Re: meanings of model

[John M <***>]

HP and TG:
I add my tuppence to 'physical law' and some other sentiments in this
discussion:
HP:>>HP: My only point was that most physicists are no longer
reductionists.<< - -
  Maybe. (Tegmar and company etc.) However the basic vision IS strongly and
exclusively reductionistic (including constructionism, what HP claimed.)
Physicak thinking is still a limited mode view of measurable and calculable
model-limitations and restricted to such choices in the infinite total.
In such choice repeat(able)(ed) cases are considered as 'lawful', equatable
to
other similar model-items (=measurement) and are called "the law".
Even the Tegmar followers are tempted to consider the Multiverse as an
infinite repetition of the kind of universe we see here (as in physically
done
observation). Computable (granted: more than just Turing, but analog is a
dream) and replicating our observed situation.
Life as a what? - never mind, I am not game to consider biology something
different from 'another' chosen chapter observed by its own tenets - within
the unrestricted total. It gained exceptional attention (just as physics),
because "we live in it" - it is 'us'... 'Biology' of remote stars provided
less amount of scientific literature (I mean: supernova atom-cooking etc.).

The selected observation and explanation of models is the culprit.
As in all we consider "the sciences". Equating values of one limited model
with the values established for other limited models. Looking for the
characteristics (processes, effects) of select parts (e.g. cells) without
the entire network-imput of effects and processes. I know, it is impossible!
Compromising. however, is right only as such, not as drawing final and
'total' scientific conclusions. Not in biology, not in physics.

Of course we need it and it is useful in the phase of learning about the
world
within our limited capabilities (the stars are the limit: what about
beyond?)
and it succeeded in building our technology, machines, medics, astronomy,
physiology, whatever. Our present cognitive science and technology inventory
we have. It does not provide wisdom in wider understanding, the one e.g. RR
aimed at his philosophy of the 'total natural view'.

I did the reductionistic science-work for 50 years, then asked: can we in
any way understand what's going on? I drew the dividing line and try to keep
the two separated. RR did not have this luxury, he was conversing with the
scientists of reductionist efforts. This is why I strongly suggest to find
the distinction between RR's practical argumentations and his theoretical
ideas.
It may be detrimental to the entire Rosen-oeuvre if we mix all together.
He KNEW math, he KNEW biology, he KNEW physics, he wrote about all these,
but he THOUGHT about the undividable total nature and its principles - so
far beyond our expressive capabilities. We better find this part and expose
it (as Rosenism), or we lose many of the audience we need.

As HP rightly quoted:
> > "Words grew
> > out of the womb of matter" (Laotzu, Tao Teh Ching 1).
We need to create the "new-view" words (meanings, semantics) to help us
understand the 'matter' that beget our thinking in the conservative terms.

John Mikes


----- Original Message -----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 9:09 PM
Subject: Re: meanings of model


> Howard,
> See interposed comments.
> Regards,
> Tim
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Howard
> > Pattee
> > Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 2:17 AM
> > To: ***
> > Subject: Re: meanings of model
> >
> >
> > At 08:09 AM 12/12/04 -0500, Tim wrote:
> >
> > >Another way to say it would be: when do the inherent limits of
> > expression in
> > >formal models (in your first sense) impinge on the capacity for
> > them to be
> > >formal models (in your second sense)?
> >
> > HP: There are at least two schools of thought (or two ontologies)
> > that bear
> > directly on  the form of your question. At the extremes there are the
> > Platonists who see physical laws as derivatives of abstract
> > forms. "In the
> > beginning was the word" (John 1;1). And  there are the
> > Constructivists who
> > see the semantics of formal symbols  limited by physical laws.
> > "Words grew
> > out of the womb of matter" (Laotzu, Tao Teh Ching 1).
> >
> > I am a Constructivist, so I would phrase your question
> > conversely: when do
> > the limits of physical laws impinge on the capacity of formal symbols to
> > have meaning? That is, when do the purely syntactic expressions of
formal
> > mathematics go beyond what can be measured or encoded by nature?
>
>
> TG: (Using you definition of physical laws in your post yesterday ("I
> usually mean by physical laws the natural laws that I imagine exist
whether
> or not I have created a model of these laws.")). I don't really understand
> the intent of your rephrasing. Of course there are many - probably
> infinitely many - formal symbol arrangements that are not commuting models
> of any natural systems. How is this important?
>
>
> > Also Constructivists, like most computer modelers, see no reason why the
> > formal concept of Turing computability should limit how we actually
write
> > programs.
>
>
> TG: The limits of Turing computability are inherent in any program that
run
> on a computer. (Obviously excepting an analog computer, which is an
entirely
> different meaning of "computer".)
>
>
> > Many programs for physical and biological models are not even
> > algorithms because they do not halt by themselves.
>
>
> TG: This is rather vague. I have no idea what kind of programs you are
> talking about, so I don't know if you are talking about successive
numerical
> approximation routines or something else. I disagree that they are not
> algorithms -- of course they are algorithms: they are running on a
computer,
> aren't they?
>
>
> > In fact, strictly
> > speaking, our computers are not Turing-equivalent. They are finite
memory
> > and finite state machines, and all theorems on computability
> > depend on the
> > syntax of infinite sets.
>
>
> TG: The limitations of a universal Turing machine will apply equally (or a
> fortiori) in a finite Turing machine.
>
>
> >
> > This is a classical metaphysical controversy. Henri Poincare (the
> > constructivist) and Bertrand Russell (the formalist) argued this
> > for years
> > and finally agreed to disagree. Rosen and I were closer to agreement
than
> > Poincare and Russell, but there was no doubt Rosen was not as
> > constructivist as I am. We will not resolve this issue here, but I think
> > understanding why there is an issue might help the discussion.
> >
> > Poincare's basic argument is that there is no empirical, ontological, or
> > semantic evidence for infinite sets and certainly none for transfinite
> > sets. He saw infinite sets as useful but purely syntactical games with
> > symbols. He saw Richard's and Russells's paradoxes (and would have seen
> > Goedel's and Turing's theorems) as just limits on how you can play
> > syntactic games, but semantically irrelevant for models of
> > physical reality.
> >
> > Of course, the constructivist agrees that there are formal
> > symbolic models
> > (in my first, right-hand sense) that he cannot compute by Goedelian
> > conditions; but to convince a constructivist that this is scientifically
> > relevant requires an example of physically observable behavior that he
> > cannot adequately model (in my holistic second sense) by satisfying only
> > the Hertzian conditions.
>
>
> TG: Any natural system which possesses closed loops of entailment cannot
be
> modeled solely by a computable model.
>
> > Howard