Re: Operational Closure

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

Howard,

I read Rosen differently. Forms, such as mathematical forms, all sit on the
formal system side of the modelling relation. The only thing that sits on
the natural system side are percepts. The organization we perceive arises
from our mind and are then imputed back to the natural system:

        "Briefly, we believe that one of the primary functions of the mind is
precisely to *organize* percepts. That is, the mind is not merely a passive
receiver of perceptual images, but rather takes an active role in processing
them and ultimately in responding to them through effector mechanisms. The
*organization* of percepts means precisely the establishment of relations
between them. But we then must admit that such relations reflect the
properties of the active mind as much as they do the percepts which the mind
organizes.
        "What does seem to be true, however, is the following: that the mind
behaves *as if* a relation it establishes between percepts were itself a
percept. Consequently, it behaves *as if* such a relation between percepts
arises from a corresponding relation between qualities is the external
world. Therefore, it behaves as if such a relation between qualities in the
external world were itself a quality, and as if the perception of this new
quality consisted precisely of the relation it established between percepts.
The basic point is simply that relations between percepts are, at least to
some extent, creations of the mind which are then *imputed* to the external
world. As such, they may be regarded as "working hypotheses", or, to use a
more direct word, *models* of how the external world is organized." [AS p.
46]

So, I see it that organization is a model like any other, and sits on the
formal side. Models are how we analyze and understand natural systems in the
external world. I think what Platonists do is impute the model *as an
entity* to the external world, leading to the notion of forms (models) as
being ontological entities. I think this is just a confusion of the products
of our analysis - the formal models - on the formal system side of the
modelling relation with the natural system side. I think it is as confused
as thinking that tensor fields (as an example), which are entirely
mathematical objects on the formal system side, are actual ontological
entities that permeate the external world. The same thing goes for similar
musings from string theory, etc.

I doubt, therefore, if Rosen would have argued that either matter or form
were more fundamental ontologically than the other. I think it would be a
nonsensical question to him.

I think the last quote sentence you provide ("The organization of a natural
system (and in particular, of a biological organism) is at least as much a
part of its material reality as the specific particles that constitute it at
a given time, perhaps indeed more so.") is not an assertion of organization
as being more ontologically fundamental, but rather is alluding to the
relative importance of relational models (as opposed to structural or
dynamical models) for the understanding (i.e., analysis) of biological
organisms.

As for realizations (in the quote you provide), moving from a formal model
("bauplan") to a physical realization does not entail that the formal model
is therefore an entity in the external world. The formal models that arise
for making a realization are either from analysis or are a "free creation of
the mind". In either case, these model(s) that are used for realizations all
sit on the formal side, and it is only if we allow the confusion mentioned
above that we think of them as something like Platonic forms.

Regards,
Tim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of Howard
> Pattee
> Sent: Tuesday, November 30, 2004 9:35 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Operational Closure
>
>
> Tim wrote:
> I don't think of Rosen as "more of a Platonist" because he
> focused on system
> organization. I think his argument was quite the opposite: that
> organization
> was as physical as anything else, and therefore models of
> organization were
> valid models, and belonged to an expanded view of physics.
>
> HP: Of course, forms have physical realizations. By “more
> of a Platonist” I was not denying Rosen’s recognition
> of physical realizations of forms any more than Plato did. The
> issue is what is considered ontologically more fundamental, form
> (organization) or matter (specific realizations). Most
> theoretical physicists are Platonists in this sense. They
> don’t deny matter, or think of it as unphysical, but they
> think of it more as “derived” or
> “realized” from abstract mathematical forms (e.g.,
> string theory and Wheeler’s “It from Bit”).
> This is similar to how Rosen thought.
>
> Rosen: “As we have seen, reductionism dispenses with
> organization as the first, essential step in its analysis. It
> expects to recapture organization later, as I have indicated. In
> the relational approach, it is the matter that is dispensed with.
> But the concept of realization allows us to, in a sense,
> recapture matter from a bauplan.”
> [snip]
> “However, there is nothing in the relational strategy that
> is unphysical, in the sense of ideal physics. The organization of
> a natural system (and in particular, of a biological organism) is
> at least as much a part of its material reality as the specific
> particles that constitute it a a given time, perhaps indeed more
> so.” (LI, p. 119)
>
> Howard