|
Judith,
I use the term 'simulation' as it is described in LI ch. 7
and 9.
As you say,
"In the example
you cite, there is no argument over the fact that simulation is not a congruence
between entailment structures.". Therefore, by the very criteria
for a modelling relation, it fails, and thus the simulation is not a
model.
Then, "However,
there is congruence over external observables. ". Yes, that makes it a simulacra or simulation, but it does
not make it a model. Matching only the behavior of observables without regard
for the entailment relations is mimesis, not
modelling.
Regards,
Tim
Tim,
Define "simulation".
To simulate something is to... what?
In the example you cite, there is no argument over the fact that
simulation is not a congruence between entailment structures. However, there
is congruence over external observables. So... in the case where you are
modeling a storm for some film you're directing (setting: "... it was a dark
and stormy night..."), the external observables are those properties you need
to model. In the case where you are trying to predict what the weather in some
location is going to be like on next Thursday... you must model different
aspects which correspond to entailment structures. My father's point is that
human beings tend to think if they can simulate a system convincingly enough,
that's the same as creating an exact replica... and human beings also tend
to think that, because we can fool ourselves and each other with a
convincing simulation, that systems which "seem" complex are really
simple underneath.
Judith
|