Re: Stephen Hawking is wrong

[John M <***>]

Dear Jack,
it was so boring to read that Lawson text: I felt I am
reading my own writing. Of course he used 'closure'
and I use 'model', but that does not change too much.

Thanks for the info, I am sorry all that did not come
out with my name. (Maybe his English and style is a
bit better)<G>. I had the details spread into posts on
diverse lists, some here. 

John M

--- Jack Park <***> wrote:

> This paper is found at
>
http://www.arn.org/docs2/news/stephenhawkingwrong112201.htm
> Jack
> 
> On 11/27/05, Rodrigo Peláez <***>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > With regard to the thoughts recently brought by
> Judith, I consider it
> > pertinent to copy an article written by Hilary
> Lawson. I don't know how to
> > attach an archive to the list, so excuse me the
> length of the post.
> >
> > On Sun, 21 Mar 2004 Tim Gwinn writes about a
> "?book entitled Closure: A
> > Story of Everything by Hilary Lawson (Routledge,
> 2001). After reading this,
> > I find the ideas presented therein to be very
> enlightening and persuasive. I
> > also find that they are consonant with Rosennean
> complexity in a very deep
> > way, such that I feel it has opened up and
> broadened my understanding of
> > complexity and its pervasiveness greatly."
> >
> >
> >
> > Stephen Hawking is wrong. By Hilary Lawson
> >
> > The notion that we might uncover the nature of the
> world through a
> > combination of careful observation and logic goes
> back to the inception of
> > the scientific project. It was the dream of the
> Enlightenment and it could
> > even be said that this vision has defined modern
> western culture. A
> > motivating and liberating force, it has given us a
> sense of progress, a
> > sense that unlike previous cultures and other
> societies we are on the road
> > to truth. Nevertheless, it is profoundly mistaken.
> >
> > In the closing pages of A Brief History of Time
> Stephen Hawking took a
> > sideswipe at contemporary philosophy, arguing that
> it has been reduced to an
> > analysis of language. In his haste to dismiss
> philosophy he allowed himself
> > to misunderstand not only language but the nature
> of the world. Hawking
> > makes the simple error of assuming that the world
> and our descriptions of it
> > might be one and the same. In our descriptions of
> the world we divide it
> > into things: trees and houses, people and events,
> stars and planets, atoms
> > and molecules. But the world is not a thing or a
> combination of things, for
> > these categories-these closures, as I call
> them-are the outcome of our
> > descriptions. Instead, the world is open and it is
> we who close it. Through
> > our closures we grasp the openness of the world as
> things, and out of these
> > things we build stories and models through which
> we are able to intervene.
> > But these stories and models are not the world,
> nor could they in principle
> > come close to being the world.
> >
> > The world does not come pre-packaged and divided
> into its parts. We are not
> > in a cosmic supermarket identifying cling-wrapped
> items of reality. Instead
> > we find ourselves in openness, and in order to
> make sense of it, to have
> > some means of intervening to certain effect, we
> realise closure. We do not
> > form our closures in a vacuum. We find ourselves
> in a network of linguistic
> > closures already realised and handed down by our
> culture from generation to
> > generation. As biological organisms, we are
> already set up, through
> > evolution, to generate certain types of sensory
> closure. These biological
> > and cultural systems of closure have been adopted
> because they prove useful,
> > not because they are true.
> >
> > Current theories of astrophysics, with tales of
> the big bang, black holes
> > and antimatter, have the feel of science fiction.
> And in a sense that is
> > what they are: the stories of contemporary
> science. These stories are not
> > unconstrained; they do not allow anything to be
> said. For the stories of
> > science have an internal logic which drives them
> forward. They are often
> > useful. We live by our closures. But we should not
> imagine that we have
> > thereby captured the secrets of the universe. Nor
> should we suppose that
> > there are not countless alternatives, offering
> other ways of holding the
> > world that may be equally valid.
> >
> > The closures of contemporary science appear to be
> unavoidable because they
> > take their place in a system of closures that has
> been built and defended
> > over centuries. When Hawking describes the
> universe as a vast array of
> > galaxies exploding into the emptiness of space
> propelled by the energy from
> > the original big bang, it is the outcome of a
> history of preceding closures
> > which combine to make it look as if Hawkins's
> closure is the only available
> > option. Yet there are other options, at every
> level of the account, from the
> > tiniest detail to the most general theory; options
> that would grasp openness
> > differently in some respect, that would draw
> attention to different patterns
> > and different connections, and which would as a
> consequence offer different
> > ways of intervening and to different purposes.
> >
> > In his new book, The Universe in a Nutshell,
> Hawking regards Newton's
> > account of motion and his theory of gravity as the
> starting point for the
> > contemporary scientific account of the universe.
> Instead, we should regard
> > Newton as the initiator of a complex and elegant
> system of closures.
> > Newton's centrality to science and to our culture
> obscures the limitations
> > of his theory. We are dazzled by his importance
> and his influence and so
> > overlook the mechanism of his closures.
> >
> > Since Newton every schoolchild has known that the
> apple falls from the tree
> > because of gravity. Yet gravity cannot be detected
> or identified. We see
> > only its consequences. Newton replaced one
> mystery, the falling apple, with
> > a more profound one, the existence of something
> that cannot be seen or
> > touched, and which causes change instantly across
> any distance. Newton's
> > explanation was no less mysterious than the
> explanation that the apple falls
> > to the ground because God made it do so. We have
> become so used to the
> > notion of force that it seems to us now to be
> almost mundane in character.
> > Yet Newton's theory, which proposed that the world
> is awash with
> > undetectable and mysterious forces, is bizarre.
> There is evidence that
> > Newton himself was concerned about the essentially
> mystical core to his
> > theory (as Einstein would later be about his).
> >
> > There is also, throughout Newton's theory, a
> circularity: for the most part,
> > the apple does not fall at all but remains on the
> tree. Newton has therefore
> > to propose that another force is acting to keep
> the apple on the tree, a
> > force precisely equal and opposite to that of
> gravity. And like gravity,
> > this force is also undetectable. Force is Newton's
> explanation for change,
> > but to any counter-example we choose to offer,
> Newton simply proposes a new
> > force that is equally unidentifiable or provable.
> This circularity might
> > appear a weakness, but the great strength of his
> theory was precisely that
> > it could not be disproved. It is a circularity
> which ensures a solid core
> > from which to build a system of closures. Where
> the theory proved useful, it
> > could be applied. And where it was not, a complex
> amalgam of other forces
> > could be envisaged to explain its failure. So
> gradually the web of
> > explanation and closure grew. Over time, Newton's
> framework enabled others
> > to extend and develop the system of closure until
> today we have the vast
> > network of closures that make up the contemporary
> scientific 
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