Re: Karl Popper/False positives...

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Jerry,

> JZ: I wonder how is truth defined by Popper. Anybody?

TG: Well, this isn't really a forum on Popper, but since you ask...from his
book "Realism and the Aim of Science" he states:

        "Although, following Tarski, I do not believe that a criterion of truth is
possible, I have proposed a criterion of demarcation -- the criterion of
falsifiability. My proposal was that a statement (a theory, a conjecture)
has the status of belonging to the empirical sciences if and only if it is
falsifiable." [p. xix]

...and on the next page:

        "A statement or theory is, according to my criterion, falsifiable if and
only if there exists at least one potential falsifier -- at least one
possible basic statement that conflicts with it logically. It is important
not to demand that the basic statements in question be true. The class of
basic statements must be characterized in such a way that a basic statement
describes a logically possible event of which it is logically possible that
it might be observed." [p. xx]

..and finally:

        "The special thing about human knowledge is that it may be formulated in
language, in propositions. This makes it possible for knowledge to become
conscious and to be objectively ctiticizable by arguments and by tests. In
this way we arrive at science. Tests are attempted refutations. All
knowledge remains fallible, conjectural. There is no justification,
including of course, no final justification of a refutation. Nevertheless we
learn by refutation, i.e., by the elimination of errors, by feedback." [p.
xxxv]

In our lingo, I would say Popper is asserting that falsifiability takes
place entirely on the right-hand side of the modelling relation, in the
formal (inferential) world. That is where logical agreement or conflict can
arise, and our only certainty (i.e., logical certainty) exists. But our
certainty in this sense does not allow us to impute our certainty to the
occurrences on natural system side. Therefore, knowledge will always be
"fallible, conjectural". In contrast to 'falsifiability', which he reserves
as a technical term for logical statements, he uses 'falsification' as a
technical term to refer some kind if conclusive empirical refutation. But
since a falsification is itself just another piece of knowledge, it is
likewise fallible and conjectural. Therefore, neither a theory nor any
experimental refutation of that theory is "truth" in any absolute sense.

I'm not arguing for or against Popper, or that Popper and Rosen are
necessarily in agreement, but I just note that kind of inability to hae a
definitive determination of "truth", would in the Rosennean picture, I think
arise from the lack of the entailing of the encoding/decoding from within
the modelling relation itself; they must instead be posited independently.
Both I think would agree that underlying all attempts at science are the
hosts of metaphysical presuppositions (as JohnK noted re Popper), which are
inherently unverifiable, yet which play a deep role in any kind of
assertions of "truth".

Regards,
Tim