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Judith,
Hmm, after
going back and re-reading your comments on Ayten's post, I think we
fundamentally disagree. You said:
Entailment describes relations, including potential, in
totality. Causality describes what happens. In this way, causality
can be seen as a subset of the total entailment potential of systems and
can be used to try to learn about the entailment relations within system
organizations. It is entailment that Robert Rosen was most seeking to
understand because it would include causality (and inference, as well--
which describes the version of entailment expressed in
modeling/simulations) within it. Entailment is the more comprehensive
category.
As I see
it, entailment is meaningful only as it occurs in either
inferential or causal structures. If entailment is, as in the OED, "To bring
on by way of necessary consequence", then this presupposes and requires that
entailments can only occur where there exists systems of necessary
relations by which "necessary consequences" can be formed.
Entailment is thus not a more comprehensive category, but
instead more like an organizational property occurring in a realm with
necessary relations. Nor does causality just describe "what happens".
Causality in my view is the entire locus of necessary (i.e.,
causal) relations between phenomena in the external world, whether a particular
incident has occurred yet or not. Likewise, inference is not merely a
description of what happens in the formal world, but is instead the
entire locus of necessary relations between formal entities, whether a
particular inferential relation has been calculated yet or not.
We can establish synonymies between these two modes of
entailment, but I argue that it is not possible to abstract entailments away
from these modes. This would be attempting to abstract the
organization of necessary consequential structures away from the system of
necessary relations (causal or inferential) which makes it work. We can analyze
(e.g., Aristotelian analysis) either of these causal or inferential entailment
structures, but that does not abstract entailment away from the mode
being analyzed:
"Indeed,
inferential entailment (between propositions) and causal entailments (between
external events) are the only two modes of entailment we know about. We can in
fact deal with both of them in exactly parallel Aristotelian terms, by
asking why." [EL p. 89]
Where you
say below:
In other words, the
behaviors we observe are "causality" but the entailment relations created by
the organization are what drive causality.
But either
these "entailment relations" are causal entailments or they are inferential
entailments. Otherwise, this posits some third kind of entailment mode, which
conflicts with the quote from Essays above. If it is a material system, then
these must be causal entailments.
Where you
say below:
JR: I would agree with that, but
at the same time, it will always be the case that there are far more
entailments than what are being illustrated causally.
I would say in
reply:
If there are indeed far
more entailments than what are being illustrated causally, this tells us that
our current formulations of causality are highly
inadequate.
This is what I
meant by:
Tim G. wrote: And that if there are perceived
to exist entailments which exceed a particular representation of
causality, then it is the representation(s) of causality which need to be
expanded/revised so that such entailments can be accounted for in causal
terms.
As you say, we
import causal entailments into formal counterparts, to ask "why?" of them.
The formalisms of these formal counterparts are what I called "the
representation(s) of causality" in the above quote. I think we can
study entailments only as they occur in either causal realms or inferential
realms. I do not think that we ever study (or
ever can study) entailments divorced from these realms.
The reason I focused on
causality (as opposed to inference) is that I agree with Rosen that
processes in the external world is the realm of effective processes[EL
p. 160], and thus, entailments in the causal realm are the place to
look to determine the adequacy (or not) of our current formal
representations of causality, and thus more importantly, the adequacy of our
formal representations of entailments therein and generally.
Regards,
Tim
Tim Gwinn wrote:
I view causality as the means by which entailments occur in the external
world.
I would agree with that, but at the same time, it will always be
the case that there are far more entailments than what are being illustrated
causally. One of the purposes of conducting behavioral experiments, for
example, is to try and trigger causal "episodes" so that we can try
to get a glimpse into the entailment relations which make such
episodes happen (to "cause" the episodes).
Tim G. wrote:
And that if there are perceived to exist entailments which exceed a
particular representation of causality, then it is the representation(s) of
causality which need to be expanded/revised so that such entailments can be
accounted for in causal terms.
So this seems not quite accurate.
Our models are built with inferential entailments which are intended to mirror
the causal entailments of the real system we are modeling. In other words, the
behaviors we observe are "causality" but the entailment relations created by
the organization are what drive causality.
