Re: Empirics and Life

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Hi Arno,

Interesting thoughts. Imagine a system with some machinery M, which uses raw
materials R to build computers C, and then C processes some software input I
to some software output O. Then, C has two roles: causal outcome (M:R -> C)
and efficient cause (C:I -> O). The system is obviously not closed to
efficient causation, but serves for the purpose of asking about observables.

If we were to examine such a system presented to us, then what would the
observable(s) be that would tell us these relationships? I think it is tied
up in the word you used "roles". Relational modeling is all about functions
and organization. We would have to determine the roles of the various
components by their various actions and relations, and then this would tell
us that C has two roles. So we would analyze the system into its functional
components, and then the entailments between them. As Rosen noted, these
entailments cannot be perceived directly, but rather by examining relations
between observables; in this case, examining relations between the
operations of the various components. By asking "why?" for each component,
this gives us a set of answers which are relative to the role of the
component of which we are asking why?.

I think you are right about the incommensurability  - this would occur as a
necessary condition of a closed-to-efficient-cause system. But I believe the
incommensurability is not at the level of an observable in the usual way we
think of observables; rather it arises in the organization as what
'emanates' the observables. This goes back to the very idea of Rosen's that
organization is a thing - something that can be studied apart from the
matter. The observables and incommensurability are in this venue, rather
than in the venue of particles.

In the example above we have a system that if strung together the functional
organization is: M:R -> C:I -> O. But this is not a coherent enunciation of
the role of C in the organization. Instead, to display the organizational
roles of C, we would have to write it two ways, as something like: [M:R->
C]:I -> O and M:R -> [C:I -> O], the former displaying the role of C as
causal output and the latter displaying C as efficient cause. The two
represent two distinct and incommensurable descriptions of the causal roles
of C. This is all from examination of the organization.

A benefit of the graphical relational models Rosen used is that the material
cause and efficient cause roles are represented by distinct arrows, rather
than being immanent or embodied as in the description notation I used here.
This allows these incommensurable descriptions to be combined into one view
(and now the incommensurability is embodied in the incommensurability of the
two kinds of arrows); but it does so at the cost of abstracting away the
details of the mappings.

Regards,
Tim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Arno
> Goudsmit
> Sent: Friday, January 28, 2005 5:46 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Empirics and Life
>
>
> may I offer an idea that may be useful for defining an observable
> F that corresponds to the defined f (where f is a component of a
> system closed to efficient causation):
>
> such observable F should appear in at least two roles: as caused
> outcome and as efficient cause. In order to perceive closure
> (i.e. to efficient causation), an observer must be capable of
> combining at least these two percepts.
>
> It is not unreasonable to assume that these two are of a
> different logical type, and hence may be incommensurable. If so,
> then the empirical observation of closure should focus on this de
> facto incommensurability.
>
> I hope you will find good arguments why this may not be the case!
> best,
> Arno Goudsmit