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Judith;
this is not a contradiction to your
post.
*
I think the failure of any model comes from it
being considered as the 'total' instead of as a limited model. 'Natural
law' has IMO 2 flaws: the 'natural' instead of
"model-related" and the 'law' - instead of the "generally observed variants'
deduction".
Otherwise: it is OK <G>.
We have NO idea what a natural law may be: we
have a limited vue of nature
1. according to the level of epistemic
enrichment we reached,
2. the interpretation of our mind of whatever
impact 'it' gets.
*
To your very much appreciated PS on gravity?
Context is the way we interpret the effects of
nature that reach 'us'. So gravity (as we see it!) is contextual. Who knows what
may be in a 'wider' vue without material, space, time, energy, mass etc. etc.
prejudice? Or our vues without the prejudice of biology (life?), for that
matter? Our vues are contextual beyond the considered level we confess to.
John Mikes
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, December 19, 2004 6:24
PM
Subject: Re: What is Natural Law?
Steve J. wrote: Would you agree with the
following
restatement?: No model is a complete reflection of Natural
Law. A
model only encodes an aspect of it. Thus I would say
the failure
of Physics models referenced above is a
failure of the modeler to recognize
the limitations
of the model and not failure of the model to capture
an
aspect of the Natural Law.
I think there are many reasons why models fail. The fault
could be with the model, with the modeler, with the application, with the
encoding and/or decoding, and some combination of the above, which may have
synergistic effects in interaction with each other that magnify the
problems.
I also think it may be impossible to know whether any model is a
complete reflection of Natural Law/s or not.. but, this being a complex
universe, the set of relations underlying it is likely to be
infinite (containing infinite models) all of which are incomplete. In any
case, one thing is pretty clear: it is better to err on the side of caution
and presume that our models are incomplete!
So is the inapplicability of Physics-based Laws to Biological
systems purely a situation of a set of models being incomplete? Maybe. Or
maybe the models are incorrect, in some respect. It could be any combination
of the above reasons for model failure. My father's opinion was that
there are aspects of the Physics-based models that don't satisfy the Hertzian
Condition, but the side-effects are too subtle to be noticed when the models
are applied to certain kinds of systems (simple systems)...or else the side
effects are easily bearable (within the "margin of
error"). He said that atoms are complex systems and yet are
considered to be in the province of Physics. He pointed out, in his
work, all the areas where the Physics-based models cause problems or
create paradoxical results. The concept of "state" was, in his
view, inapplicable to natural systems in this
universe.
Judith
PS: You asked in your other post on this subject whether I
thought Newtonian models of gravity were subject to contextual change...
I'm not a physicist, but from what I know of my father's work, I have a
"hunch" or preliminary opinion about the answer to that question; My intuition
is that one of the Laws of Nature in this universe is that the impact of
context is inescapable. This is a relational universe. What is "gravity"? It's
an effect of relations, is it not?
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, December 19, 2004 5:12
PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] What is Natural
Law?
Judith:
"In my view, and I daresay in my father's as
well, the
so-called "Laws of Physics" are inferential laws,
pertaining
to the models for use in specific
applications, and are only laws in that
sense. If they
are not applicable outside of those
original
applications, as in with Biological systems, then they
are
proving that they are not reflections of "Natural
Law"."
Steve:
I think I agree. Would you agree with the following
restatement?:
No model is a complete reflection of Natural Law. A
model only
encodes an aspect of it. Thus I would say
the failure of Physics models
referenced above is a
failure of the modeller to recongize the
limitations
of the model and not failure of the model to capture
an
aspect of the Natural Law. It's a case of "when you
have a hammer
everything looks like a nail." If you
unthinkingly apply a model
developed for one set of
observables to another set you will get "a
failure of
model". To be more precise it is not a failure of the
model
(the entire commuting modelling relation) but a
construction of an
entirely new Bad Model by taking
the right side of the relation
from the original
model and trying to encode another natural system
into
it.
--- Judith Rosen <***>
wrote:
> Hi Steve (and everyone else too, of course),
>
> I think I can help answer at least part of this
>
question:
> Steve J. wrote:Anyone who can provide a definition
>
of what "Law" is
> for the purpose of present discussion?
>
> I posted an excerpt from "Life, Itself" that
> discusses
Robert Rosen's
> concept of Natural Law. He was describing, in
that
> excerpt, how the
> very fact that we are discussing
phenomena in the
> ambience (and
> arguing about what
constitutes proof that we have
> figured out various
> real
consistencies in the ambience) means that
> certain things have to
> be true. The fact that those things have to be true
> in
order for us to
> be discussing and modeling it is an embodiment
of
> this truth: There
> are consistent principles underlying
phenomena we
> perceive in "the
> ambience" and these
principles echo over and over.
> This is Natural
> Law, in
totality.
