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Re: The "Relational Complexity" Reference Library of Dr. Robert Rosen...



Judith,
 
In my view, Reichenbach is either using an exceptionally narrow definition of 'causality' here and in doing so he is mixing two points. One being the "principle of causality" as "a principle a priori", and the other being the behavior associated with that principle. With the introduction of QM, the underlying principle of causality remains, and QM in its mathematical formulation is law-like, followed strictly, each and every time. That the function describing the behavior of what happens every time an effect follows from a cause in QM has a probabilistic formulation does not thereby make the principle itself haphazard or probabilistic, much less void the principle of causality.
 
Regards,
Tim
 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:***On Behalf Of Judith Rosen
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 2:45 PM
To: ***
Subject: The "Relational Complexity" Reference Library of Dr. Robert Rosen...

I thought the list might be interested in the following:

I've begun (finally) the massive task of sorting, inventorying, inspecting, and repacking my father's reference library (which I am planning to donate to a university, although I haven't chosen one yet-- VCU has been hemming and hawing over one of my stipulations-- that the collection must remain intact for 50 years or be returned to my keeping; no mixing it all in with the rest of the library inventory-- which I insist on because I think there is information in the collection, itself. So, all options are open as far as I'm concerned, until I sign something). There are all sorts of gems in there; sometimes it's a book (there's a Japanese language version of one of Dad's books, and I actually can't tell which book it is! Anyone here read Japanese? It's got a 1971 publication date on it, so it is too early to be AS or FM). Sometimes, it's a discovery on my part of one of Dad's papers published in someone else's book. Other times, it's Dad's notations marking up a book-- which can be frankly hilarious on occasion-- especially if he was expressing honest irritation. But sometimes there are amazing moments; finding, in his notation and underlining, past moments where he was putting together some of the important pieces...
One such book is titled "Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics" by Hans Reichenbach. I wouldn't have thought this book would be of interest to me, but it had all this underlining and scribbled notes in it, so I started reading it. There are aspects in it that are right on target for discussions on the list in the past couple months. For example, here are a few excerpts (with Dad's underlining), starting on Page 1:
 
"The philosophical problems of quantum mechanics are centered around two main issues. The first concerns the transition from causal laws to probability laws; the second concerns the interpretation of unobserved objects. We begin with the discussion of the first issue...
 
The question of replacing causal laws by statistical laws made it appearance in the history of physics long before the times of the theory of quanta. Since the time of Boltzmann's great discovery which revealed the second principle of thermodynamics to be a statistical instead of a causal law, the opinion has been repeated uttered that a similar fate may meet all other physical laws. The idea of determinism, i.e., of strict causal laws governing the elementary phenomena of nature, was recognized as an extrapolation inferred from he causal regularities of the macrocosm. The validity of this extrapolation was questioned as soon as it turned out that macrocosmic regularity is equally compatible with irregularity in the microcosmic domain, since the law of great numbers will transform the probability character of the elementary phenomena into the practical certainty of statistical laws. Observations in the macrocosmic domain will never furnish any evidence for causality of atomic occurrences so long as only effects of great numbers of atomic particles are considered. This was the result of unprejudiced philosophical analysis of the physics of Boltzmann.
 
With this result a decision of the question was postponed until it was possible to observe macrocosmic effects of individual atomic phenomena. Even with the use of observations of this kind, however, the question is not easily answered, but requires the development of a more profound logical analysis.
 
Whenever we speak of strictly causal laws we assume them to hold between idealized physical states; and we know that the actual physical states never correspond exactly to the conditions assumed for the laws. This discrepancy has often been disregarded as irrelevant, as being due to the imperfection of the experimenter and therefore negligible in a statement about causality as a property of nature. With such an attitude, however, the way to a solution of the problem of causality is barred. Statements about the physical world have meaning only so far as they are connected with verifiable results; and a statement about strict causality must be translatable into a statements about observable relations if it is to have a utilizable meaning.
 
The statement that nature is governed by strict causal laws means that we can predict the future with a determinate probability and that we can push this probability as close to certainty as we want by using a sufficiently elaborate analysis of the phenomena under consideration.
 
With this formulation the principle of causality is stripped of its disguise as a principle a priori, in which it has been presented within many a philosophical system. If causality is stated as a limit of probability implications, it is clear that this principle can be maintained only in the sense of an empirical hypothesis. There is, logically, no need for saying that the probability of predictions can be can be made to approach certainty by the introduction of more and more parameters. In this form the possibility of a limit of predictability was recognized even before quantum mechanics led to the assertion of such a limit."
 
I've never heard it said that some of the laws of physics are not causal in nature but probablistic/statistical. This book was published in 1944! >From what I've seen of the resistance to my father's work on relational causality and his far less incendiary description of the scientific "laws" derived from Physics, it seems like questioning the applicability of laws of physics to causality is almost a lynching offense.
 
Judith