[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next]   [Date Index] [Thread Index] [Author Index] 

Re: Inequivalence of models

Hi Steve,

I see what your confusion is from (at least, I think I do...)

If we are going to discuss the philosophical nature of the universe, then we would be 
speaking of things very differently than we are in discussing Robert Rosen's work. What 
my father was trying to do was come up with a better way for science to address these 
aspects of the universe in order to learn about them. In Life, Itself he discussed many 
of these philosophical concerns and pointed out that in order to "do science" (as he put 
it) then you have to commit to the equivalent of "faith" in certain basic precepts. The 
two main ones he mentioned were that 1.) The universe proceeds according to certain 
consistent principles. and 2.) The human organism is capable of perceiving, learning 
about, comprehending, and communicating at least some of these aspects/principles. He 
said "This much must be true, or else we can all go home." All of his work was created in 
order for him to "do science" with it and he was only interested in modes of science 
which would really help him learn things about the stuff he was interested in (living 
organisms). He was NOT interested in aspects of science which tend to do everything and 
anything BUT help us learn things about the universe. In his mind, such things are 
"unscientific". So the issues of orthadoxy, the issues of ego, the issues of artificial 
laws that humans created being the only ones you're ALLOWED to use for doing science... 
that is pure crap as far as he was concerned.

In the question you raised on "how would an alien evaluate the specific example of "car", 
parked at the curb... You've got a zillion presumptions already in your scenario. For 
example; it's standing there, looking at the car... with what? What kind of sensory 
equipment does this alien have? What kind of technology does it have? If it's visiting 
another planet, one would think that its species has access to some advanced 
technologies, no? The point is, this question isn't about science, it's in the realm of 
philosophy or sci-fi. On the other hand, if we were to evaluate some new system pulled 
out of a glacier or something, never before seen by  humans of our time, and we want to 
know if it's alive or not... the thing my father would recommend is to look at the 
entailment patterns. Specifically, we would need to see if we could find out whether it 
is "self-entailed/entailing" or not. There's no way to do that just by looking at it and 
it might be unhelpful to try to do that by taking it apart. As he said, the relational 
models (for mechanism, for complex system, for organism) will extend regardless of 
"exotic chemistries" and configurations, etc. and will therefore be the only useful ones 
for dealing with extraterrestrial phenomena.

Judith
-----Original Message-----
From: Steve Johnson <***>
Sent: Jan 18, 2005 12:34 AM
To: ***
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Inequivalence of models

JR: So, having reiterated that, let's look at the issue of the system we call "car".... 
In order for a car to be a car, what we have to look at is the organization that makes it 
a car. Not the organization of the atoms or the molecules or the next larger category of 
components.... the organization of an atom is not what makes a car a car. 
 
SJ: Judith, I struggled with this issue for a while myself when I wrote my post. As I 
said in it: "a car is a simple system at least as far as its car-ness (or form) is 
concerned." I did not put it as clear as you did but I think I had a similar idea. 
 
However, one thing keeps bothering me and I don't quite know how to express it. I will 
try and maybe someone can pick it up. To say that X is a simple system *presupposes* that 
we definitively know its organization or "bauplan" (and we know it is 
simple/simulable/predicative etc). This is true in case of car because the word car (as 
you used it) *denotes* a particular mode of organization with a known form and function. 
So with car we do not have to build models to prove it is simple because it is simple by 
definition. As we analyze the minute details of viscosity of oil in the ball bearings we 
indeed slowly leave the "car" concept and start dealing with other complex systems 
outside of its car-hood.  The word "dog"  (when it is used to denote a specific dog) on 
the other hand does not refer to a known mode of organization and thus we do not have the 
luxury to declare that viscosity of blood in its veins is not part of its dog-hood. All 
we can do is build models of it. 
 
So when you use the word "car"  it can have two meanings: 1) a  mode of organization and 
b) an imperative to think of a specific car. If you take the first meaning then indeed 
car is a simple system. If you take the second meaning (as I suspect John M. did) and you 
are thinking of a specific car with all the molecules of gasoline, drag coefficient, 
viscosity of oil etc. then you are dealing with a natural system (that was pointed to by 
the imperative: think of a car!).
 
To take the example even further: suppose an alien scientist who evolved from a bird like 
creature (and thus never had any use for wheeled form of transportation) is analyzing a 
specific honda civic. Unlike us it does not know which aspects are relevant to its 
car-hood and which are not. From its perspecitive it would be just another natural system 
much like a tree or a dog are two us. And thus the Rosennean alien not being able to 
separate the irrelevant aspects might well conclude that this object (that humans would 
call "car") is complex.
 
- Steve
 


Judith Rosen <***> wrote:Hi John M.
 
One thing to always keep in mind is that "system-hood" is, itself, a relational property. 
It has to do with the relation of the observer to "the system" (meaning"that which is 
being observed"). This is one of the reasons why science can never be a truly "objective" 
pursuit-- I would argue that there is no such thing as objectivity in science. By its 
very nature, "science" is a human mental creation and exercise. However, science is what 
humanity has developed as a way to aid in learning about ourselves and our world/universe 
(because we do see both from an innately egocentric perspective). So all of these 
descriptions are being made from within the context of SCIENCE..
 
