Steve,
1) In everything I've read Rosen always takes Aristotelian taxonomy of
causes as given. I've never seen an argument that would justify this
particular choice. Should we consider Aristotelian taxonomy of causes a
foundational axiom in the Rosennean view? Does it have the same status
as the concept of Natural Law itself?
TG: I do
not think the Aristotelian taxonomy is to be considered at the same level as
Natural Law. Instead, I think Aristotelian categories is best
thought of one kind of mode of analysis. It is a particularly useful mode
of analysis, but Rosen does anywhere (that I have seen) claim it to be the
only way to analyze entailment relations. That would be an
entirely artefactual limitation. By the very nature of Rosennean
complexity, Aristotelian analysis is not exhaustive: in complex
system the four causal categories fail to remain distinct, and instead become
intertwined.
2) Are there other taxonomies of causes?
TG: I am
unaware of any others.
3) Is "Efficient Cause" a rigorously defined concept? Rosen (and
others) in describing this concept typically give the Aristotelian example
of the "house" with bricks as material cause, construction workers as
efficient cause, blueprint as formal cause, and intent to dwell as the final
cause. I've never seen any more rigorous definition besides invocation of
this admittedly useful metaphor. What is the definition of efficient cause?
Can anyone provide a defintion that does not invoke the house
metaphor? Efficient cause is key to Rosen's argument in Life Itself so I
think it's important to have a consensus on what it means.
TG: From
Aristotle's Physics II.7: "They [the aitia] are four, and the
student of nature should know about them all, and it will be his method, when
stating on account of what, to get back to them all: the matter, the form, the
thing which effects the change, and what the thing is for.". So, efficient
cause is "the thing which effects the change". (Aristotle himself did not use
the term "efficient cause" - that name was assigned to it later on in history
somewhere.)
As
Jannie, pointed out, the Greek word usually translated into 'cause'
is 'aition' (or 'aitia'). But 'cause' is a bit of an incorrect translation,
especially since it is pre-loaded with certain other connotations of
causality. >From the quote above, aitia are the answers to "on account of
what?" (or more briefly, "why?"). I have also read that aitia carries the
connotation of "that which is responsible" in the legal sense of
'responsible'. So, "efficient cause" might also be defined as "that which is
responsible for effecting change".
Regards,
Tim