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meanings of model
- From: Howard Pattee <***>
- Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2004 21:02:26 -0800
Tim and Boris,
Your discussions raise a problem I have had with definitions of "model"
that appears to me to have two profoundly different usages. One meaning of
"model" refers to the structures of the formalism itself. Essentially this
usage refers to "the formal model" as the right half of the modeling
diagram. In this formal sense we can speak of all possible models and other
formal concepts such as infinite sets, formal mappings, equivalence
relations, duality, direct sums, Cartesian products, and the largest
model. In this formal context, analytic and synthetic are used as in
formal logic, analytic referring to purely syntactical propositions where
proof by contradiction is allowed. Synthetic expressions are not true or
false by virtue of syntax alone, but among logicians I can't find any
consensus on its precise meaning.
The other meaning of "model" is an empirically testable representation,
implying the WHOLE modeling relation. In this usage the right-half
formalism is a model if and only if it satisfies some empirical test such
as the Hertzian condition that (as a result of measurement or encoding) the
interpreted consequents of the model's formal syntax matches closely enough
the consequents of nature. This is definitely not a formal condition since
neither measurement nor "matching closely enough" is a formalizable process
or condition.
Since empirical models are always finite, non-formal approximations, I do
not see how exact logical conclusion about model formalisms necessarily
apply to reality in other than the Hertzian testable sense. Except for
practical speed/complexity issues, like NP-completeness and all that, I am
not aware of any biological modelers that feel limited by or are even
concerned about the formal aspects of computability. Other problems seem
more important.
Yet Rosen apparently argues that they are limited and they should be
concerned when trying to model complex systems. I accept his formal
conclusions about "the formal model" as correct, but I don't follow the
informal argument that would preclude empirically testable models of some
aspects of life. What am I missing?
Howard