Re: Modeling relations and semantics

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Carlos,

I think there are two important points which I have left out in my previous
posts whcih I feel are important to understanding the modeling relation. I'm
not sure if Judith's view exactly match's mine. One is context dependence: a
modeling relation creates a context in which some particular system
definition, particular encodings/decodings, and model(s), are put into
relation with each other which is meaningful within that context.  The other
is the importance of distinguishing between the modeling relation as an
abstract thing, and specific physical realizations of a modeling relation.

Where you said.....
> Does he believe that the act of measurement is a "free
> creation of the human mind" and "introduce an obvious
> further semantic element into the model, over and
> above what semantic...
And I replied.....
TG: No, no. Again, encodings and decodings are the *mappings*. What he is
saying is that choosing how a physical observable will *map* to a formal
model (and thus also, the inverse mapping back to the natural system), is
our free choice.

....I was not clear. My point is that the abstract mappings of the modeling
relation are what is a "free creation of the mind". If we *physically
realize* an abstract mapping by including use of a measuring device, it is
not that the measuring device per se is a "semantic element", but that the
encoding mapping - of which the measuring device is part of the physical
realization of it, in the context of this specific modeling relation - is a
"semantic element". And, of course, the mapping is semantic with respect to
the context of the specific modeling relation.

So, in a certain indirect sense, one can say that the measuring device (and
other associated physical aspects) are 'part' of the semantic nature of
encoding/decoding, but in my view it is only because those physical aspects
are part of the physical realization of the abstract mapping. I prefer to
say that the semantic aspect belongs to the abstract mapping, and not call
the physical devices used 'semantic'. An analogy would be that spoken speech
may have semantic elements in it, but we do not say that the soundwaves or
air movement of the speech are thereby 'semantic'. The semantic aspect
belongs to another level of organization.

To continue, we could not choose some particular measuring device without
first having in mind: 1) what phenomenon we wish to the measuring device to
"observe" and 2) what sense we are to make of how the measuring device
responds. The abstract encoding mapping includes: 1) the selection of some
phenomenon, and the selection of some means of transducing that phenomenon
into a formal object (e.g., into a number). Thus a measuring device may be
employed to interact with the chosen phenomenon and the resulting physical
changes in the measuring device are then interpreted as some formal value
(e.g, we choose that when a meter needle moves to some point, we shall
associate that with a certain numerical value).

Finally, another way to think of the modeling relation that may be helpful
is to view it as Natural Law [LI p. 58] operationalized.

Regards,
Tim