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Re: Rosen, Kauffman and compatibility
- From: Tim Gwinn <***>
- Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 15:48:17 -0500
Howard,
With regard to the
Boolean networks and state-transition rules, I approach it from the view of
Aristotelian questions - asking "why?". So, if I ask "why current state
X?", I can answer:
* because
prior state X0.
(material cause)
* because the
particular type of transition dictated by the state-transition rule. (formal
cause)
* because the
transitioning effected by the state-transition rule. (efficient
cause)
So, we have rule R
effecting the change: R: X0
® X
But if we ask "why
R?", there is no answer within the above statement, aside from final cause
("because X"). But R will be composed of some formula which constitutes the
rule. So, there is some formula R=f(a,b,c,...), or restated as
something like f:(a,b,...) ® c. So, it
will be possible to answer "why R?" with something like "because f" for
efficient cause.
Now, either
f represents something from the environment or it represents something
from within the system under study. If it from the environment, then these
state-transition rules describe impressed forces on the system; that is, if we
ask "why f?", then the answer is "because the environment". If
f is supposed to be from within the system, the question is: from where
do they arise? The only answer in terms of efficient cause for f would
be "because the simulator". Otherwise, f is unentailed (and therefore,
so is R) within the model. There is a tacit interpretation that f,
and thus R, have their origin somewhere within the system, but this
tacit interpretation is extraneous to, and not part of, the model per
se.
In my view, this
situation reflects the Newtonian-style system-environment dualism, where a
system is divided into an "inertial" portion and a separate "gravitational"
portion which imposes forces on the inertial portion. In such a situation, the
partitioning becomes problematic for answering " why?" questions as
to how it is that such a system can remain a coherent and stable
whole, because the partitioning makes the entailment picture incomplete.
Further, that partitioning means that it also becomes not possible to determine
if any such constructed model - whether it displays stable behavior (or
"order") or not - is a model which is actually a model of a possible
material realization into which both the inertial and gravitational aspects
must be simultaneously instantiated.
Regards,
Tim
Tim,
I agree and disagree. See my
comments below.
At 08:54 PM 1/26/05 -0500, Tim wrote:
It seems to me that Kauffman's
inquiries are at a different level of
analysis of the organism than
Rosen's. Rosen's focus in "Life Itself" is on
organization of biological
functions. Kauffman is focusing primarily on two
things: thermodynamics
and chemistry.
HP: This is true for Investigations (a
book with generally bad reviews). However, Kauffman's earlier work focuses on
abstract organization at three levels, origin of life, evolution, and
development. All these involve biological function. His basic NK network model
was entirely physics-free -- no thermodynamics or chemistry.
TIM: The idea of the collectively
autocatalytic network is interesting, both as a
mechanism for organism's
normal operation and as part of the origin-of-life
problem, although I
simply don't know how widely or seriously the idea of
collectively
autocatalytic networks occuring in organisms is taken.
HP:
Almost all origin of life models depend on some type of catalytic cycles
contained within some type of membrane (e.g., Eigen's, Hypercycles. See
Steps Toward Life, Oxford UP, 1992)
TIM: It is not clear to me how
they would map to Rosen's (M,R)-system (or the "closed
to efficient
cause" facet of that model)
HP: Me neither. I do not yet see
how the existence of "closure to efficient causation" can be empirically
decided.
TIM: As to "order for free",
which as best I can tell is based on his work with
Boolean networks,
seems to be a far cry from Rosennean complexity.
HP: True,
"order for free" is a loose metaphorical interpretation of network behavior,
usually pre-biological. It does not reach the level of Rosen complexity.
TIM: The Boolean networks are
entirely "Newtonian" in the sense that they consist of
"forceless"
syntactic symbols pushed around by state-transition rules.
The
regularities which arise and pass for "order" suffer from an
inability to
sustain themselves; instead, the "forces" maintaining the
"order" are
external to the network: they come from the simulator.
HP: On the contrary, the organization of limit cycles
originates and maintains itself. There are no external forces necessary to
sustain the order. Not only that, but the order can be stable to noise in the
state transition rules, the node functions, and the node outputs.
TIM: Rosennean complex systems,
on the other hand, will generically be rife with forces coming from within
the system itself (hence the impredicativities).
HP: All the
forces in Kauffman's NK models come from within the system. Since all the
transition rules and initial conditions (and any noise) are random it is clear
that the simulator has nothing to do with the stable order. Is randomness in
states and state transitions a kind of impredicativity?
TIM: All those kinds of
approaches which don't incorporate the dual nature of matter (what Rosen
called the "inertial aspects" and the "gravitational aspects" in Essays)
as
capable of both imposing forces as well as having forces imposed on
them are
doomed when they finally have to ask: "but how will it stay
together!!??".
HP: I would guess that the cycle structures
stay together because they are closed to efficient causation. By that I only
mean that they form and maintain an autonomous stable order that does not need
any external cause.
TIM: This seems to be what lead
to Kauffman's use of the "edge of chaos" notion,
and his concern with the
"work cycle" as a means of avoiding a systemic
deterioration into
thermodynamics equilibrium.
HP: The "edge of chaos" metaphor
arose from later evolution experiments in a fitness landscape with coupled NK
networks essentially competing in a game-theoretic model. This is physics-free
and has nothing directly to do with work cycles or thermodynamics. This is a
complex model. See Kauffman and Sonke Johnsen, "Coevolution to the edge of
chaos: Coupled fitness landscapes, poised states, and coevolutionary
avalanches." J. Theoretical Biology 149, 467-505,
1991.
Howard