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Re: Fundamental problems in Physics



Howard,
 
A few new comments, interposed:
 
HP: My interpretation of the machine metaphor is that it is equivalent logically to strong reductionism. So there is hope, because I don't know any physicist today who believes in or subscribes to such an  "inbred, closed orthodoxy," i.e., that every model of a system can be obtained from the largest model by formal means (LI, p. 103). I think that is a straw man. (Consequently, as I have mentioned before, physicists find this one of Rosen's most irritating claims.)
 
I am perfectly willing to believe that you personally know physicists who don't subscribe to the machine metaphor as a philosophy of how the universe is, in fact I know a few myself. But if they aren't changing the basis on which physics is predicated, then nothing changes. Most physicists don't feel any deep need to put themselves through the trouble that Einstein faced, because the limitations of the paradigm don't get in their way or make it impossible to do what they want to do using it as it is. However, since it is the basis for all science, even areas of science where the limitations DO get in the way, cause serious impediments, or make real understanding impossible (Medicine, Physiology, Ecology, Meteorology, etc) will have to bear this burden unless it's changed at the foundations. The reason physicists find it irritating is because this is a pain in the ass and they don't see the need: "The trouble with YOU, Rosen, is you're always trying to answer questions that nobody wants to ask!" As he said in Life, Itself, "The machine metaphor isn't just a little bit wrong, it is entirely wrong and must be discarded." The fact that Einstein (who was also accused of being a pain in the ass) wasn't able to figure out what was fundamentally in the way of a unified set of "Natural Laws" was, in my opinion, due to the fact that he stayed within physics as he was looking for it. The simplified view that a particulate matter-based paradigm creates is a distorting looking glass. It is a testament to Einstein's intuition and talent that he kept on looking. I think his work and his frustrations in not being able to finish it allowed Robert Rosen to come along from the perspective of Biology and finish the puzzle.
 
On the other hand, I don't know any physicist that does not believe that there exists completely general physical laws that every living system must follow in detail at all levels of complexity. In other words, life requires more than one model, one of which is the detailed universal general physical model that Rosen criticizes LI, p.12. In fact, as Rosen used to emphasize (pre-1980s) that full understanding of life requires a hierarchy of complementary models. Which model you focus on at any time depends on the questions you want answered.
 
I don't see sentence number one and sentence number two, above, as being corollaries of each other. I agree with sentence number two but I think the physicists are wrong about sentence number one. This is exactly my point, in fact. I think it's pretty clear from my father's work that one of the main components of "Natural Law" (completely general physical laws that every living system must follow in detail (cannot avoid) at all levels of complexity and non-complexity) is that there is enormous potential for causality in relational interaction. Physics, as a science, is less than helpful in analyzing any system which has an organization where the organization supplies more "causality" than the parts alone do. Frankly, I see this as being true even in "simple" systems, like chemical reactions, but you can pretend it isn't and get away with it. Any chemical reaction is just that; a reaction. It's the effect of interaction between two or more "things". Therefore, the causality or action is all in the relation and the way the relation is formed is going to impact the result. The way things are organized when/while they interact is what specifies the relation. We live with this reality from birth and it's so familiar that we don't even see it anymore (familiarity breeds contempt?!). Many things that are necessary for human health or human life are also dangerous if we interact with them in a different way from the way it is necessary. Fire/heat, water, air, nutrients, elements... In fact, I would argue that "causality" could not exist except via relational interaction. So to speak about "matter" at all, or "forces" or atomic processes or velocities is to ignore the most important fundamental aspect of the universe while incorporating it unconsciously.
 
