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Re: Operational Closure



I think this is an interesting situation-- it is also an opportunity to show how a relational model would apply:
 
Howard Pattee wrote: For example, is it entirely nonsensical to believe that in the universe acceleration is more important than velocity, as is clear from our models?
What is acceleration without any value of velocity? What are either of these values without some notion of time? Acceleration of "what", "where?"... It appears we need some value of space as well. None of these things can exist without one another. In some sense, then, they entail each other and are entailed, at the same time. In no way can acceleration be said to be a "more important" value than any of the others in any model that is congruent to natural systems in the universe. The relations between all these entities will generate causal effects in the natural system, therefore the relations need to be included in the model, just as the fact that isolation of these entities from each other is impossible in the natural system must be included in the model.
 
As for judging the importance of one aspect over any of the others, that is a matter of perspective, and perspective is relative, too.
 
Judith
 
 
To: ***
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2004 9:17 AM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Operational Closure

Tim wrote:
Certainly I agree with you that if congruence in our modelling relations
between formal and natural systems means anything, then our formal models
are congruent with counterparts in the external world. My concern is with
how much we can say about those counterparts. Rosen was quite cautious,
though, even in his assertion of there being an external world.
[snip]
Because all of this rests on so much indirect and unprovable evidence, along with an inability to pierce the noumenal veil, then I feel that ontological questions such as whether form or matter are more fundamental ontologically cannot be answered within this kind of epistemology - they are nonsensical questions in my view.

HP: I agree we can't say much about what really exists. But if as you say some aspects of reality are congruent with our models can't we infer that those aspects that are more important in our models correspond to what is more important in reality? For example, is it entirely nonsensical to believe that in the universe acceleration is more important than velocity, as is clear from our models?

Howard