Re: Empirics and Life

[Arno Goudsmit <***>]

may I offer an idea that may be useful for defining an observable F that corresponds to 
the defined f (where f is a component of a system closed to efficient causation):

such observable F should appear in at least two roles: as caused outcome and as efficient 
cause. In order to perceive closure (i.e. to efficient causation), an observer must be 
capable of combining at least these two percepts. 

It is not unreasonable to assume that these two are of a different logical type, and 
hence may be incommensurable. If so, then the empirical observation of closure should 
focus on this de facto incommensurability.

I hope you will find good arguments why this may not be the case!
best,
Arno Goudsmit
snip----------

> HP: Some specific observables Rosen might have had in 
> mind are not obvious from the phrase "any component of a 
> material system." Definitions are not subject to proofs 
> or disproofs. The purpose of definition is to allow clear 
> communication. I am trying to understand Rosen's idea 
> here. If the definition is too broad we can sharpen the 
> definition. As I suggested to Tim [04:49, 1/27/05], it 
> appears to me that Kauffman Boolean nets are closed to 
> efficient causation, but they are nowhere near "alive".
>