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Re: Von Neumann vs. Robert Rosen

Judith Rosen wrote:
OK; that's close to one of the options I came up with for the initials... Which two books have you read?

Life Itself and Fundamentals of Meas. and Rep. of Natural Systems.

GR: Let me paraphrase you to be sure I understand.

A paraphrase of a paraphrase... I think we're in danger, here... 

Naaaa.  They're just words. Paraphrasing is an inherent part of
listening.  If someone can't repeat back to you what you said in their
own words, then they didn't really understand what you said.  Like
below, my incompentent paraphrase of you demonstrates quite nicely that
I didn't understand you.

Complexity is not binary, unless you accept Von Neumann's definition of it (which RR referred to as "complicatedness"). This actually isn't a side issue, it's the main issue. 

I haven't read a large percentage of vN's work, at least not read it
closely; but, it sounds wrong to me that vN's definition of complexity
implies that complexity is binary.  Both vN and RR seem to suggest to me
that complexity is a spectrum (though not necessarily a continuum).

And although I don't think the -arity of complexity the main issue, you
seem to think it is.  So, let me ask as clear a question as I can that
relates to the -arity of complexity...

For those of you who see a clear distinction between machines and
organisms due to a dichotomy (perceptive or existential) between simple
and complex systems, _how_ do you relate the two disjoint properties of
complexity and simplicity to objects you run across in the real world?

For those of you who see a clear distinction between machines and
organisms due to a scalar degree of complexity, _how_ do you measure (or
experience in the case of qualitative distinction) a real object's
complexity?


are self-referential. Even car engines are self-referential. In a sense, what organisms are is self-entailing and environmentally-referential. 

OK.  I understand this part, I think.  "Self-entailment", in the way
you're using it, sounds similar to the ethic that "organisms are _ends_
in themselves, not merely means to some ends".

So, what you're suggesting is a possible answer to my question.  You
might be saying (again, I'm paraphrasing in an attempt to give you
feedback as to whether I understand you or not) that your qualitative
measure that distinguishes a machine from an organism is as follows:

If an object that you run across in the real world is (or can be thought
of as) an _end_ in itself, then it is an organism.  If an object always
is (or always appears to be) simply a means to some other end (a tool, a
slave, etc.), then it is not an organism.  (It might be a machine, but
there are other requirements for a machine that are unrelated to it
being autotelic.)

That would be a pretty damn good answer to my question.  _If_ that's
what you're saying. [grin]

As for concreteness... I'm not sure I understand your definitions. Does that mean "material form"? How is a progression from "abstract" to "detailed concrete" invoked by what I said? 

Sorry.  I want to stay on point and avoid digressions.  But, to clarify
in case I use the words again, by "concrete", I mean: "Of or relating to
an actual, specific thing or instance; particular".  By "abstract", I
mean: "Considered apart from concrete existence: an abstract concept;
not applied or practical; theoretical".  And by "detail", I mean: "An
individual part or item; a particular; particulars considered
individually and in relation to a whole".

So, I often use concrete as an antonym of abstract.  And concrete things
have details whereas abstract things lack detail.

don't contradict one another in the slightest. I don't believe it can
be paraphrased as you put it, though. I am not a mechanical engineer
(although I'm married to one!) but I think I could probably design and build a machine, all by myself, that would satisfy every aspect you put in your attempted paraphrase. It wouldn't be an organism, that's for sure. 

OK.  So, I failed to adequately paraphrase you. [grin]  That's cool.  It
helps me know that I inferred you wrongly.

However, this brings up some interesting concepts. For example;
how does one build an ontology? And I'm curious as to how you define
"evolution"?

The most common attempts to build (or attempts to build... I actually doubt that it's possible) an ontology with formal systems. The idea is Hilbertian. You try to define a consistent and complete set of dynamics, a set of atomic building blocks, fire things off and let them run.

Now, before people run off citing Goedel or Tarski, note that I would not consider the above _method_ (define dynamics, a set of atomic building blocks, etc.) limited to formal systems. I believe kinetic artists and roboticists do this sort of thing all the time. Robots, in particular, are built such that some of the detail in reality matters and some of it doesn't. (Using our immensely powerful tool of analytic calculus to winnow the abundant detail of reality.)

Evolution means: "change over time".

contemporary laws of physics, that's all. Because he used that as his
basis, and because he suggested that it was possible to cross a threshold from simplicity to complexity by accretion,

Excellent!! This is the citation I'm looking for! Can you point me to some places where vN said or implied that one could cross over a threshold from simplicity to complexity by accretion?

GR: He would have been better served doing more engineering work with
concrete materials (like our current gene-o-philes ;-). It wasn't concreteness or detail that gave him his growth and evolution of complexity. It was the structure and dynamics (organization) of the machine that presents the meat of his work in that area. (at least from what I know of it)

Question: Did Von Neumann ever actually attempt to build these self-reproducing automata? Or was it that he merely suggested that it
should be theoretically possible. Secondly, I still don't see what concreteness and detail have to do with one another.

To the best of my knowledge, vN was a theoretician just like your dad. So, I doubt that he tried to construct the devices out of physical material. But, hell, the guy was so productive, it wouldn't surprise me if he did try. My self-esteem always drops a notch when I study people like vN and Penrose. [sigh]

Anyway, I raised the point about detail because, when dealing with machines in the real world (like car engines), you can build formal systems to describe them, some of which exhibit complex (plaited) causality and some of which don't. My original claim was that in order for a formal system that describes car engines to be practically useful, it must be capable of expressing complex causality. In that sense, complexity is _not_ an adequate classifier for distinguishing machine from organism.

GR: And by complexity here, I mean, self-referential, causally looped, iterative, nonlinear properties.

This is not the same definition for complexity that we are working from, I have to point that out.

Right. And that's important. The word "complexity" is victim of whole armies of neologism-mongers and hyper-speciation. I like to use it in its broadest meaning, starting with: "Consisting of interconnected or interwoven parts; composite; composed of two or more units".

Along those lines, perhaps this list is too specific to RR's universe for this conversation? I'm coming to the conclusion that my question is inappropriate for this forum.

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glen e. p. ropella              =><=                Hail Eris!
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