I think part of the confusion may
have to do with the different uses of the word "cause". Aristotelian analysis
is based on the four categories of "causation" which can actually be viewed as
entailment, rather than "causality". Inferential entailment is the entailment
which drives the inferences we can make in a modeling situation and causal
entailment is the entailment which drives causality.
So, to reword (my additions in
brackets) your assessment of Aristotelian analysis:
Tim wrote: So, for example, Aristotelian [analysis of]
causa[tion] offers temporal simultaneity of causal
[entailment] factors unlike a linear, chain-like, view of
[the sources and flow of] causality, and
Aristotelian [analysis] offers [explanations
for] causal potential in the category of final cause
[/causation].
I would equate entailment in a system with what you called
"causal potential".
Tim wrote: But
the Aristotelian picture falls short in other ways, and so seems to me to lead
to the opportunity to create yet more comprehensive formalisms of
causality.
I agree. I think my father would also. In fact, I believe his
work is an attempt, on multiple fronts, to begin doing exactly that; with one
little change to your wording... On page 10 of Life, Itself:
Robert Rosen wrote: "There is, as yet,
no comprehensive investigation of the ideas I have sketched in the course of
the discussion above; they are too new. But it seems that such ideas, or ideas
like them, are necessary in many ways. I would in particular draw attention to
the way such ideas ultimately rest on entailment alone, on systems of
entailment in the material world (causal entailment) and in the world of
formalisms or mathematics (inferential entailment), and on comparisons or
congruences between such entailment systems. I have come to believe that the
concept of entailment provides a reliable anchorage for the scientific
enterprise itself, and I accordingly recommend it to your
attention."
Judith
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, February 14, 2005 9:01
AM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Causality vs.
Entailment
Regards,
Tim
Ayten's notion of entailment is accurate in depicting
entailment as sort of a form of "causal potential" although there is
more here than this. All causality is just a tiny fraction of the total
potential entailed by systems and their interactions. Entailment is also
independent of time or directionality, in that separate things
(parts, components, stages, interactivity, etc) can
both entail/be-entailed-by one another in totality, but not
necessarily directly or specifically (like the chicken and the
egg). Causality is dependent on time flow, among other things, where
entailment is not.
Entailment describes relations, including potential, in
totality. Causality describes what happens. In this way,
causality can be seen as a subset of the total entailment potential of
systems and can be used to try to learn about the entailment
relations within system organizations. It is entailment that Robert
Rosen was most seeking to understand because it would include causality
(and inference, as well-- which describes the version of entailment
expressed in modeling/simulations) within it. Entailment is the more
comprehensive category.
It's sort of like a situation where your pet dog reacts
to some new stimulus in ways you've never seen it behave
before. Extreme heat, extreme cold, earthquake, weather, whatever...
The entailment was always present, but this is the first causal
example.
There have been cases of organisms that were thought to be
fully understood, only to have it suddenly become manifest that what we've
seen is only a very long larval stage and the organism undergoes a sudden
metamorphosis to reach some new stage (which we presume is the adult). The
Axolotl, of Mexico, was one such organism. It developed the capability of
breeding while still in its larval stage, a fairly well-known phenomenon
(neotony). In this case, the lakes where this salamander species lived was
at very high altitude. When taken to lower altitudes, the axolotls began
to metamorphose into a fairly ordinary salamander species.
My father was fascinated by the axolotl because he said it
had far more biological capability in its larval stage, which it lost when
it metamorphosed. For example, in the larval stage it can breathe air or
use its gills in an aquatic environment. It can completely regenerate an
entire limb if cut off. In its natural environment, the axolotl never
actually fulfills its entailed metamorphosis from larval stage to adult
stage, living its entire life in the larval stage. Thus, entailment and
causality diverge in the same species.
My father actually wrote a fictional short story based on
this phenomenon, entitled "What Really Happened To Jeff" or something like
that, where the main character is a college student whose roommate was
experimenting on axolotls and developed a theory that our current human
form may just be a case of arrested development in the larval
stage. He figured out how to trigger it and disappeared without a trace
with no clues as to what could have happened to him (except for
the dessicated sea squirt found lying on the floor of the
lab...).
Entailment is what is responsible for side effects; the so
called "hidden variables" or unknown relations within a system being
studied.
Judith
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