Re: Why four categories of causation?

[Arno Goudsmit <***>]

Jannie and others,
this is what I like: to make links between various disciplines. Right now, we seem to get 
involved into ancient metaphysics. Indeed, there have been developed lots of alternative 
metaphysical systems. Aristotle has of course been extremely influential on Arabic and 
medieval European thinkers (Thomas), but don't ignore neoplatonist (Plotinus, Porphyry), 
gnostic and pythagorean influences, as well as those of the presocratics (e.g. 
Parmenides). All highly profound stuff, be it usually of less clarity and sophistication 
than the 'Philosophus' himself.

The relevance of all these various attempts, in my opinion, is that at least they make us 
realize that Aristotle's system is not the only possible choice, be it a brilliant one. 
What I find interesting, also for the discussions on this list, is that Aristotle's four 
causes may be not always as distinct as their definitions would suggest. So, next to 
Rosen's 'augmented' relational diagrams, I would be interested in 'more augmented' 
diagrams in which several types of causal processes are de facto indistinguishable, be it 
that they are conceptually distinguishable. For instance, in the famous diagram of fig. 
10.C.6 in LI there is an interesting double relation between Phi, B and F: 

1) B is material cause (Phi being efficient cause and F outcome)
2) B is efficient cause (F material cause, Phi outcome)

So the 'really' interesting point, I think, is: what does this relation between B and F 
look like, apart from the definition of these various causal relations? There MUST be 
some kind of ambiguous process going on, that can be interpreted as material or efficient 
relation, but how do these two relations mix up in their physical realization? It is in 
answering such questions, I think, that Aristotle's causal system may not be sufficient 
here. Perhaps Heidegger (or my preference: Merleau-Ponty (i.e. the later one, as in 
Signes and Le visible et l'invisible) might be useful, but this is all very tricky stuff.

best, 
Arno

----- Original Message -----
From: "Jannie Hofmeyr" <***>
To: ***
Subject: Re: Why four categories of causation?
Date:         Wed, 12 Jan 2005 02:11:36 -0500

> 
> Hi Steve
> 
> You quoted Robert Rosen as writing: "What Aristotle was essentially doing
> in his discussion of the categories of causation was giving names to, and
> thereby distinguishing between, certain kinds of relations between events.
> As we noted in Section V, this is precisely the province of causality, one
> of the twin pillars supporting our belief in natural law". Theoretical
> Biology and Complexity p. 188.
> 
> I am surprised that, despite reading this paper many times, I had not
> picked up on RR's use of "events" for both cause and effect in the above
> quote. Aristotle's four "causes" are different (and exhaustive, according
> to Aristotle) answers to the question "why something?", where something
> could be an event, but is more often an object or substance (both natural
> or artefactual). These answers then explain the object. Note that the
> Aristotelean causes themselves are not events, as are they are in the
> modern (post-Humean) sense.
> 
> I have found http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm a very
> useful exposition. In particular, I have found the suggestion that we
> shift from using the noun "cause" to the verb "make" useful, as it fits
> perfectly with RR's use of Aristotelean causes for explaining fabrication.
> If used in this sense, "causality" is an extremely useful concept.
> 
> SJ Q1) In everything I've read Rosen always takes Aristotelian taxonomy of
> causes as given. I've never seen an argument that would justify this
> particular choice. Should we consider Aristotelian taxonomy of causes a
> foundational axiom in the Rosennean view? Does it have the same status as
> the concept of Natural Law itself?
> 
> JH: Since the four Aristotelean causes cannot be derived from anything
> else, I suppose they have axiomatic status.
> 
> SJ Q2) Are there other taxonomies of causes?
> 
> JH: To my knowledge nobody has come up with a different set, but if
> alternatives exist I would love to hear about them.
> 
> SJ Q3) Is "Efficient Cause" a rigorously defined concept? Rosen (and
> others) in describing this concept typically give the Aristotelian example
> of the "house" with bricks as material cause, construction workers as
> efficient cause, blueprint as formal cause, and intent to dwell as the
> final cause. I've never seen any more rigorous definition besides
> invocation of this admittedly useful metaphor. What is the definition of
> efficient cause? Can anyone provide a defintion that does not invoke the
> house metaphor? Efficient cause is key to Rosen's argument in Life Itself
> so I think it's important to have a consensus on what it means.
> 
> JH: See http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm
> Efficient cause is one sense of "aition", namely the one that "produces"
> (or "makes") an object or event. In the formalised version of Rosen any
> object or event b is in the range B of a map
> 
> f: A x I ---> B
> 
> where, for a particular element,
> 
> (a,i) |---> f(a,i) = b
> 
> A is the material cause, I the formal cause, f is the efficient cause.
> This is a very powerful (and still underappreciated) and very precise way
> of defining three of the four causes. In LI Rosen of course shows how to
> handle the fourth: final cause.
> 
> All the best
> Jannie