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Re: Empirics and Life



I think I must be defining "logic" differently than you are. To me, logic is a very general concept and can perhaps be characterized as "clear, rational thought process that consistently maintains all  entailment relations which pertain to the ideas being processed". There's no stipulation regarding formalizability or use of language, etc. I don't see logic and creativity as being antagonistic to each other; quite the contrary. Robert Rosen's mind was a very logical mind, but also extremely creative. Those qualities worked together very well.
 
I am aware that logic is also a word used in a mathematical sense, where it has a much narrower definition, and I consider that an artificial limitation on the concept. Logic in that usage is constrained by mathematical rules and encodings, and can wind up creating outrageous paradoxes that are anything but "logical" to my mind.
 
Applying my own definition of logic to the subjectivity of measurements in science, I question whether we CAN put an objectively verifiable number on "the speed of light". I question whether we CAN verify objectively that this is one of the invariant values in the universe. We can't even objectively verify what light IS. It seems to me, logically, that all we can do is generalize about such things as "invariant principles" in the universe. Specific numbers can only be viewed as accurate in a narrow, local, particular situation. Most direct human experience is all of those things; narrow, local, and particular. So, what I'm ultimately saying is that our view is extremely subjective and cannot be otherwise. Extrapolating from that view to a specific about the entire universe is very much like quicksand. Accuracy won't survive the transition. We can only approximate accuracy and then, only by using generalities.
 
For example, I think the logic is sound in the few definitive statements Robert Rosen has made about the universe:
1.) Most, if not all, causality is relational.
2.) Various types of system organization create/maintain/govern relations within the system which adds differing amounts of information/causal impact to the system as a whole, depending on organization type.
3.) Complex organization adds so much information/causal impact to the system as a whole that it is impossible to fully learn about or understand such a system using a reductionistic approach.
4.) The universe is complex.
5.) Change is the only constant because time and space are co-organized into the complex system that is our universe. (In other words, there is no such thing as a "state" in the physics-based use of that word, except in physics-based models.Therefore, such models do not correspond to natural systems in the universe in general.)
 
Some of the above are not direct quotes, but are translations of quotes or are statements he made in conversations. Using these as springboards, I can make some logical assertions of my own:
 
1.) The universe has more potential than what we have seen so far, in terms of system organization types and behavioral manifestations.
2.) Potential for relational (interactive) causality is not the same as expressed causality via specific relations. In other words, the same two systems can interact in infinite ways, with the only difference being the nature of the relation that specifies their interaction with each other. The causal effect will be different based on the nature of the relation.
3.) This is why taking a system apart and studying the "parts" in isolation is of limited value in a relational universe. What the parts have, in isolation, is potential... The relations those parts have, as specified by the intact natural organization, are what specifies the range of values as expressed in the system.
 
Judith

----- Original Message -----
To: ***
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Empirics and Life

At 12:56 AM 1/29/05 -0500, Judith wrote:

What is theoretical science, then? I think it is the use of logic to find invariant relations (Natural Laws) out of all observables-- which includes experimental results (even data from "failed" experiments, often the most instructive of all).

HP: That's too general a definition. Sometimes logic is used. Example: Galileo's logic  that large bodies and small bodies fall at the same rate. His "proof by contradiction": If small bodies fall slower, then attaching a slower small body to a large body would slow it down. But the two together are even larger than the large body, so they should fall faster.

On the other hand, most great discoveries in both math and science are more like artistic creations that are not logical or even fully conscious. Einstein said that language played no role in the initial thoughts of relativity. He said that visual and even muscular awareness were essential. Many similar cases are recorded in Brewster Ghiselin's The Creative Process, in Hadamard's The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, and Miller's Imagery in Scientific Thought. The problem is that nobody writes much about the psychological motivations (Rosen does a bit in AS and LI). Consequently, scientific writing is only about the final logical _expression_, the tip of the creative iceberg.

Judith wrote: So, basically "invariant," as it applies here, is a subjective judgment.

HP: That is true in a specific sense. You are correct to say that choosing to pay attention only to those models that give answers that cannot be influenced or controlled by any real or imaginable observer is indeed a subjective decision. Deciding to be a vegetarian or a physicist is a subjective choice. But all choices are subjective, by definition. Life has been defined as physical systems that make choices. Inanimate nature does not make choices. But choosing to pay attention to the speed of light does not logically or physically imply that the speed of light is a subjective choice.

Your comments on closed to efficient causation are helpful. I still have to figure out how to apply it to what goes on in cells at a more detailed level. And by the way, detailed models need not imply reductionism although they are often misinterpreted as reductionism.

Howard