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HP: I think your logic appears somewhat flawed.
Isn't mutuality a wonderful thing?
HP: In any case, invariant relations (Natural laws) are created by
the imagination and tested by experiments, not by logic.
What is theoretical science, then? I think it is the use of logic
to find invariant relations (Natural Laws) out of all observables-- which
includes experimental results (even data from "failed" experiments,
often the most instructive of all). The kind of science you are describing above
sounds to me like purely experimental/applied science, although I would argue
that subtracting all logic out of that would be a mistake.
HP: It is demonstrably the case that invariant relations can be
discovered and tested by subjective measurements. I don't think Rosen questioned
the existence of such Natural laws. His point was that the existing laws are too
narrow, primarily because they are limited by their formal Newtonian syntax
(i.e., state-determined dynamics).
Yes, quite so. However, that wasn't what I was pointing out the
flaws of. Your original wording was different:
Howard Pattee wrote previously: I think of it like the epistemic
principles in physics, like the requirement that all empirically verifiable
models (laws) obey invariance principles.
Judith asked: How would you define an "invariance principle"? HP replied: This is what the epistemology of physics requires for ideal objective models. Objective just means freedom from subjective influence or effects on the lawful properties of the system being modeled. Invariant means invariant with respect to the state (time frame, location, speed, state of mind, language, culture, etc.) of individual subjects or observers. Clearly, all our individual observations are subjective just because it is the observer who must decide what, when, and how to make measurements, and the resulting data will depend on the state of the observer. Laws are discovered by finding the invariant relations among the data from individual subjective measurements. You were not speaking of "Natural Law", but of "epistemic
principles in physics". You were defining "an invariance principle" via the
laws derived from what "the epistemology of physics requires for ideal objective
models". You then defined "objective" in regards to this context, and I was
responding to that when I wrote the following:
Judith wrote: So, basically "invariant," as it
applies here, is a subjective judgment. Isn't it true that the
resulting data will not only be influenced by the state of individual
observers, but also such things as: the mode of measurement, the
application of the mode, the mental models of the observer who's doing the
measuring, the mental models of the observer who's doing the interpretation of
the data, the criteria/rules by which the data are being measured or
interpreted, and so on, etc.? So they start with admittedly "subjective" data
and try to subtract that out by adding more subjective input. The result is
labeled "scientific objectivity" and scientific "laws" are based on it. That
logic appears to be somewhat flawed.
(Incidentally, I wasn't referring to YOUR logic, I was referring to
the logic behind these rules in science.)
Regarding the clarifications to "closure to efficient causation:
Where Robert Rosen wrote: "The answer we propose is now this: a
material system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to efficient
causation. That is, if f is any component of such a system, the
question "why f?" has an answer within the system, which corresponds to
the category of efficient cause of f. . . .We claim
that everything else about organisms, everything studied in biology by
biologists, and much else besides, arises from and devolves upon this property."
[p. 244, ital orig.]
If "f" is any component of an organism...
[pick a component-- a physical one, a functional one-- it could
be skin; toes; metabolism; brain; immune system;
appendix...]
then the question "why f?"-- in the category of
"efficient cause"...
[Remember, there are four categories of causation , and each
one can be used for analysis of the same component, generating radically
different information about the same component. Here, we are only concerned with
answers having to do with efficient causation... As I have previously
said, for me the AC/DC song title "Who Made Who?" provides a good
conceptual base for the notion of efficient cause. If the efficient
causation answer to "Why does this house exist?" is "Because construction
workers built it" (which was the example my father used)... Then the efficient
causation answer to the question"Why does Skin/metabolism/brain/immune
system.... exist?"... ]
... has an answer within the
system.
[ ...the answer will be "Because something within the organism
specifies that."]
Does that help?
Judith
---- Original Message -----
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