HP: That is not a fair assessment of biosemiotics. I believe my statement below is a more accurate consensus:
"The concept of Biosemiotics requires making a distinction between two categories, the material or physical world and the symbolic or semantic world. The problem is that there is no obvious way to connect the two categories.  .  . In fact, how material structures serve as signals, instructions, and controls is inseparable from the problem of the origin and evolution of life. Biosemiotics was established as a necessary complement to the physical-chemical reductionist approach to life that cannot make this crucial categorical distinction necessary for describing semantic information. Matter as described by physics and chemistry has no intrinsic function or semantics. By contrast, biosemiotics recognizes that life begins with function and semantics." (Pattee, J. Biosemiotics 1, in press)
 
Again, what the above doesn't acknowledge is the foundational issue of how these two "worlds" (material/physical and symbolic/semantic) interact to make each other possible. "Matter as described by physics and chemistry has no intrinsic function or semantics. By contrast, biosemiotics recognizes that life begins with function and semantics." 
Matter as described by physics has no organization, either, which is pure nonsense. My father's point is that Physics needs to change because it is in error at the most fundamental level.
 
Judith
 
 
Original Message -----
To: ***
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 1:51 AM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] meanings of model

Judith,

Many of your postings I find are excellent statements of Rosen's views and your own views with which I agree. So to keep discussions as concise as possible, I'll usually pick on points where I think our disagreement is interesting. The first instance of such disagreement is probably what we each find interesting! What I think is interesting are  the disagreements that remain apparently irresolvable by empirical evidence, logic, and rational (and even emotional) arguments. The reason is that this situation suggests that there exist two or more irreducible or complementary models and that all are valuable or necessary. (I include basic assumptions and definitions as parts of every model.)   

Judith: Obviously, my father was a scientist and he was not trying to make living organisms fit into the model of a machine. So I believe there's hope for science, but not if it remains an inbred, closed orthodoxy built on machine-metaphor-based physics.

HP: My interpretation of the machine metaphor is that it is equivalent logically to strong reductionism. So there is hope, because I don't know any physicist today who believes in or subscribes to such an  "inbred, closed orthodoxy," i.e., that every model of a system can be obtained from the largest model by formal means (LI, p. 103). I think that is a straw man. (Consequently, as I have mentioned before, physicists find this one of Rosen's most irritating claims.)

On the other hand, I don't know any physicist that does not believe that there exists completely general physical laws that every living system must follow in detail at all levels of complexity. In other words, life requires more than one model, one of which is the detailed universal general physical model that Rosen criticizes LI, p.12. In fact, as Rosen used to emphasize (pre-1980s) that full understanding of life requires a hierarchy of complementary models. Which model you focus on at any time depends on the questions you want answered.

HP: Rosen's ideas are known to some of them, but as yet it is not clear how these ideas can apply to empirical models.
 
Judith: How is it not clear?

HP: I mean that Rosen's ideas, as far as I know, do not appear in empirically testable models except as timeless epistemological principles or beliefs at a high level of abstraction. It is not clear that these ideas themselves admit empirical verifiability. That does not mean they are not useful. Most epistemic principles are not empirically verifiable, like the modeling relation itself.

Judith: However, what needs to happen is that the paradigm of "science" itself must expand because physics still states that all relations are figments of human imagination.

HP: All models are figments of a brain's imagery or imagination. Scientific models are only those figments of the imagination that satisfy the modeling relation. This relation is a powerful restriction on scientific models.
 
Judith: My concern about Biosemiotics and about bio-informatics and about various other types of "complexity" is all due to the fact that none of these "newer" disciplines question the underlying assumptions in Physics/Science... They ignore them.

HP: That is not a fair assessment of biosemiotics. I believe my statement below is a more accurate consensus:
"The concept of Biosemiotics requires making a distinction between two categories, the material or physical world and the symbolic or semantic world. The problem is that there is no obvious way to connect the two categories.  .  . In fact, how material structures serve as signals, instructions, and controls is inseparable from the problem of the origin and evolution of life. Biosemiotics was established as a necessary complement to the physical-chemical reductionist approach to life that cannot make this crucial categorical distinction necessary for describing semantic information. Matter as described by physics and chemistry has no intrinsic function or semantics. By contrast, biosemiotics recognizes that life begins with function and semantics." (Pattee, J. Biosemiotics 1, in press)

Howard