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Hi Steve (and everyone else too, of course),
I think I can help answer at least part of this
question:
Steve J. wrote:Anyone who can provide a definition of what
"Law" is
for the purpose of present discussion? I posted an excerpt from "Life, Itself" that discusses Robert
Rosen's concept of Natural Law. He was describing, in that excerpt, how the very
fact that we are discussing phenomena in the ambience (and arguing about what
constitutes proof that we have figured out various real consistencies in
the ambience) means that certain things have to be true. The fact that
those things have to be true in order for us to be discussing and modeling it is
an embodiment of this truth: There are consistent principles underlying
phenomena we perceive in "the ambience" and these principles echo over and over.
This is Natural Law, in totality.
I think the concept of an echo is a good analogy (An analogy is a
word model, so a good analogy is a word model that satisfies the
Hertzian Condition). To model something is a form of echoing chosen
aspects of it in a new system of some sort. That new system may be thoughts, may
be text (words, language), may be mathematical descriptions, may be visual
(diagram/graphs/maps/three dimensional sculptural representation, etc)... In
short, the mode of modeling doesn't change what you're doing-- you're still
creating or using a new system to represent something else, in some way and
to some degree. No model is going to correspond to any original system entirely
(identical twins are not the same in every way, for example) and it is not
even necessary for a model to "get as close as possible" in
its entirety to that 'ideal' in order for it to qualify as a good
model. In fact, I would argue that it is not an "IDEAL" at all.
Why? Because what aspects you want to model depend entirely on what
you want the model FOR. Based on the context of what you want a model to do, the
aspects to be included in the modeling relation will be chosen. So already
context is critical, as is an ability to think! A good model is one where the
relation of the inferential entailment in the model to the causal entailment in
the system being modeled is one of correspondence AND pertains to what the model
is supposed to be used for. Trouble can enter the picture from all directions,
though, because what if the modelers don't know what they need? What if
they don't know what they DON'T need??? What if the modelers don't realize they
don't know?! This is where the discussion turns to issues of optimality and
side-effects. However, let's assume that the modelers managed to create
models that were in solid enough correspondence with the aspects of their
natural systems which had required the use of models for some reason.
Let's further assume that the models were applied well to whatever
tasks required their application (another avenue for serious trouble to creep
in). In that case, the models would prove very useful in their purpose/s and
would satisfy the Hertzian Condition.
The Hertzian Condition is contextual, too, though. Models created
for one purpose may only be corresponding accurately (in the modeling
relation) in those aspects necessary for that
particular purpose. If the model is assumed to be in correspondence in
all sorts of other ways, and applied to different purposes, what are the
chances that it will be in correspondence in ways made necessary by any new
context? I think this is what has happened/is happening with Physics. Those
models of reality satisfy the Hertzian condition well enough to be
useful when applied to the tasks they were created for but the
assumption has carried over that they can be trusted to be
accurate representations of all aspects of any natural system. One of the
things my father wrote in the notes I found after he died was the statement;
"There are no such thing as Paradoxes in the natural world. There are only
poorly created models, poorly applied. What we call paradoxes are really a
symptom; a side-effect." They are a symptom that something is not
corresponding well between our models and the systems being
modeled.
By inference, then, we can say that the more applications in which
a model satisfies the Hertzian condition (and its application doesn't generate
side-effects), the more it is likely to reflect at least some aspect of Natural
Law. Kepler's "regularities" don't automatically fall into this category because
the sun doesn't "rise". That's a model, based on our perception. (However,
it's interesting that this is a perception that other organisms apparently have
modeled too! The sun's regular appearance and disappearance in any ecosystem
triggers the single largest migration/behavior in organisms of any natural
cyclical phenomenon.)
I don't think it's accurate to say:
Steve J. wrote:Natural Law as per Rosen. An
epistemological
principle delineating what is open to (human?) cognition. He said that the establishment of true correspondence via a
modeling relation was proof that we are capable of
perception/cognition/communication of aspects of Natural Law. As you will see in
the excerpt I posted, he said; "Natural Law makes two separate assertions about
the self and its ambience". What these amount to (my translation) are 1.) That
natural law exists; and 2.) That we can perceive and describe aspects
of it.
In my view, and I daresay in my father's as well, the so-called
"Laws of Physics" are inferential laws, pertaining to the models for use in
specific applications, and are only laws in that sense. If they are not
applicable outside of those original applications, as in with Biological
systems, then they are proving that they are not reflections of "Natural Law".
Natural Law was what he defined as pertaining to both self and ambience: The
entailment in the universe (causality). Laws of science are our attempts to
establish congruent modeling relations and are inferential laws of entailment.
They have been generated by our "models" (whatever those models may be,
including mental imaging, intuitional thoughts/pictures, and assumptions). The
Hertzian Condition refers to the "encoding" and "decoding" verification
processes.
Does that help?
Judith
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