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Re: Empirics and Life



Howard Pattee wrote: I think our discussion of objectivity is veering away from Rosen's ideas of modeling life.

 
Not at all. In fact, this is very much at the heart of what he was wrestling with and I'm attempting to persuade you to change your mind-set. If you want to understand the kind of modeling he was suggesting, you have to abandon certain traditional patterns of thinking. It's an issue of perspective, really. The kind of "objectivity" you are describing (from Physics, which then pervades all of science) is derived from certain basic assumptions, and models of the universe that were constructed from those assumptions. His discovery was that those assumptions and models apply to only a very small ("special") group of system types; those with "simple" (non-complex) organization-- Systems that are approximately "the sum of their parts". As you know, he came to the conclusion that most systems we know of in the universe are not of that organization type. So, what is considered "the general science" really isn't general. And, what initially seemed to set biological systems apart from others turns out to be due to aspects which are actually the general case-- systems where the relational causality conferred upon the system by its organization is what makes such systems "more than the sum of their parts". The pursuit of the type of "objectivity" you have described is a part of the problem in science and it's no surprise that it was generated from the same assumptions as the models and the approach. It's also somewhat schizophrenic because, as I've tried to illustrate, they are trying to subtract by adding more of what they're trying to subtract...
 
From page 35 of "Life, Itself":
Robert Rosen wrote: "To assess the "level of generality" of contemporary physics, or indeed of any other scientific or mathematical discipline, in any kind of absolute terms is an extremely difficult thing. It raises in fact a metatheoretic question; a question about the theory, not a question within the theory. Intuitively, the "level of generality" of a theory characterized the class of situations with which the theory can cope, the class of phenomena it can in principle accommodate. How, if at all, can such a thing be measured?
 
It is instructive, in this regard, to look at the Theory of Numbers in pure mathematics, where the situation is much more under control. Number Theory has historically been plagued with conjectures (really inductions, based on limited experience or sampling with small numbers), which no one has ever been able either to prove or produce a counterexample (disprove). Is Fermat's Last Theorem a theorem? How about the Goldbach Conjecture, that every even number is the sum of two odd primes? Is Number Theory general enough, even in principle, to cope with these very specific situations?
 
The situation is made even more interesting as a result of Gödel's celebrated work on undecidability in Number Theory, which we shall see much more of as we proceed. In brief, Gödel showed how to represent assertions about Number Theory within Number Theory. On this basis, he was able to show that Number Theory was not finitely axiomatizable. In other words: given any finite set of axioms for Number Theory, there are always propositions that are in some sense theorems but are unprovable from those axioms (unless, of course, the axioms are inconsistent to begin with-- in which case everything is a theorem). The conclusion here is that every finitely axiomatized system of Number Theory is too special, in some abstract, absolute sense. But there is no way of telling whether a specific assertion or conjecture about numbers is provable, or disprovable, or undecidable (unprovable) within such a system.
 
If this is already the situation in Number Theory, how much more complicated to ask similar questions about physics. But that is exactly the question raised by reductionism; it is an assertion, or conjecture, or belief, pertaining to the generality of contemporary physics itself. And indeed, it is not a conjecture based on any direct evidence (as, say, Goldbach's Conjecture in Number Theory is), but rather on indirect (circumstantial) evidence, insofar as evidence is adduced at all. In short, it rests on faith."
 
Unless you completely disagree with all of that, it needn't be so very difficult to jettison some of the physics-based patterns of thought that are holding you back.
 
Judith
----- Original Message -----
To: ***
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 7:27 PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Empirics and Life

Judith,
I think our discussion of objectivity is veering away from Rosen's ideas of modeling life.

At 11:05 AM 1/29/05 -0500, Judith wrote:
Applying my own definition of logic to the subjectivity of measurements in science, I question whether we CAN put an objectively verifiable number on "the speed of light". I question whether we CAN verify objectively that this is one of the invariant values in the universe.

HP: Of course according to your logic you are correct that everything is subjective. But I don't think that is the issue in modeling life. As I said last post, we all must make choices about what to believe and what to doubt, and in your inclusive sense all these choices are indeed subjective. My choice of Aristotle's narrow logic is just as subjective as your choice of Judith's inclusive logic. To believe the evidence that the speed of light is an objective invariant value in the universe is also a subjective choice. To believe any epistemology, like the Hertzian condition for a good model, is also a subjective choice. But that is not the crux of the problem that physics addresses.

The crux is that if you accept the Hertzian condition, then you will find that a model of Natural laws in which the speed of light is not a constant of Nature will not satisfy the Hertzian condition. Your model and your measurements won't commute. That is all physicists mean by an objective model. I am sure Rosen would agree so far. What Rosen says (and I agree) is that a model of life based only on state-determined Newtonian dynamics won't commute. What I am trying to make clearer in my own mind is just what specific encodings and formal models of life Rosen believes will commute.

Howard