In Rosen's (M,R)-system, an input to the system from the environment ('A'
in the diagram) is a material cause to the question "why B?" (see
LI p. 139) in the metabolism function "f:A->B". When Rosen says [LI p.
244] that organisms are "closed to efficient causation", he explains the
relevant why? question in the subsequent sentence: "That is, if f
is any component of such a system, the question "why f?" has an answer
within the system, which corresponds to the category of efficient cause of
f". So, "closed" in this sense is related to the existence of
a loop of entailment; the ability to find all these particular informational
answers to the why? question in the system diagram without leading to an
infinite regress of such answers outside the system.
In general, though, an arbitrary system will not have an internal
functional organization like an (M,R)-system, or a metabolism function to
which can assign material or efficient causes in an identical manner. The
informational answers depend upon the particular thing we ask about and the
particular why? question we ask of it. If we have a closed adiabatic container,
and ask of it: "why the conservation of heat?", then the material cause will be
"because the initial energy content" (the initial state) and the efficient cause
would be "because the insulation insulating". (Efficient causes are as, as
Aristotle said, "the primary source of the change or the staying
unchanged"; the 'cause' of the unchanging heat content is the insulating
effect of the insulation.)
I generally agree with your paragraphs 3, 4 & 5, with a few
exceptions. Where you say:
I roughly agree, except for the "materially closed system". As discussed
above, I'd also add that we have to specify "efficient closure" of
what? That is, what why? question are the efficient causes answers
to. In Rosen's case, the what was the he was talking about was the
relational functional organization and the why? was about the efficient causes
of the functional components in that organization.
In the Newtonian paradigm, both conceptually and mathematically, forces are
part of the environment and they act on the particle, which
is described by its phase - state and velocity. In relation to the question
"why the particle's state?", the forces (which must come from the environment in
that paradigm) are not material cause, they are efficient cause: they are
what is responsible for changing the trajectory of a particle (see LI p.
102-103).
This might sound like a quibble, but
"constructor" sounds too limited. An agent acting as a "destructor" would also
be an efficient cause (as Don used to say, catabolism is as important as
anabolism).
In reference to your #5, I don't know if there is any kind of
"closure" for formal or final causes. I suspect not. Aristotelian formal and
final causes are answers to some particular why? question. Think of Rosen's why?
question he posed for "closed to efficient cause". The thing he was asking it of
was the (M,R)-system organization, and the specific aspect of that was 'why the
efficient cause of each functional component in that organization?'. In order to
get similar informational answers for formal and/or final causes, what is
the thing of which you would be asking a why? question, and what would the
specific why? question be?
> -----Original
Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [
mailto:***]On
Behalf Of John
> Kineman
> Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 12:39
PM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: What is
closure?
>
>
> Hi Tim & list,
>
> Thanks for
the reply. I am very sorry this began as a disagreement;
> something I
hadn't anticipated and was a little taken aback by. I do
> think it is
important for us and the list to clarify these points
> because whenever
an a-priori exclusion is taken in science, unless it
> has been well
established, it blocks progress. That is why I came down
> on the
statement that "there is no relationship." I then provided the
> quotes
indicating Rosen's view: that they are indeed distinct forms of
> system
closure, but nevertheless that they are relatable in a discussion
> (i.e.,
this one) of the relationship between old and new physics and in
>
analyzing reasons why the later is indeed necessary. I suggest we
>
accept that position as a working hypothesis and move forward by
>
actually exploring the ideas. Otherwise I am cut off from commenting -
>
excluded from the court before you even hear the case.
>
> I was
echoing the description of such a relationship (between these
> ideas of
closure) that Schrodinger and Rosen described and saying that I
> had
finally gotten it - sort of an aha. It would be nice to offer that
>
experience to others on the list and to be able to do so I require an
>
open minded atmosphere. I think I have discovered something in the
>
literature we are all studying and I would like to share the discovery.
>
If there is any ego in trying to be "right" I could, in any case, only
>
make the claim now, as even a few weeks ago I didn't see it, and if it
>
is not right, obviously I would like to know why. The best choice is to
>
discuss the ideas and, if possible, try to imporve them. So...
>
> I
would like to discuss the idea that "closed to efficient cause" is a
>
direct and important extension (and expansion) of other forms of system
>
closure. From my reading, which was not casual, I think that is a very
>
important message if not the most important message of the first chapter
>
in Essays. For clarity only (not confrontation) I should reiterate that
>
I believe (strongly) that the concept of "closure" is similar in both
>
cases where the word has been used - the case of thermodyamics and the
>
case of efficient cause, and that Chapter 1 in Essays describes this
>
similarity. If there is agreement to proceed, here is my attempt to
>
outline the major points we might start out with, that perhaps will get
>
us to heart of the matter.
