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Re: Turing machines and tape length



Howard,
 
It seems to come down to a difference in what we each consider "commute" to mean, or the requirements for a modelling relation to "commute". For me, I take Rosen's stance that it involves bringing the entailment structures into congruence via the encoding/decoding. Indeed, I agree that the encoding/decoding are creative acts. However, in Rosen's view, in order for a modelling relation to commute, there is the following requirement placed on those creative acts:
"The only condition on them is that they bring the two entailment structures into congruence -- that is, they satisfy the commutativity condition, which I have written as [1 = 2 + 3 + 4]". [EL p. 159]
In your post, you say: "As Hertz emphasized, the only limit on a model is the commutation condition." This "commutation condition" seems to be a different kind of requirement than the one Rosen uses. As I read Hertz, it seemed to me to pretty much mirror Rosen, albeit in a less precise manner; but, I think we must be reading it differently. Can you explain what you mean by the "commutation condition" on a modelling relation - what kind of requirement does this place on the modelling relation?
 
Regards,
Tim
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:***On Behalf Of Howard Pattee
Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2004 12:24 AM
To: ***
Subject: Re: Turing machines and tape length

Tim,

The way I interpret your question I would have to answer: No, I do not agree. The exact wording here is important. When you use "formal model" it can be ambiguous because the phrase can refer to only one side or to the whole modeling relation. To disambiguate I suggest "a formalism interpreted or encoded as a model." I hope you accept this clarification. As I expressed it in the last post: "I would emphasize that no formalism is a model until it is interpreted, which requires the encoding/decoding process." Or to quote Rosen: "Formalisms become science, as we have seen, precisely when their elements are endowed with referents.  .  . Indeed, they acquire their external referents by virtue of the specific encoding and decoding arrow that have been mandated" (LI, p. 98).

The reason the formalism does not limit the model is because all interpretation is limited only   by our imagination. As I expressed it: "The important point is that coding and interpretation are unentailed by both Nature and the formalism." Rosen is also clear on this point: "the encoding and decoding arrows were themselves unentailed " (LI, p.61).

I think your question implies entailment: " . . .do you not also agree that the model is likewise limited to being capable of modelling only aspects of the natural world which meet the limits of Church's Thesis?" There must be some kind of intrinsic entailment between the formalism and the encoding if it is a limit on the model. I believe that interpretation is really a free creative act (and I think Rosen said that somewhere too). As Hertz emphasized, the only limit on a model is the commutation condition.

One example comes to mind. So-called pseudo-random numbers are deterministically generated by feedback shift registers (i.e, the sequence ultimately repeats). Nevertheless this formal deterministic computation is often interpreted as random in some models because for all observable purposes of the model these numbers "behave as if" they were random. In other words the actual formal computational determinism does not limit the capability of the model to represent a complete indeterminism.

This type of interpretation of formalism is not uncommon, and it also shows that any limit or lack of limit we choose from a formalism on a model is not generalizable, but must be determined empirically according to the requirements of the model.

Howard
   
TG: If what it means to be an "empirical model" is to be a formal model in a commuting modelling relation with some natural system, then if that formal model is a member of the class of computable models, then do you not also agree that that model is likewise limited to being capable of modelling only aspects of the natural world which meet the limits of Church's Thesis?