Re: Karl Popper/False positives...

[John M <***>]

Tim,
(> TG: Well, this isn't really a forum on Popper...) but for the fun of it:
KP forgot his own words in the 2 par-s you quoted: when he said
(par. 1)" I do not believe that a criterion of truth is possible,..." then
it sounds funny (par. 2):"It is important not to demand that the basic
statements in question be true. " What???
(I like the usually strong mind of Sir KP, but am shaken off by his very
idealistic friend and partner, the other earl Sir John. )
About 'truth' - if it is of any value, I hold it is a personal belief based
on argument one accepts (1st pers) valid. Within one's mental model. The
reason why nobody can argue about it. Part of the belief system It goes from
reason into emotions very easily.

I find RR much more open minded when going along with the struggle starting
with his math-biol background into the vaguenesses of totality.

Jerry wrote about the post-modernist Lyotard (would be interesting to read?)
and quoted:
>>Lyotard rejects an interpretation of science as
representing the totality of all true knowledge, which
is the dream of modernism.<<
Interpretation of what? (Which 'science'?) and a "true" knowledge is a
model-based belief. Dream really.
I really went through a portfolio of belief and unbelief systems during my
thinking days, (starting with my 1st essay about a (Durant-based)survey of
historical 'ethics' (rather: ethicists) in high school, - 1938)
and was able to 'falsify' them all. The systems choose a 'narrative' and
abide by it. The narrative goes into the belief system - the base.
(BTW I called my BigBang substitute Plenitude-based worldview a narrative,
not a theory, not even a hypothesis). A basis for my (logical?) conclusions.
It is a good base for a Rosenean 'wholeness - based' kind of thinking.

(One more to Jerry; to compare Popper (science philosophy), Darwin's genetic
theory and Marx's political battle-writing is a bit exaggerated. One has to
find a common ground...)

Regards

John M


----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Wednesday, January 05, 2005 11:53 AM
Subject: Re: Karl Popper/False positives...


> Jerry,
>
> > JZ: I wonder how is truth defined by Popper. Anybody?
>
> TG: Well, this isn't really a forum on Popper, but since you ask...from
his
> book "Realism and the Aim of Science" he states:
>
> "Although, following Tarski, I do not believe that a criterion of truth is
> possible, I have proposed a criterion of demarcation -- the criterion of
> falsifiability. My proposal was that a statement (a theory, a conjecture)
> has the status of belonging to the empirical sciences if and only if it is
> falsifiable." [p. xix]
>
> ...and on the next page:
>
> "A statement or theory is, according to my criterion, falsifiable if and
> only if there exists at least one potential falsifier -- at least one
> possible basic statement that conflicts with it logically. It is important
> not to demand that the basic statements in question be true. The class of
> basic statements must be characterized in such a way that a basic
statement
> describes a logically possible event of which it is logically possible
that
> it might be observed." [p. xx]
>
> ..and finally:
>
> "The special thing about human knowledge is that it may be formulated in
> language, in propositions. This makes it possible for knowledge to become
> conscious and to be objectively ctiticizable by arguments and by tests. In
> this way we arrive at science. Tests are attempted refutations. All
> knowledge remains fallible, conjectural. There is no justification,
> including of course, no final justification of a refutation. Nevertheless
we
> learn by refutation, i.e., by the elimination of errors, by feedback." [p.
> xxxv]
>
> In our lingo, I would say Popper is asserting that falsifiability takes
> place entirely on the right-hand side of the modelling relation, in the
> formal (inferential) world. That is where logical agreement or conflict
can
> arise, and our only certainty (i.e., logical certainty) exists. But our
> certainty in this sense does not allow us to impute our certainty to the
> occurrences on natural system side. Therefore, knowledge will always be
> "fallible, conjectural". In contrast to 'falsifiability', which he
reserves
> as a technical term for logical statements, he uses 'falsification' as a
> technical term to refer some kind if conclusive empirical refutation. But
> since a falsification is itself just another piece of knowledge, it is
> likewise fallible and conjectural. Therefore, neither a theory nor any
> experimental refutation of that theory is "truth" in any absolute sense.
>
> I'm not arguing for or against Popper, or that Popper and Rosen are
> necessarily in agreement, but I just note that kind of inability to hae a
> definitive determination of "truth", would in the Rosennean picture, I
think
> arise from the lack of the entailing of the encoding/decoding from within
> the modelling relation itself; they must instead be posited independently.
> Both I think would agree that underlying all attempts at science are the
> hosts of metaphysical presuppositions (as JohnK noted re Popper), which
are
> inherently unverifiable, yet which play a deep role in any kind of
> assertions of "truth".
>
> Regards,
> Tim
>