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Re: The notion of semantics in Rosen's writings
- From: John M <***>
- Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2005 10:38:14 -0700
Judith and Tim:
I always satisfied myself with Judith's opinion that
my English is insufficient (true!) and this is the
origin of my misunderstanding the terms. Carlos seems
to be from Argentina, - same problem. Then why are you
two, born Anglos disagreeing in how to represent some
terms?
Judith in the 1st par below illustrates perfectly the
reductionist ways of thinking: in the model (she?)
drew up about her grandparents, she recognized ONE
in-model reason for 'fears' and concluded that the
fears are baseless. In my wholistic (no-definite
one-causality) view I allow countless other
originating potentials for thegrandparents' attitude
and even if I find "that" one fear baseless, the
position they exposed may be valid. RR might have had
better reasons for disobeying. My father had similar
attitude about 'allowable' activity: he said, if in
doubt whether (authorities) will agree, ASSUME that
they will and DO what you wanted - IN GOOD FAITH. If
you were wrong? prove a pardonable error. (That was
against nazi - later commi authorities in business).
*
Tim's en/decoding into/from formal systems is hard to
follow: in any direction it is a reductionist model
activity: a map is a model, a territory a wider model.
About a cat or car as 'natural system'? (for that
matter: a computer?) (In my multilingual understanding
ONLY) the may turn into natural systems if we
transcend all limitations that may make it a cat, a
car, or a computer, combining them into the unlimited
(natural) interconnections. Any formalization
(=limiting into boundaries) modelifies them into
topical limitations.
Maximum model? that is a joke. Schrodinger tried an
impredicative cat- maybe - but an impredicative car?
To Carlos: you just formalized nicely the questions (I
believe) many of us may have in spite of having gotten
used to a vernacular which still remained "not too
clear". This is one reason why I keep urging a
"glossarizing" of the RR terms. (If it is humanly
possible?).
John Mikes
--- Judith Rosen <***> wrote:
> Yay, Tim!
>
> In your comment: "One of the common themes in
> Rosen's thinking is to
> remove unjustified a priori restrictions wherever
> they occur," you
> really nailed down clearly one of the most salient
> aspects of his
> approach to science (and everything else, really).
> In fact, I think
> this was just a part of his nature from very early
> childhood. Perhaps
> this is what comes from being a child prodigy who
> also happens to be
> the only child of two very ordinary immigrant
> parents-- who both had
> large immigrant families that each came to the US as
> a unit-- and who
> were both trying to assimilate. They really didn't
> know what to make
> of him. I'm sure they tried to cope with his active
> mind by trying to
> curb him and no doubt they issued warnings and
> edicts based on them...
> which he (no doubt) tested and found the warnings
> were groundless. If
> "P, then Q" works in the negative, too! "If not P,
> then not Q" can be
> turned into a new encoding: "If the warnings are
> groundless, then the
> parental edicts are baseless."
>
> He said he figured out very young that it was better
> not to ask
> permission to do something he wanted to do; it was
> better to just do
> it. If you ask for permission, and it is withheld
> based on
> inapplicable fears (which they would never
> concede)... then you have
> two choices: you can either accept their decision,
> which doesn't seem
> fair... or you can do what you wanted to do anyway.
> But once you have
> asked permission, if you go against a parental
> edict, you have
> committed a much more serious sin! You are
> insubordinate! Off with
> your head! If you just do it, without asking
> permission, they may get
> mad after the fact, but then you just apologize and
> that tends to
> settle everyone down.
>
> In using this approach with science, though, he
> didn't apologize.
> Probably because he considered everybody in that
> milieu as equals and
> therefore he owed no fealty or familial respect to
> people who were
> trying to rein him in based on their own fears. I
> would say that the
> only person he paid a great deal of familial respect
> to was Rashevsky
> (his PhD advisor/mentor). In many ways, Rashevsky
> was the father he
> never really had.
>
> Judith
> PS: Incidentally, I confess that I have often been
> irked by the
> numerous times, in my father's published work, where
> he gave far more
> credit to Rashevsky than was actually warranted. I
> questioned him
> about this, once, and he said that since Rashevsky
> had arrived at a
> similar conclusion (that whatever scientific law was
> not applicable),
> prior to Dad being in Chicago, so he felt that
> Rashevsky deserved the
> credit for the insight. My argument was; "Yeah, but
> Dad... YOU not
> only arrived at the insight on your own, but you
> developed it. Why are
> you giving HIM all the credit for it?" He just
> shrugged and couldn't
> really give me an answer that made sense to me
> beyond that it was his
> own sense of duty and ethics (and sentimentality, in
> my view). Dad
> actually loved "the old man" as he called Rashevsky.
> And Rashevsky was
> shafted, big time, when Lewontin came to Chicago,
> etc. I think my
> father always felt he had kind of left Rashevsky
> unprotected, by
> moving on to Buffalo to pursue his own career.
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Tim Gwinn
> To: ***
> Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2005 8:54 AM
> Subject: Re: [ROSEN] The notion of semantics in
> Rosen's writings
>
>
> Carlos,
>
> I know Judith has already replied, but sometimes
> multiple replies
> are
> helpful. :)
>
> > The first problem I have is with the definition
> of
> > 'encoding' and 'decoding'. Rosen defines in the
> book
> > Life Itself encoding and decoding as the
> 'translation'
> > between 'formalisms'. I understand this as the
> idea of
> > translating well-formed formulas given in a
> formal
> > language to well-formed formulas of another
> formal
> > language. But, what is 'encoding' and 'decoding'
> > between a formal language and a 'natural
> system'?
>
>
> TG: Encoding is the mapping of a phenomenon (i.e.,
> an observable) in
> the
> natural system to a counterpart in the formal
> system.This is
> associated with
> the notion of measurement, where measuring some
> physical observable
> results
> (typically) in a number, a formal thing.
> Decoding is the inverse operation, mapping a
> formal entity to an
> observable
> in the natural system. This is associated with the
> notion of
> prediction,
> whereby we use results from a formal model to
> predict what some
> value of
> some observable would be if we were to measure it.
>
> So, for example, if we measure the current in a
> physical electrical
> circuit,
> we are encoding that observable into a number,
> such as "10 amps". If
> we then
> use our model of electrical circuits, we can say
> that "if we double
> the
> resistance in the circuit, the current should be
> cut in half to 5
> amps,
> according to our model". This is decoding the
> formal results back to
> the
> physical system - making a prediction about it
> based upon our model.
>
> There are much more extensive descriptions of the
> modelling relation
> in the
> earlier books "Anticipatory Systems" and
> "Fundamentals of
> Measurement".
>
>
>
> > Also, is not very clear to me what qualifies as
> a
> > 'natural system', since Rosen defines them as
> systems
> > "in the ambience or external world".
>
>
> TG: A natural system is simply a collection of
> observables from the
> world
> outside of us. A 'car' or a 'cat' or a 'proton' is
> a natural system,
> comprised of the observables we have chosen to
> consider as belonging
> to that
> system. Again, the books AS and FM go into much
> more detail.
>
>
> > I can't
> > understand Rosen's point very well, so I'd
> pleased to
> > know in what exact sense" the entailment
> structure
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