Re: Operational Closure

[Howard Pattee <***>]

Tim, 

Apparently we do agree that there is "something out there" that corresponds to our model. 
The problem seemsto be how we speak about what is out there without confusion.

The only issue where there is apparent disagreement is on  deciding what observables we 
should choose as important. In my view, and also I believe in Rosen's view, this choice 
of the important observables it crucial in forming a model. For example, I think for 
physical models, acceleration is more important (or more fundamental, if you prefer) than 
velocity. 

Howard
> 
> From: Tim Gwinn <***>
> Date: 2004/12/03 Fri PM 05:39:19 EST
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Operational Closure
> 
> Hmm, "near-solipsistic"? Well, we differ here, certainly. :) I do not
> consider my position solipsistic in the least. It rests on there actually
> existing "out there" phenomena and relations between them.
> 
> I disagree somewhat with your assertion that this "view would also require
> that there is no matter or forces in the external world". Concepts of
> 'force' and 'matter' are just that: concepts. Whether 'force' is a "real"
> quality or not is debatable. Hertz proposed a forceless mechanics.
> Einstein's general relativity has bodies not being forced, but rather bodies
> follow a warping of spacetime. As to "matter", my position is as Rosen
> states - that we consider there to be noumena behind the phenomena we
> perceive. Thae exact nature of that noumena remains shrouded. We've modeled
> "matter" as everything from the four elements of earth-wind-water-fire to
> the unbreakable atoms of Democritus to vibrating infinitesimal strings.
> 
> I suppose I could restate my view by saying that all our concepts and
> terminology sit on the formal side and when we impute them to the external
> world, we have decorated (somewhat in the sense of decorationg a graph) the
> external world of phenomena with these concepts and labels. This works
> eminently well day-to-day or FAPP, but I find it to be a confusion to take
> those decorations as ontological. I think this is what leads to things like
> considering the Newtonian paradigm as self-evident, because there is a
> blurred distinction between the model (or, in this case, the paradigm for
> the models) and what is being modeled, such that the decorations are
> considered to actually *be* aspects of the external world on the same
> ontological footing as the phenomena.
> 
> I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a "more real existence". In your
> previous post, you said "HP: I agree we can?t say much about what really
> exists."
> 
> Regards,
> Tim
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Howard
> > Pattee
> > Sent: Friday, December 03, 2004 4:33 PM
> > To: ***
> > Subject: Re: Operational Closure
> >
> >
> > Tim wrote:
> > All that sits on the natural system side of the modelling relation are
> > percepts (perceived phenomena) and the relations between them. There is no
> > 'acceleration' or 'velocity' in the external world.
> >
> > HP: This near-solipsistic view would also require that there is
> > no matter or forces in the external world. I agree that this
> > metaphysical belief is logically consistent and empirically
> > irrefutable, and consequently not profitably discussed much
> > further. My feeling is that both Rosen and I believe in a more
> > real existence corresponding to these observables that is also
> > logically consistent and empirically irrefutable.
> >
> > Howard
>