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John M.
Looking for generalities is a useful thing to do, and my father did
a lot of it. That's what his work focused on for a substantial part of the
time. Another portion of his time, he was looking for particularities.
Yet another portion, he was looking for patterns among the generalities,
patterns among the particularities, patterns among the patterns...
My concern is that you often seem to be willing to sacrifice all
particularities in order to keep the generalities. Just as a reductionist
perspective is not good if it's all you do, it's equally not good to go to the
opposite extreme. I once pointed out on the list that Robert Rosen did
not think reductionist approaches in science were inherently "bad" or
always un-useful. On the contrary. They are only un-useful when applied in
situations where they presuppose a condition that doesn't exist. When that
happens, those approaches destroy information we need. He was not advocating
that science sacrifice the entire notion of learning about structure by taking
things apart. Science can get important information that way, even with complex
systems. His point was that it must not be the only approach allowed to be
called "science" because structure is a limited sub-system of the total
organization. He was also recommending that a broader theoretical perspective be
kept in mind, even when using reductionist approaches-- that helps to limit
the inappropriate application of them.
What his notion of complexity is trying to get across is that the
relational effects resulting from organization are far too important in a
complex system for science to ignore such aspects. There needs to be some
balance to it all.
Judith
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Sunday, November 28, 2004 3:26
PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Operational
Closure
Tim and Judith:
"A" cause is chosen from and for a
limited model. It is the natural system's
total change that results in an
'event' and I wouldn't even call the
triggering (good word!) as a
'beginning', rather as the observed immediate
'affectings'.
It is also a
consequence of the process in the totality. And I would cut out
the limited
view for a M-V 'system' ("subset").
Organizations consist of
organizations consist of organizations - our view.\
I am seeking those
general distinctions that are applicable at any level.
I don't care if
Org.#1 consists of people, of cells, of atoms, of stars?
all these are well
defined (limited) models and subject to general
principles.
John
Mikes
(Happy to see the list alive again).
----- Original Message
-----
From: "Tim Gwinn" <***>
To: <***>
Sent:
Sunday, November 28, 2004 8:27 AM
Subject: Re: Operational
Closure
> Steve,
>
> > 1. How are the words
"trigger" and "cause" different
> > in this context? Do Rosen and
Maturano/Varela mean
> > different things by the word "cause" or is
there a
> > deeper disagreement?
>
> As I understand it,
an environmental input (trigger) does not 'cause' the
> resultant
behavior of an autopoietic system in the sense that the system
>
itself (by virtue of its internal organization) determines how (and if)
it
> will respond to that trigger, as opposed to the system's behavior
being
> merely reducible to a chain of causes beginning with the initial
trigger.
I
> think it is just a different sense of the term 'cause'
and not anything
> contrary to Rosen. I do not think that M&V were
denying causality as a
> physical property or were proposing acausality.
Instead, I think they were
> denying a mechanistic
determinism.
>
>
> > 2. Is "Closure Under Efficient
Cause" equivalent to
> > "Operational Closure" and if not then what
are the
> > differences?
>
> They are very similar. I
defer to a very useful paper (see end of post)
from
> Letelier, Marin
and Mpodozis entitled "Autopoietic and (M,R)-Systems",
which
>
concludes that autopoietic systems constitute a subset of
(M,R)-systems.
> This is because in addition to the requriement of
organizational closure -
> which is satisfied by any (M,R)-system - the
autopoietic systems
definition
> additionally has a topological
requirement that the system possess a
> physical boundary within which
the organizational closure occurs. Since
> (M,R)-systems have no such
specific requirement, then autopoietic systems
> are a further
constrained subset of the set of (M,R)-systems.
>
>
> >
3. Rosen never extended his concept of closure to
> > societies or
"third order structural couplings" as M/V
> > refer to them. (first
and second order couplings being
> > unicellular and metacellular
organism)
>
> My thought is that because the (M,R)-system is
intended to be a model
> specifically of _individual_ living organisms,
then it would seem to be
> inappropriate to employ it as a model for a
society (i.e., a population of
> organisms).
>
>
>
Some of the papers I consider informative for comparing (M,R)-systems
and
> autopoietic
systems:
>
============================================================================
>
==
> Letelier, Marin, Mpodozis. "Autopoietic and (M,R)-systems". J.
Theo. Bio.
> 222(2):261-272
> Zaretzky, Letelier. "Metabolic
Networks from (M,R)-systems and Autopoietic
> Perspective". J. Bio. Sys.
10(3):265-280
> Nomura, Shimohara."A Description of Quasi-Autopoietic
Systems based on the
> Framework of (M,R) Systems". AROB III
1998:658-661
> Nomura. "Quasi-Autopoietic Systems Using Metabolism
Repair Systems". ECAL
> 1997:48-56
>
> You can find the
links to these (and others) on my website at:
> http://www.panmere.com/rosen/webresources.htm#mrsys
>
>
Regards,
> Tim
>
>
> > -----Original
Message-----
> > From: ROSEN Forum
[mailto:*** Behalf Of Steve
> >
Johnson
> > Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2004 6:16 PM
> >
To: ***
>
> Subject: Operational Closure
> >
> >
> > I was
reading Maturano and Varela's "Tree of
> > Knowledge" as well as
"Autopoesis and Cognition" and I
> > want to hear your opinions on a
point that I found
> > confusing.
> >
> > One of
the key concepts in the book is "Operational
> > Closure". As far as
I can tell this is defined as
> > follows: "changes in the system are
determined only by
> > the internal structure and dynamics of the
system not
> > by external inputs".
> >
> > They
labour the point that external stimuli only
> > "trigger" the changes
in an organism but they do not
> > "determine" them. The changes are
determined by the
> > internal structure/dynamics of the system.
The
> > external stiumulus merely "selects" one of the
> >
possible paths for the ontogenetic drift from the
> > space
defined by the internal structure/dynamics.
> >
> > A single
cell, a multicellular organism, as well as a
> > society are all said
to have operational closure.
> >
> > At first I thought this
was analogous to Rosen's
> > definition that organisms are closed
under efficient
> > cause, that they are self-causing. But as I
read
> > Maturano/Varela further I was puzzled to come across
>
> repeated protestations that there is no causality,
> > that
external stimuli only "trigger" but do not
> > "cause" behaviours (or
rather internal changes whose
> > motor expressions we perceive as
behaviour).
> >
> > So my questions:
> >
>
> 1. How are the words "trigger" and "cause" different
> > in this
context? Do Rosen and Maturano/Varela mean
> > different things by
the word "cause" or is there a
> > deeper disagreement?
>
>
> > 2. Is "Closure Under Efficient Cause" equivalent to
>
> "Operational Closure" and if not then what are the
> >
differences?
> >
> > 3. Rosen never extended his concept of
closure to
> > societies or "third order structural couplings" as
M/V
> > refer to them. (first and second order couplings
being
> > unicellular and metacellular organism)
> >
>
>
> > I know causality is a sore topic on this list so I'm
>
> sorry if I'm adding oil to the fire.
> >
> >
Thanks,
> >
> > - Steve
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