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Distortions on Wikipedia entry for Robert Rosen
- From: Tim Gwinn <***>
- Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2004 10:37:09 -0400
I wanted to note
that the current entry (as of 21:26 28 Sep 04) for Robert Rosen at
Wikipedia.org (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Rosen)
contains what I consider to be, several glaring distortions. I want to make some
entry corrections, but I wanted to toss this out to the listmembers prior to
doing so.
1)
That his book Anticipatory Systems is "mainly
concerned with what he termed the modelling relationship".
This statement
utterly misses the point of AS as a study of anticipatory systems and their
models.
2)
That "organization" is not captured by "differential equations but using
category theory. This study, Rosen says, must be independent from which
constitutes a living system."
I cannot tell if
this is just badly mangled English or confusion, but it misrepresents the role
of relational models with respect to organisms, and it does not make clear why
different formalisms (diffeqs and category theory) are required for different
types of models.
3)
Calls "functions" a "teleological notion".
Unnecesary
conflation of final cause with teleology has been one of the reasons final
causes (and anticipatory systems) have been repulsive to science. 'Function' for
Rosen need not imply telos:
"I am advocating
the objectivity of at least a limited kind of final causation. This
is precisely what closes the causal loops. It simply desribes something in
terms of what it entails, rather than exclusively in terms of what entails it.
This, it will be observed, need have nothing to do with Telos, any
more than, say, Gödel's Incompleteness
Theorem does." [EL p. 95 ital. orig.]
4) "The notion that life can be described as correspondence
between some kind of ideal form independent of observable entities
(organization) and an abstraction (a mathematical structure) is remarkably
similar to Platonism."
This incorrectly
tries to make relational mathematical models appear to be somehow less credible
than dynamical mathematical models. elational models are no more Platonic than
mathematical models. Also, the idea that it is "independent of observable
entities" is incorrect (what it does do is change what our notion of an
observable must be to include functional processes and organization) and misses
the distinction between a model and a material realization of that
model.
5) Regarding evolution, it states: "The proposed solution
for this problem is embracing entailment in evolution, citing the works
of Ernest (sic) Haeckel and his idea
of ?ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny?, René
Thom's Catastrophe Theory and D'Arcy
Thompson's On Growth and
Form."
This phrasing
suggests that Rosen's "proposed solution" (in LI sec. 11G) includes
promoting Haeckel's and Thompson's ideas. This is not at all the case. They
are instead used as historical examples of attempts at
understanding entailment in evolution.
6) "Questions about Rosen's mathematical underpinnings
of "relational biology" have been raised in a paper authored by Christopher
Landauer and Kirstie L. Bellman which claims that that some of the mathematical
"proofs" used by Rosen are dubious."
One the one
hand, myself, Aloisius Louie, and Don Mikulecky all rebut this paper
as one which fails to even comprehend Rosen's concepts and therefore is a bogus
charge. So I am inclined to simply delete this remark. On the other hand, I
don't want to erase debate, so I could link to my rebuttal. But then again
Wikipedia is not really the forum for exchanges of ideas.
7) "Moreover, the idea that is possible to establish a
correspondence relation between languages and ideal or abstract entities
different but related to physical objects has been repudiated in a broad sense
from disciplines like lingustics and philosophy of
language."
I have no idea
what is the basis for this assertion. Nor does it specify what it is intended to
refute. My guess is that it intends to refute the modeling relation. However,
science is predicated upon being able to make mathematical models of the
physical world. I am inclined to strike the remark entirely.
Several of these
statement almost seem to be willful attempts to discredit Rosen's work by use of
misleading or incorrect portrayal of his ideas. I wonder if others here get that
same impression.
Regards,
Tim