>
> 1. Let's explore the idea that the
term "closure" in both cases refers
> to causality. If that is true, then
certainly they are related in at
> least that way. Here's the case: The
physical concept of a closed system
> means essentially, in Aristotelian
terms, "closed to material cause."
> This translates directly into
conservation of energy and matter. Science
> (old physics) presumed
absolute closure to material cause, which led
> naturally to the 1st law
of thermo, which builds on to conservation of
> energy (part of material
closure) to deduce that energy flow can only
> take place from higher to
lower energy environments (hot to cold). The
> 2nd law of thermodynamics
then then also implied, where the same
> principles of universal closure
and resulting conservation laws require
> that (a) there can be no
perpetual motion machine, because it would
> violate material closure,
i.e., it would imply you can "get something
> for nothing" or something
from outside the system; and (b) there must be
> a univeral increase in
entropy as energy is used and thus necessarily
> flows toward lower energy
states and ultimately "heat death." These are
> all logical consequences
of material closure.
>
> 2. We recognize that living systems and
especially organisms are not
> "closed to material cause" but instead
quite open in that regard, thus
> being exceptional to the ideas stated
above. While the physicist tends
> to emphasize the "larger system" in
which the hope for material closure
> is retained, Rosen shows that there
cannot be a "largest system" in
> which this is true. Finding one is thus
the very definition of
> mechanism. In contrast, the physics of open
systems [and yes, this does
> mean open to material cause], as Rosen
states, is quite primitive. The
> ideal of material closure was the main
paradigm of mechanistic science
> for centuries, with astonishing results
regarding material properties of
> systems and little attention to open
systems until recently. The physics
> of open systems - meaning systems
that are open to material cause
> [implicitly matter and energy] is in
large part the "new physics."
>
> 3. Efficient closure has to do
with bringing into a system material
> processes that, in the paradigm of
materially closed systems, would
> otherwise reside in the [concept of]
its environment, or "outside." The
> importance of this simple proposal of
bringing what might otherwise be
> outside, inside a system, is the
critical step in expanding beyond the
> "old physics." Its importance in
this regard cannot be overstated. In
> the logical progression of ideas
that Schrodinger and Rosen presented,
> and which I am attempting to
recapitualte and explain, we are reasoning
> from the old physics to the
new. [Warning: this does not mean that the
> new physics can be "deduced"
from the old, it is a logical progression
> of thought from old to that
needed for understanding organisms, which
> along the way demonstrates
that some of the assumptions in the old
> physics are too restrictive and
must be relaxed, mainly the idea of
> absolute material closure]. If we
remember that the separation of system
> from its environment is a
conceptual issue in the old physics model -
> that they are not truly
separate in reality - it is perhaps easier to
> see that the "trick" of
bringing something of the outside, inside, is
> what violates the old
physics assumptions and creates "causal loops"
> that cannot be
represented without generating mathematical
> impredicativities. This is
because "outside" in the old view is the
> source of material causality,
i.e., gravitation or forcings, and
> "inside" in the OLD view is the
inertial thing being forced. The whole
> thought system cannot have things
forcing themselves, and thus must
> preserve insides and outsides. Once we
bring an outside thing that acts
> causally into an inertial system, we
have internal causation - a
> violation of the old rules. What kind of
causation is that? What do we
> call it? Well, it is efficient cause
because it has to do with forcings
> that become part of the inertial
system - it is a constructor, i..e,
> like the builder of a house living
in the house.
>
> 4. The reason this "trick" has not been perceived
as important in the
> old view is that it strongly believes in being able
to fractionate
> systems for analysis. So, what has been internalized is
not regarded as
> part of the inertial object - it is analytically
fractioned away as an
> outside force when that aspect is studied, or as
an inside inertia when
> that aspect is studied. The problem is that these
two fractions cannot
> then be combined meaningfully, and that is the part
of science that was
> simply not developed. Hence, the old view has been
preserved as a
> "valid" analysis, with "valid" meaning mechanically
valid, and the
> closed loop causalities treated as a problem that has not
yet been
> solved. This left plenty of room for substituting belief for
knowledge
> by assuming that the old paradigm could indeed eventually be
used to
> untangle the closed loops, but it can't be.
>
> 5.
These are the basic beginning that take us as far as considering
>
efficient closure. In other posts I suggested there might also be a
>
discussion of formal and final closure, and that those very distinct
>
kinds of closure may also be relatable to these ideas. That, I
>
suggested, might be why Rosen later saw fit to say there are potentially
>
more issues in establishing a "sufficient" explanation of organisms and
>
hence presenting efficient cause as only a "necessary" element.
>
>
OK, that's about as good as I can do explaianing the ideas - what I get
>
from Ch 1. Any aha's? Or do I get the boot?
>
>
JJK