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Tim Gwinn wrote: one cannot reliably argue backwards from
behavior (effects) to causes.[EL p. 123] The former does not entail the latter.
Tim you're getting into quicksand, here. My father did not say this
the way you are representing it. All of science argues backwards from effects to
causes. The problem is that such an argument is a linear _expression_ and a linear
view. That is precisely what limits "causality" as a subject for study. The
underlying entailment relations don't follow this linear, timebound form and
are, therefore, more comprehensive.
Judith
----- Original Message ----- From: Tim Gwinn To: *** Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 10:29 PM Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Causality vs Entailment Hi Steve, I think one general point about mimesis Rosen makes is that And an accretion of behaviors does generically entail a particular accretion of causes. Analytic models are not generically the inverse of synthetic models. Thus to create something which mimics the behavior of some original system does not entail that the mimic therefore has the same underlying causal entailment organization - it's causal basis - as the original system. So mimetic approaches will generically result in a lack of synonymy of entailment structures between the two systems. With respect to simulations, there is again the problem that that there is a lack of synonymy of entailment structures between the original system and a simulation of it. In a simulation, all the entailment structures are collapsed into material cause (i.e., software program) to a simulator (i.e., hardware). Additionally, the simulator does not decode into anything in the original system: it is entirely extraneous to the original system yet entirely integral on the simulation side. In both cases, I feel the term 'entailment' is used consistent with the way he uses the term elsewhere. Regards, Tim |