Re: Some thoughts on the Modelling Relation

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Hi Dan,

DF:
> I have started to read semiotics and that is good
> for a parallel universe perspective. They have a
> field or approach there called modeling systems
> theory. They also talk of semiotics as modeling
> and systems of meaning. Also of three major types
> of modeling/semiotics/meaning - phyto-, zoo- and
> anthro-semiotics. If these are three different
> instantiations or realization of modeling relations,
> does this help answer your question(s)?


TG: I preface my remarks by saying that I don't hold a favorable view of
semiotics as being useful, or perhaps, even very meaningful. This is just my
own tentative view from my prior reading about it via the web and in Pierce.

If - for the sake of discussion - these three types you mention are indeed
instantiations of modelling relations, then it seems to me we are still
talking about modelling relations as the generality and not something more
generic than modelling relations.

I'd like to hear how these three types are, in fact, instances of modelling
relations. This would go a long way toward bridging these two fields. From
my understanding, though, the partitioning of the aspects of communication
in semiotics is not consistent with that in modelling relation.


DF:
> I forgot to mention that phyto-semiotics (plants),
> zoosemiotics (animals) and anthro-semiotics (humans)
> are not only different modeling systems and systems
> of meaning, but the semiotics folks also talk of
> them as being hard if not possible to bridge between,
> that communication between these realms is near
> impossible because they are so different.


TG:I don't know their reasoning in semiotics, but in the Rosennean paradigm
it is readily apparent that there would generally be no obvious or expected
mappings between the pairs of encodings/decodings of the intrinsic modelling
relations possessed by different systems (i.e., different organisms).


>They talk
> of some inter-species communication between humans
> and chimps/apes, and the link between and anthro-
> and zoo-semiotics seems near bridgable. But imagine
> the gap between human and plant systems of meaning
> and trying to communicate across that gap? I don't
> think the difficulty of this thought experiment
> means that plants don't have intelligence at all,
> rather that the type, form or formalism of that
> plant intelligence is vastly different.


TG: There is the question of what "intelligence" and "systems of meaning"
and "communicate" means, in both (people and plant) cases. Is it meaningful
to say that a plant can "communicate"? It gets tricky when we take the words
applied to humans and apply them elsewhere. I can say my house
"communicates" with me when it creaks; it "tells" me where the loose board
is. Obviously, in this case I mean this metaphorically. Its obvious because
a house is not a biological organism. But is the human term "communicate" a
term applicable - with the same meaning - to all living things? And if it
means something different in each case, then we probably ought not be
calling it "communicate" lest we mislead ourselves. The question in my mind
is how readily and literally can we apply these terms outside of their
normal usage, and what is our justification in doing so in each case?


> So different
> that it might be a link to say that Natural Law in
> the two realms is different also.

TG: What does "realm" mean here? All Natural Law says is that 1) causal
entailment exist in the natural world and 2) we can at least somewhat
cognize them. Plants and people are part of the same physical "realm", the
same natural world.

Regards,
Tim