Re: The notion of semantics in Rosen's writings

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Carlos,

I can see that I have been unclear on the encoding/decoding. My apologies.
Let me give some thought to this point before responding. My time is
unfortunately very limited during the week so it may be a day or two.
Perhaps Judith can clarify the situation before then. I just wanted to
respond now so you wouldn't think I had forgotten about you. :)

Regards,
Tim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Carlos
> Limarino
> Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2005 9:16 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: The notion of semantics in Rosen's writings
>
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
>
> > No, no. Again, encodings and decodings are the
> > *mappings*. What he is saying is that choosing how a
> physical observable
> > will *map* to a formal model (and thus also, the
> inverse mapping back to
> > the natural system), is our free choice.
>
> But you also wrote earlier:
>
> > Encoding is the mapping of a phenomenon (i.e.,an
> observable) in the
> > natural system to a counterpart in the formal
> system.This is associated with
> > the notion of measurement, where measuring some
> physical observable results
> > (typically) in a number, a formal thing.Decoding is
> the inverse operation, mapping a >formal entity to an
> observable in the natural system.
>
> If you call a number a 'formal entity', the idea of
> encoding is 'mapping a formal entity in the natural
> system' and viceversa. So, what is the difference
> between 'encoding' and just measurement? It is not
> very clear to me.  You wrote "What he is saying that
> choosing how a physical observable will *map* to a
> formal model, is our free choice", but Rosen says in
> "Syntatics and Semantics in Languages" that
> 'encodings' and 'decodings' manifest a 'free creation
> of the mind' (see my earlier message). In conclusion,
> "encodings is the *mapping*" is: a) Mapping a number
> to an observable entity in the natural system, b) the
> result of the usual, well-known activity of
> measurement in science or c) Choosing how a physical
> observable will *map* to a model. I need enlightening
> about this Rosennean notion.
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
>
> > 'Entailment structures' refer to the organization of
> entailments in
> > a system. In a formal system, entailments are the
> inferential relations;
> > in a natural system, entailments are the causal
> relations in a system. The
> > entailment structures are *mapped* across the
> modeling relation.
>
> I'm afraid I find the notion of 'entailment' very
> confusing in Rosen's writings. If you define the
> 'entailments' of a formal system as inferences and the
> 'entailments' of a natural system as causal relations,
> it would be very illustrative to me understand it by
> example: what are the 'encodings', 'mappings' and
> 'entailment structures' between and in Et=1/2m*v^2 and
> a rock if I want to calculate translational kinetic
> energy of it?
>
> Tim Gwinn wrote:
>
> >TG: A physical computer? Of course it is would be a
> natural system.
> >Where did I say it wasn't?
>
> That was a question for Judith Rosen.
>
> >This depends on how you define the system. If you
> define the system
> >as a single, solid, inelastic entity, then there are
> very few >observables to this
> >system, and it has little or no causal entailment
> structures.
> > If you define
> > the rock to include its sub-atomic interactions, its
> thermal
> > properties, etc., then there is alot of causal
> interactions going on > within the system. *How* you
> define the system is subjective in this > sense. The
> point is that there is no absolute "right" way to
> define > a given system.
>
> But it seems to me that if you're right, Rosen's
> notions of 'encoding' and 'decoding' are redundant if
> definition (c) is right: For what reason would we need
> to find a "congruence between inferential entailment
> and causal entailment" if 'causal entailment' depends
> in our definition of a system?
>
> >Ah, logical *connectives*. Ok, now I see. Your
> original question
> >was:
> >"Are the logical constants [connectives]of the formal
> language of a
> >formal
> >logic a candidate for "entailment structure"?"  Yes,
> logical
> >"implication"
> >is in fact just another name for "inferential
> entailment" (See LI p.
> >46).
>
> So, is Rosen suggesting that given the semantics of
> proposotional logic, the logical constants change if
> the propositions have a different truth value? (See my
> first message).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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