Re: Rosen, Kauffman and compatibility

[John M <***>]

Daniel,
let me please insert some remarks into your excellent post. I want to point
to some fundamental differences and consequences not as the compatibility,
but to the comparison at all. In a different view from Judith's. Merging
needs similarity in the foundations.

I f two intelligent and reasonably educated scientists look at the same
problem and describe them (in their own views), any other reasonably
intelligent and educated spectator can find compatible signs. If both say:
"I can observe phenomena of the universe" that is no compatibility yet.
The crucial points are the differences especially in points of view.  I met
Stu once, more than a decade ago and as far as I know, he is on the top of
the world (in 'complex' economical and scientific topics). What I saw
(experienced) about him and his accolades, gives me the idea that if we
handle StK too much oin this list it will turn into a StK-list with some
occasional mention of a guy called 'Rosen?' or something alike.
He is the hero of the 'non-Rosenite' - 'complex' - Santa Fe Institute, whose
Nobelist founder-president delivered a lecture in classical reductionistic
(model)-math-complexity, refusing pretty rudely all the unlimited (natural)
connotations in the discussion.
John

----- Original Message -----
From: "Dan Fiscus" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2005 3:22 PM
Subject: Re: Rosen, Kauffman and compatibility
> Judith,
>
> I am not sure that there is no way to merge them. The
> big, general, synthetic ideas I have gleaned from
> Kauffman's work seem very compatible with Rosen, and
> even if the foundations differ the results are more alike
> than different and together perhaps stronger to help
> challenge and overthrow the "entrenched orthodoxy" of
> mechanistic reductionist objectivist universalizing science.
JM:
Thinking in terms of the unlimited nature, a "synthesis" of a model-based
complex construct INTO a higher involvement (maybe still model) structure is
not feasible because of lack of the beyond-boundary
ingredients necessary to the 'higher level" (wrong expression: broader
maybe) construct, (even still model or the natural complexity).
One will not arrive at non-computable models by synthesis based on the
computable ones without widening the scope beyond a 'synthesis' within the
available ingredients only.
> Kauffman talks about:
>
> 1. Life is not miraculous or a "long shot" with very low
> odds of emerging but is to be expected. This to me is
> akin to Rosen saying 1) complexity is general and 2) life
> and complexity are closely related.
JM:
Hindsight. The ways of nature are NOT according to our consent or
post factum explanations. The word (I try not to use) "bifurcatio" is an
open potential of nature.
>
> 2. The central organization of life is "collective
> autocatalysis". This to me is akin to Rosen saying that
> organization is key, life is closed to efficience cause (it
> is its own self-making active agent) and unfractionability
> is key - remove an integral part of the "collective" and
> you no longer get the autocatalysis of life.
JM;:
Autocatalysis is used in a very special sense: nothing 'autocatalyses' by
itself, not even collectively, without the impact of environment (i.e. the
rest of the world ensemble) which eliminates the "auto". If I have a system
that does autocatalyse: it is still in the state of its formation before
reaching the 'changed' structure (organization).
I tried to complete the Cairns-Smith clay life-origination with my own
colloidal processes impact and found that nothing comes from itself, no
'auto' involved. When I tried to put up an argument with a Kauffmann postdoc
author he resigned from the argument saying that Stu did not appreciate at
this point to discuss such angles. (1997-8).
>
>3. "Order for free" comes from getting past a threshold
>in "complexity". Granted that maybe Kauffman's
>complexity is more akin to complicatedness or
>combinatorics, but the "order for free" part I think will
> someday be seen to be compatible with the role of
> organization or topology and both of these linked to
> Fantappie's syntropy which we need to balance the
> current over-emphasis on entropy being the only
> tendency or natural direction to change.
JM:
I go with Bohm's "order": whatever we know about the system.
K's "threshold" what I call boundaries secure it - in our present
views (limited models). I don't know about the 'funtropies'. Nature
has mpore ways to go than what we approve (or even know about).
The rest is not my table.
Regards
John M

> (DF:)
> These concepts are also compatible with work coming
> out of ecological network analysis by Bob Ulanowicz
> and Bernie Patten. They have found importance in
> network properties such as indirect mutualism, which
> Bob U. links to autocatalysis - loops within ecological
> trophic webs. Bernie Patten and colleagues have
> developed an idea of "network synergism" that shows
> how locally seemingly negative interactions -like
> predation by alligators on frogs - almost always turn
> out to be beneficial even to the prey when all links,
> transformations and flows are analyzed and
> integrated. It is like syntropy or order for free in
> ecological networks, also like collective autocatalysis,
> also like the networks are closed to efficient cause,
> unfractionable, topologically and organizationally
> different than machines, etc.  Still Ulanowicz and
> Patten don't share all of Rosen's foundations. These
> two from ecosystem ecology even differ on very
> fundamental opinions. Yet I see their work as having
> more power in concert than alone. Like having and
> using two distinct, incommensurable models for
> ecosystem networks instead of just one.
>
> Some ideas on trying to find the common ground and
> compatibilities, partly so as to build and add allies even
> if not perfect matches in all respects.
>
> Dan
>
>
> Judith Rosen wrote:
>
> > *From the various summaries and quotes so far, my intuition is that
> > while both sets of ideas talk about organization, Kauffman tacks the
> > concept of organization onto the current scientific foundations, which
> > is where his inconsistency comes from, I suspect. In contrast, Robert
> > Rosen concluded the foundations were at fault in the inapplicability of
> > models from physics to answer questions in biology, and he basically
> > re-imagined the foundations-- /around /matters of organization. So, he
> > would say that Kauffman's notion of organizational principles does not
> > have a sound foundational basis to explain those principles. *
> > **
> > *Because of that, their work is actually incompatible even though they
> > are both talking about the importance of organization. There is no way
> > to "merge" them.*
> > **
> > *Judith*
> >