Re: Operational Closure

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

> -----Original Message-----
-snip-
>
> HP: I agree we can?t say much about what really exists. But if as
> you say some aspects of reality are congruent with our models
> can?t we infer that those aspects that are more important in our
> models correspond to what is more important in reality? For
> example, is it entirely nonsensical to believe that in the
> universe acceleration is more important than velocity, as is
> clear from our models?


All that sits on the natural system side of the modelling relation are
percepts (perceived phenomena) and the relations between them. There is no
'acceleration' or 'velocity' in the external world. Those terms only have
meaning with respect to a formal model. The congruence established is
between the entailment relations embodied in those formal models and their
outputs with natural system counterparts of perceived entailment relations
between percepts and measurements on those percepts. We commonly call those
counterparts by the names we use in the models, but strictly speaking, those
terms only are sensical within the formal model -- there is no Newtonian
spacetime, Minkowski space, etc. in the external world.

Also, I'm not sure what "important" means here. In particular, I'm not sure
what it would mean for one ontological quality to be "more important" than
another ontological quality; or for that matter, what criteria would be used
to select what aspects of our formal models are "more important" than
others.

Regards,
Tim