glen e. p. ropella writes:At least in B&M, there is an attempt to treat circularity, in general, referring to mathematical efficacy and modeling as well as logic and philosophy. In particular, that proposition 2.6 seems to treat several kinds of circularity. (I emphasize "seems".)
Non-well-founded set theory is useful in modeling non-well-founded structures and phenomena.
In any case, knowing when cycles of these types should and should not be prevented by underlying assumptions is important, regardless of what terms we use to refer to them. So, we don't have to refer to the whole set as "impredicativities" (even though I still believe that they all satisfy Torkels' definition of "impredicativity as used in logic and philosophy").
It's unclear to me what it is you believe. Using AFA we prove the existence of a unique set a such that a={a}. What impredicative definition do you associate with this set?
In the other direction, do you associate some non-well-founded structure with the impredicative comprehension principle I stated earlier?
That's hilarious! Have you actually seen that used?
No, I introduced it as an analogy.
http://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers.html
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