Re: Causality vs Entailment

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Hi Steve,

I think one general point about mimesis Rosen makes is that one cannot
reliably argue backwards from behavior (effects) to causes.[EL p. 123] The
former does not entail the latter. And an accretion of behaviors does
generically entail a particular accretion of causes. Analytic models are not
generically  the inverse of synthetic models. Thus to create something which
mimics the behavior of some original system does not entail that the mimic
therefore has the same underlying causal entailment organization - it's
causal basis - as the original system. So mimetic approaches will
generically result in a lack of synonymy of entailment structures between
the two systems.

With respect to simulations, there is again the problem that that there is a
lack of synonymy of entailment structures between the original system and a
simulation of it. In a simulation, all the entailment structures are
collapsed into material cause (i.e., software program) to a simulator (i.e.,
hardware). Additionally, the simulator does not decode into anything in the
original system: it is entirely extraneous to the original system yet
entirely integral on the simulation side.

In both cases, I feel the term 'entailment' is used consistent with the way
he uses the term elsewhere.

Regards,
Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Steve
> Johnson
> Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 12:51 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Causality vs Entailment
>
>
> As I mentioned many times here I think RR uses the
> word entailment in a couple of different ways. When he
> says "causal entailments" he usually refers to a "a
> certain relationsips between events". It is in this
> sense that he talks about two types of entailments:
> causal and inferential. Causal entailments are certain
> relationship between observables of events and
> inferential entailments are certain relationships
> between propositions.
>
> However, in many other cases he talks of entailments
> as potential hidden within system. This sense of
> entailment is similar to the way he sometimes uses the
> phrase "causal bases". In ELI Chapter on Mimesis he
> remarks that the causal bases of a mimic are not
> equivalent to the causal bases of the system that it
> mimicks. As far as I can tell in this sense the
> entailment means the entailment among the parts of the
> system that gives rise to "new parts", new functional
> components that have their own behavioral
> manifestations.
>
> I think this sense is most strongly felt when he
> discusses why a computer simulation can never be
> identical with the "real thing". He says it is because
> the entailments of the natural system are not present
> in the simulation. In this context it does not make
> sense to interpret entailment in the same way as
> "relationship between observables of events".
>
> I'm quoting from memory so I apologize in advance if I
> misinterpreted anything.
>
>
> - Steve