure", you're pretty much back to relational biology.
Structure is a word used by CS jockeys, but, I think in this case, it
means the shape of a relationship graph.
One wonders how it is that the "neural networks" of our brains do
analogy. An interesting "framework" is hypothesized and described in
Jeff (Palm Pilot) Hawkins' book _On Intelligence_, where his primary
focus is on the nature of canonical patterns, recognition elements
which can spot your grandmother, no matter which way you view her.
Might be something in there. Who can say? That idea bloomed, then
faded, in artificial intelligence circles many years back. George
Lakoff takes things further: metaphors are the canonical means by
which we reason. See _Metaphors We Live By_ and _Philosophy In The
Flesh_.
I'm out of ideas. What means "works better"?
Cheers,
Jack
[1] http://www.ccb.ucar.edu/glantz/
[2] http://www.ccb.ucar.edu/cxa/index.html
On 12/27/05, John <***> wrote:
Thanks Jack,
You make a good point. Perhaps the word 'efficient' should not be used
because of these implications.
What I really mean is that it works better than it would if there were
in fact some internal accounting of actual numbers - i.e., a process
facilitated by calculation. I think what is going on is processes
facilitated by analogy. Its the comparison between reasoning
quantiatively and acting on the result, vs. reasoning by analogy and
acting on the result. There is a really great environmental/social
scientist I know, Mickey Glantz, who has proposed "reasoning by analogy"
for environmental and ecosystem management. It has a lot of merit and
points out the shortcomings of our propensity to reason analytically and
quantitatively. I think he's right about management, and it got me
thinking that pehaps this is exactly what nature does too. I'd love to
find some references saying so. I get these ideas that seem so right to
me, and I want to include it in a paper, but now I'm trying ot be
rigorous and I have to ask what support the idea really has. On the
other hand, I can't think of any evidence supporting the idea that
organisms use some kind of internal calculation in their processes - is
there any?
John
Jack Park wrote:
John,
My 0.0012 EUROs: I like the closing sentence, but it's not at all
clear to me that a much more accurate mechanism is at work when a
runner jumps a ravine, or that nature is necessarily efficent in
transfering information. I say that while carrying the same
assumptions many have that evolutionary pressure would drive
biological systems to be as efficient as possible; indeed who would
have thunk to place a sewage disposal system in the same location as a
playground? Right? But, what about the spread of cytokines when under,
say, viral attack? Is that necessarily efficient? Accidentally
efficient? Efficient at all? What means efficient? On the surface, it
seems efficient given that it works, but consider this (numbers I
learnt when chasing a Leukemia germ): when you come under attack,
there is a process whereby your lymphatic system responds by dumping a
massive dose of white cells into the blood stream. A CBC done on
someone who just discovered an infection might show 20 to 30 thousand
whites per dl; way more than the usual 4 to 5 thousand. Is that
efficient? It would seem to be so to the extent that it often works.
What means efficient?
I'm out of EUROs now.
Cheers and happy new year!
Jack
On 12/27/05, John <***> wrote:
Hi,
I'm drafting a paper for a conference and I want to say something about
the way information is used in nature without getting too into it, since
the paper is ultimately about information system design.
Here's a paragraph I wrote. What I would like to know from my esteemed
colleagues, is if the statements here are supported well enough in the
literature for me to just say this and move on, or am I being wierd
again by suggesting that nature operates on mimicry and analogy??? If
someone would like to contribute a seminal reference I would appreciate
it. I'm not sure RR addresses this directly in his mimicry paper - its
been a while since I read that, but I'm betting it should be referenced.
Title: Information as Communication
The human body functions on the transfer of information between critical
components. It does this seamlessly and efficiently. Information storage
is a part of its use and all indications are that natural biological
information is relational and analogical, not quantitative or
analytical. This can be imagined in an example of a runner. On reaching
a ravine the runner quickly leaps across and lands accurately on the
other bank, continuing to run without missing a stride. If asked later
to look at the ravine and estimate its width, he may guess within a foot
or two. Clearly, a much more accurate process was available to the
runner naturally in the moment of need. It seems unlikely that a more
accurate quantitative capability would exist out of reach of the
conscious mind. It is more likely that the actions are determined
mimetically, by analogy to past experience, and that this is a faster
and more accurate process for anticipation in complex systems.
Thanks for your comments,
John Kineman