Re: What is closure?

[Tim Gwinn <***>]

JohnK,

Aristotle's works were labeled by topic (Physics), book number (II) and
chapter (3). There is a site that has some of Aristotle's translated work
online....here it is:
http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/index.html
(The translation I used was from the book "A New Aristotle Reader" edited by
Ackrill.) There is another site where you can flip back and forth between
English and Greek, but I don't have the link at the moment.

1) I'm having some trouble understanding your assertions generally. Can you
provide a "why?" question about a closed system and the corresponding
Aristotelian answers for material and efficient cause? That might help to
clarify.

2) I didn't understand your comment: "The non-reality of "cause" is a
specious argument...". Is this a comment to me or Howard? I made no
assertion that causal entailments do not exist.

The answers in an Aristotelian analysis provide information in response to a
specific "why?". Yes, that information does tell us about entailments. But
it tells us about entailments in the context of the specific analysis being
done, in the context of the specific "why?" being asked. The answers are
entirely context-dependent (which is one of the reasons it is useful in the
Rosennean paradigm).

3) Re the comment "The problem with causality that now plagues physics is
its non-closure of material causality." Why is this a problem?

Regards,
Tim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:*** Behalf Of John
> Kineman
> Sent: Friday, September 17, 2004 12:34 PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: What is closure?
>
>
> Hi Tim,
>
> Thanks for getting Aristotles own words! What is the reference "Physics
> II.3"?
>
> Some quick notes from my perspective (insert IMO in all that follows):
>
> 1. One typically answers "why" with "because" - i..,e "be" "cause." So,
> its deeply embedded in the analysis. There is no reason that I can see
> to say "closed system" is a different semantics than material system
> closure. There is nothing a system can be open or closed to except what
> is called causes in this view.
>
> 2. The non-reality of "cause" is a specious argument, applicable only to
> attempts, primarily in "old physics," to associate theoretical concepts
> (i.e., cause, force, particle, thing, energy, etc.) with reality itself.
> Those who do not use the concept with such intentions suffer no such
> problem with it. A "cause" is a modeling concept. Rosen's entire
> framework is based on modeling relations and so it fully handles the
> idea that anything it suggests, including "causes" are not elements of
> the natural world, but elements of a model (including metamodel,
> metaphysics, world view etc.).
>
> 3. The problem with causality that now plagues physics is its
> non-closure of material causality. Since that's the only causality it
> recognized earlier, the tendency is to discard the entire concept.
> Aristotle handled material incompleteness by proposing higher level
> causes, creating a hierarchy. Its one way to deal with it. Current
> metaphysics that physicists are pursuing, and which Howard refers to, is
> differently based. There is nothing inherently less valid about
> deconstructing nature in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics than in more
> fasionable ways in current physics - the test is how they perform for
> the phenomena of interest and that they fail outside of the phenomena of
> interest (which was the case of the mechanical metaphysics which worked
> for mechanical phenomena but not for explaining life).
>
> Apologies - I have to run  - I'll revisit the rest of this - there are
> interesting aspects to the examples you cite and I think we can sort out
> the differences in what is being said, but alas my paid job calls. The
> above are some hints of where I will try to take it regarding aligning
> the language of "closed systems" with the "closed to effiient cause" -
> again, I will try to show that they are intimately related.  Thanks.
>
> Later,
> John
>