My father's work was not philosophy, much as he was accused of that, mostly be 
experimentalists who considered "theory" to be synonymous with "speculation". So you say 
that these boundaries of system are artificial? Yeah, they are. All human perception is a 
mental artifact, in some sense. And your point is??? "Reduction" is not a dirty word, 
unless it's the only word allowed or it's misapplied to situations where it's 
inappropriate. If the former is true, it guarantees the latter, doesn't it.
 
What "RR" was saying was that science can do far better than it has been doing, in how it 
approaches learning about various aspects of our universe.
 
So, having reiterated that, let's look at the issue of the system we call "car".... In 
order for a car to be a car, what we have to look at is the organization that makes it a 
car. Not the organization of the atoms or the molecules or the next larger category of 
components.... the organization of an atom is not what makes a car a car. Similarly, we 
needn't bother going into ever larger systems, looking at the organization of traffic or 
of rush hour traffic jams, etc.... that's not the "car" system, either. The main POINT: 
it is a significant fact that the way some system is organized contributes a causal 
impact on its behaviors/capabilities. In a car, that organization is simple: pretty much 
the sum of its parts.
 
 


----- Original Message ----- 
From: John M 
To: *** 
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 5:56 PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Inequivalence of models


Hi, Judith, 
Quote from your post:
"that simple systems are computable and have a "largest complete model" into which all 
others will reduce."
I have (language?) problems here. I don't believe in "simple systems" only in  'simple 
system models'. We use the 'car' as a good vehicle for such discussions. A car is a car 
is a car - wrong. 
A car is only a car if we cut the model we assign to this distinction at the boundaries 
we consider for "a car". Otherwise the system representing that model as well, is an 
unlimitedly interconnected feature, from its submicrosco[pic, economical, ewsthetic, 
mythical, 
(you name it) associations (in connected networks) all the way to the energy we receive 
from the sun and beyond. 
A "car" is a complexity. Our limited model is simple. 
As simple as that.<G>
So a car has NO largest model. Only the limited model has some boundaries within which we 
feel happy. The "simple car". 
In our well established reductionistic thinking. 
Is that what we want to perpetuate?
You emphasize the computable simple models. "...within it". 
*
JR:
"Complex systems, on the other hand, have an infinite set of models, without ever 
exhausting all the information possible. Because there is no "largest complete model"... "
Would you like to set up a singularity with no connections outside its boundaries, what 
you can deem "a simple system"? A nirvana? 
becuase if not, EVERYTHING is a complexity and you can stop the connectivities only by 
exercising reductionism: selecting the extent of your observation. When you say "single 
model" that means a reductionistic limited (cut) model of something that does not 'end' 
at those boundaries. 
I for one do not want to study Rosenism restricted to reductionist models. Not even 
'complex (closed) models' as they say. This is why I like better to say wholeness if I 
can. and I leave reductionist inequivalency to the engineers. 
I think you simplified the simlicity while we realized the complexity of complexity. 
(Sorry, if I see a pun...)
 
Then you wrote:
and each model will then "reduce to" (fit into) that sum/largest model.
Sorry again, my non-IndoEuropean Hungarian linguistic stomach does not digest such 
meaning of reduction into increasing. I feel a 'reduction' makes something smaller, not 
into wider and more comprehensive. Not even as a word-flower. But my Inglis is poor. 
Fit into is OK, refers to a larger compartment from which it was reduced. Not vice versa. 
I mean: the nonexistent largest model.
 
 
John Mikes
----- Original Message ----- 
From: Judith Rosen 
To: *** 
Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 4:15 PM
Subject: Re: Inequivalence of models


Hi Steve, Hi Everybody,
 
Sorry for being "incommunicado" for a few days, I've been working on BioTheory. It's 
mostly up and running, although five papers are still forthcoming, and my own papers are 
among them. What can I say? By the time people get done reading all the great stuff 
that's there, my own will be ready to plug in. I haven't had much of a chance to take off 
the publishing and editing hats, much less put on the writer's hat, for a while. But 
they're almost done.
 
The question about "inequivalent models" isn't as complicated as you guys are making 
it... It has to do with the fact that simple systems are computable and have a "largest 
complete model" into which all others will reduce. If you go about it from the other 
direction; the sum of all models we can make of the system will include every individual 
model within it. That's what "equivalent" means. Complex systems, on the other hand, have 
an infinite set of models, without ever exhausting all the information possible. Because 
there is no "largest complete model"... 
 
Do you see? Any single model is a finite thing, and there is no way to get to infinity by 
accretion (adding finite numbers together). Thus, inequivalence. 
 
SNIP
and each model will then "reduce to" (fit into) that sum/largest model.
 
Does that make more sense?
 
Judith

 
 
Website address: http://www.rosen-enterprises.com/
My favorite discussion list (Independent-- Not part of Rosen Enterprises): ***



                
---------------------------------
Do you Yahoo!?
 Yahoo! Mail - now with 250MB free storage. Learn more.

Web address: www.rosen-enterprises.com