Re: Fundamental problems in Physics

[Jack Park <***>]

Howard, I would like to see the paper.
Thanks
Jack

Howard Pattee wrote:
> At 10:10 AM 12/14/04 -0500, Judith wrote:
>
> > I am perfectly willing to believe that you personally know physicists 
> > who don't subscribe to the machine metaphor as a philosophy of how the 
> > universe is, in fact I know a few myself. But if they aren't changing 
> > the basis on which physics is predicated, then nothing changes.
>
>
> HP: My only point was that most physicists are no longer reductionists.
> I also doubt that you understand the basis of modern physics, and why 
> should you? It is not easy to state precisely even if you have studied 
> it. An important point is that its models are not restricted to any type 
> of preconceived metaphor. As an ideal physicists are looking only for 
> that type of order in the universe that is inexorable and universal. 
> This means nothing can violate these laws, no matter where or when or in 
> what context or situation they are observed, or in what type of 
> organization or system they are observed in. Any violation means its not 
> a law. Of course the models describing these laws must also pass the 
> Hertzian test.
>
> Universality is often misinterpreted to claim that the laws can describe 
> all observables and all systems. That is not the claim! The laws 
> describe the relations among only a very small and weird set of 
> observables. "Quantum mechanics does not describe a tea party" (Bohr). 
> Life obeys physical laws but is not describable just by these laws. An 
> analogy (with obvious flaws) are traffic rules. In all civilized 
> countries their existence is universal and (ideally) inexorably obeyed. 
> However, they tell you almost nothing about where traffic is going, why 
> there are rush hours, or who is driving.
>
> > Judith: As he [Rosen] said in Life, Itself, "The machine metaphor 
> > isn't just a little bit wrong, it is entirely wrong and must be 
> > discarded."
>
>
> HP: It is difficult to see this statement as more than an expression of 
> irritation. I have never heard anything like this from Rosen, and it 
> contradicts his long-standing concept of complexity as systems that 
> require multiple models. He always accepted physical models as one 
> useful type of model. What might save the statement would be to replace 
> "The machine metaphor . . ." with a phrase like, "To claim that models 
> should be only machine metaphors . . ."
>
> In any case, this has nothing to do with the basis of modern physics 
> models as I explained above.
>
> > HP: On the other hand, I don't know any physicist that does not 
> > believe that there exists completely general physical laws that every 
> > living system must follow in detail at all levels of complexity.
> >
> > Judith: I think the physicists are wrong about sentence number one 
> > [above].
>
>
> HP: As I explained to John K, what I mean by physical laws is what Rosen 
> calls natural causes. Physicists and Rosen believe that everything 
> follows natural causes.
>
> Judith:  Physics, as a science, is less than helpful in analyzing any 
> system which has an organization where the organization supplies more 
> "causality" than the parts alone do. Frankly, I see this as being true 
> even in "simple" systems, like chemical reactions, but you can pretend 
> it isn't and get away with it.
>
> HP: I agree, and so do physicists. They regard chemistry as requiring 
> different models. Nevertheless, no fundamental physical laws are 
> violated by chemistry. In the traffic-rules analog, you might think of 
> physical laws as the stop signs and chemical reactions as the traffic.
>
> New topic:
>
> > HP: "The concept of Biosemiotics requires making a distinction between 
> > two categories, the material or physical world and the symbolic or 
> > semantic world. The problem is that there is no obvious way to connect 
> > the two categories.  .  . In fact, how material structures serve as 
> > signals, instructions, and controls is inseparable from the problem of 
> > the origin and evolution of life. Biosemiotics was established as a 
> > necessary complement to the physical-chemical reductionist approach to 
> > life that cannot make this crucial categorical distinction necessary 
> > for describing semantic information. Matter as described by physics 
> > and chemistry has no intrinsic function or semantics. By contrast, 
> > biosemiotics recognizes that life begins with function and semantics." 
> > (Pattee, J. Biosemiotics 1, in press)
> >
> > Judith: Again, what the above doesn't acknowledge is the foundational 
> > issue of how these two "worlds" (material/physical and 
> > symbolic/semantic) interact to make each other possible.
>
>
> HP: The above paragraph is only the first paragraph of the paper, the 
> subject of which acknowledges: "the foundational issue of how these two 
> "worlds" (material/physical and symbolic/semantic) interact to make each 
> other possible."
>
> I will send the whole paper if you wish, but I do not claim to have the 
> whole answer!
>
> Howard
>