|
I've got 2 cents to add to this (what a
surprise!)...
Glen R. wrote:
So, in order for a formal system to be expressive enough to capture
_some_ phenomena, it has to reach a certain level of fine granularity. And my suggestion a couple of rounds back in the conversation was that _any_ formal system that is rich enough to express _both_ the coarse-grained phenomena (like ideal combustion, ideal camshafts, etc) _and_ fine-grained phenomena like "pinging" will be a _complex_ formal system because it will need to describe complex physical phenomena. You're not talking about a car engine anymore, you're talking about
a car engine-- in a car, being used to perform a function (for which it was
created by human beings), and interacting with the rest of the universe. It's a
complex universe. As soon as you move away from discussing the organizational
aspects of the engine, itself, you are into different territory.
GR: So, what all the above rambling is about is not _just_ the Rosennean
focus on itra- and inter-formalism gymnastics; but, it's about practical requirements for formal systems in engineering and even science to some extent. (The thread was started by suggesting that the fabrication of an organism by putting genes together like Legos, after all. Didn't I say Venter wasn't fabricating an organism by
doing that?
GR: So, what
I'd like clarification from Rosenneans out there has to do, fundamentally, with how we map all the platonic gymnastics in this mathematical/logical world to the world we experience directly with our sensors and effectors.) I am asking for how the inference
methods RR developed will help me use the formal systems called "machines" to study extant objects. What, specifically, are you wanting to do?
Judith |