>
> I think the concept of an echo is a good analogy
(An
> analogy is a word
> model, so a good analogy is a word
model that
> satisfies the Hertzian
> Condition). To model
something is a form of echoing
> chosen aspects of
> it in a
new system of some sort. That new system may
> be thoughts, may
> be text (words, language), may be mathematical
>
descriptions, may be
> visual (diagram/graphs/maps/three
dimensional
> sculptural
> representation, etc)... In short,
the mode of
> modeling doesn't change
> what you're doing--
you're still creating or using a
> new system to
> represent
something else, in some way and to some
> degree. No model is
>
going to correspond to any original system entirely
> (identical twins
> are not the same in every way, for example) and it
> is not
even
> necessary for a model to "get as close as possible"
> in
its entirety to
> that 'ideal' in order for it to qualify as a
good
> model. In fact, I
> would argue that it is not an
"IDEAL" at all.
>
> Why? Because what aspects you want to model
depend
> entirely on what
> you want the model FOR. Based on
the context of what
> you want a model
> to do, the aspects to
be included in the modeling
> relation will be
> chosen. So
already context is critical, as is an
> ability to think! A
>
good model is one where the relation of the
> inferential entailment
in
> the model to the causal entailment in the system
> being
modeled is one
> of correspondence AND pertains to what the model
is
> supposed to be
> used for. Trouble can enter the picture
from all
> directions, though,
> because what if the modelers
don't know what they
> need? What if they
> don't know what
they DON'T need??? What if the
> modelers don't realize
> they
don't know?! This is where the discussion turns
> to issues of
> optimality and side-effects. However, let's assume
> that the
modelers
> managed to create models that were in solid enough
>
correspondence with
> the aspects of their natural systems which
had
> required the use of
> models for some reason. Let's
further assume that
> the models were
> applied well to
whatever tasks required their
> application (another
> avenue
for serious trouble to creep in). In that
> case, the models
>
would prove very useful in their purpose/s and would
> satisfy the
> Hertzian Condition.
>
> The Hertzian Condition is
contextual, too, though.
> Models created for
> one purpose may
only be corresponding accurately (in
> the modeling
> relation)
in those aspects necessary for that
> particular purpose. If
>
the model is assumed to be in correspondence in all
> sorts of other
> ways, and applied to different purposes, what are
> the
chances that it
> will be in correspondence in ways made necessary
by
> any new context? I
> think this is what has happened/is
happening with
> Physics. Those
> models of reality satisfy the
Hertzian condition
> well enough to be
> useful when applied to
the tasks they were created
> for but the
> assumption has
carried over that they can be trusted
> to be accurate
>
representations of all aspects of any natural
> system. One of the
> things my father wrote in the notes I found after he
> died
was the
> statement; "There are no such thing as Paradoxes in
>
the natural world.
> There are only poorly created models,
poorly
> applied. What we call
> paradoxes are really a
symptom; a side-effect." They
> are a symptom
> that something
is not corresponding well between our
> models and the
>
systems being modeled.
>
> By inference, then, we can say that
the more
> applications in which a
> model satisfies the
Hertzian condition (and its
> application doesn't
> generate
side-effects), the more it is likely to
> reflect at least some
> aspect of Natural Law. Kepler's "regularities" don't
>
automatically
> fall into this category because the sun
doesn't
> "rise". That's a
> model, based on our perception.
(However, it's
> interesting that this
> is a perception that
other organisms apparently have
> modeled too! The
> sun's
regular appearance and disappearance in any
> ecosystem triggers
> the single largest migration/behavior in organisms
> of any
natural
> cyclical phenomenon.)
>
> I don't think it's
accurate to say:
> Steve J. wrote:Natural Law as per Rosen. An
>
epistemological
> principle delineating what is open to
(human?)
> cognition.
>
> He said that the establishment
of true
> correspondence via a modeling
> relation was proof
that we are capable of
> perception/cognition/communication of
aspects of
> Natural Law. As you
> will see in the excerpt I
posted, he said; "Natural
> Law makes two
> separate assertions
about the self and its
> ambience". What these
> amount to (my
translation) are 1.) That natural law
> exists; and 2.)
> That
we can perceive and describe aspects of it.
>
> In my view, and
I daresay in my father's as well,
> the so-called "Laws
> of
Physics" are inferential laws, pertaining to the
> models for use in
> specific applications, and are only laws in that
> sense. If
they are
> not applicable outside of those original
>
applications, as in with
> Biological systems, then they are proving
that they
> are not
> reflections of "Natural Law". Natural Law
was what
> he defined as
> pertaining to both self and
ambience: The entailment
> in the universe
> (causality). Laws
of science are our attempts to
> establish congruent
> modeling
relations and are inferential laws of
> entailment. They have
>
been generated by our "models" (whatever those
> models may be,
> including mental imaging, intuitional
> thoughts/pictures,
and
> assumptions). The Hertzian Condition refers to the
>
"encoding" and
> "decoding" verification processes.
>
>
Does that help?
>
>
Judith
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