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Re: Causality vs. Entailment



JohnM,
See interposed.
Regards,
Tim
 
-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:***On Behalf Of John M
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 10:49 PM
To: ***
Subject: Re: Causality vs. Entailment

Tim:
to your two posts of today:
----- Original Message -----
From: Tim Gwinn
To: ***
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 9:01 AM (1)
and
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 6:55 PM (2)
Subject: Re: Causality vs. Entailment
you have a way with words, I read them several times and they still don't come up with an easily understandable content in my mind.
 
TG: If you think it was hard to read...just imagine how hard it was for me to write! <g>
 
You combine causality with entailment. 
 
TG: Not quite combine...but they are intimately related. I see entailments as required to be embedded in a realm of either causal or inferential relations. Its kind of like if you have vectors, they are embedded in some vector space; if you remove the underlying vector space then you no longer have vectors, you just have a bunch of arrows. Similarly, with entailment if you remove the necessity supplied by the underlying realm of either causal or inferential relations, then the 'necessary consequence' relation in entailment falls apart.
 
 
  According to my didactically learned English, causality is the process of the origination of events/effects in a deterministic way, usually done within a model where we formally identify 'a cause' which points to the starting point.  
 
TG: I take a somewhat more general view that 'causality' is the set of necessary relations which occur in the external world. Its vague, but it leaves open the full range of possibilities for how 'cause' might work in the external world. Phrases like "starting point" can, in my view, lead to causality being unduly cast in temporal terms and/or in linear-chain terms. I think this is also why Rosen formulated his Natural Law without specifying the details of these (causal) relations, instead just specifying that "the ambience is not entirely arbitrary or whimsical; there are relations (e.g., causal relations) manifest in the world of phenomena)" [LI p. 58].
 
Entailment, however, - the word - is a 'tail-end', the consequential termination of the happening,  - which makes it comparable to 'effect', 'outcome', 'result', not the origination of the process or the happening.  
 
TG: For me, 'entailment' indicates the whole relation, not just the "consequential termination".
 
So I see two distinct concepts (both within 'causality' as shown below):
 
1. defined cause(s) - then the happening  -  coming to an effect (outcome)     and
2. the deterministic unlimited natural system's change -  leading to necessary entailments -( may  we know all that is to a/effectuate it or not). I believe it is a futile distinction which of the two is more comprehensive, 'a cause' is a limited formal model-identified reductionistic item, the deterministic nature is an unlimited totality. Yet the entailments may well be fewer, or scimpier than what can be assigned to "cause" becuase of interfering obstacles we may not consider in the 'causal' model.
 
RR used (maybe) preferably "entailment" - 2500 years after Aristotle. Just think about the epistemic enrichment passing through the religious eras, Descartes' dualism, Spinoza's pantheism, the materialists, Bogdanov's first complexity, Bertalanffy's systems, Kohler's gestalt, Bohm's implicate order, Godel's limited access to knowledge bases, Popper's impossibility of proof, Kuhn's paradigm, all the way to a position of his 'complexity (I believe parallel to my wholistic worldview). Because of the still conventional academia he had to make his explanations compatible with the Aristotelian arguments in public (writing). There was nothing else acceptable if he did not want to be cut off from the audience he wanted to reach. It is easy today with the internet, even a decade ago things were much stiffer.
 
One more thing:
I don't feel a 'time factor' as generally includable: in asking about a simple cause "Why did you say so?" and the answer "because I think that's the truth" has no time aspect. Looking for cause in a mechanistical sequence does imply time, but not in the nature of the 'cause', rather by the nature of the process. It fades away clearly in wider-scoped pointing to (necessary) entailments.
 
TG: Agree re time.
 
Tim, when you wrote:
"As I see it, entailment is meaningful only as it occurs in either inferential or causal structures." - I felt you call the fundamentally deterministic nature "causal",
which is OK, except when we differentiate limited model cause and wholistic entailment.
In an interconnected (inter-influencing) nature everything is deterministic = causal, as in "originated by changes". You supported this iunderstanding:
"Causality in my view is the entire locus of necessary (i.e., causal) relations between phenomena in the external world, ..."
provided that we accept your causality  as the concept of the deterministic connections. You empowered such acceptance pointing to an 'entire locus'. The punctum saliens is the reductionistic modeling, a "cause" - used unfortunately by the same word.
 
John Mikes