Re: Modeling relations and semantics

[John M <***>]

Jerry, I tried to follow your post and found some
indicators of the meaning you apply to your words:
"Most of real world are statistical." 
In my terms (!) STATISTICAL means: to regard a limited
model and count the items we identify in our pattern
definition as 'similar' among the (closed?) number of
cases included in that model. Your sentence definitely
means YOUR 'reality' as restricted to such model. A
'natural system' (as I use RR's term) is unlimited and
refers to (my) reality, to which we have NO ACCESS but
to the accessible portion through the mind's (1st
person) interpretation, eo ipso a subjective
virtuality 
instead of "objective reality" we so proudly like to
say. Your "real world" is the model you identify. And
I believe this is what the 'big names' also had in
mind. 
(Pattee might have had an impredicative totality in
his mind...) What "reality" are YOU talking about?
*
Wittgenstein did not do Rosenesque modeling. 
">Philosophy shows
> us what is in common between reality and models.<
We (humanity I mean, over the past millennia) chose
"models" as cut-offs (topically, functionally, in any
boundarizable terms - "bad grammar"?<G>) from the
totality we perceived in our mind as interpreted from
the who-knows-what in nature's wholeness (reality?) -
the portion we accessed by our little feeble mind. 
That is 'in common'. Any better ideas? (Religions may
have).

John M
 


--- Jerry Zhu <***> wrote:

> John, I have some issues with the diagram also.
> 
> As Judith already mentioned earlier that causal laws
> alone only represent a narrow scope of reality or
> real
> world. Most of real world are statistical. As
> Pattee,
> Polanyi and others pointed dural control of living
> systems: matter aspects and symbol aspects. 
> Considering natural systems as under control of
> causal
> laws alone has ignored another half in most part of
> real worlds we are dealing with.  
> 
> A phiolosphicall issue in modeling, according to
> Wittgenstein, is that reality does not express
> itself
> by means of models brought to it, rather reality
> expresses itself through models by means of what is
> in
> common between the models and reality.  That what
> has
> common between models and reality can not be said in
> models (that is science and theory).  What can not
> be
> said can be shown.  Everything said in philosophy
> becomes part of science or theory.  Philosophy shows
> us what is in common between reality and models.
> Everyhing said in philosophy is a bad grammer.
> 
> Jerry
> 

>