Anthropomorphism and science

[Judith Rosen <***>]

>From the current thread definition, I would have to conclude that all
science must be "anthropomorphism"-- we are, after all, the "anthropo" who
are "morphing" reality into language through the double filter of our senses
and our minds. So be it. Some filters morph more than others, say my filters
to me. Given that my filters are consistently mine, I can discern through
them that some explanations regarding the world outside my filters appear
more accurate than others and experience bears that out. Such is life.

Judith
----- Original Message -----
From: "John Kineman" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Thursday, September 16, 2004 6:08 PM
Subject: Re: [ROSEN] "It's a causal world."


> Howard,
> Thanks for the clarification, despite some inconsistency I note in the
> following:
>
> Howard Pattee wrote:
>
> >Some metaphors are better than others but that does not depend on how
anthropomorphic they are.
> >
> followed later by:
>
> >Aristotle’s causes are highly anthropomorphic because ...
> >
>
> I agree that theory structures cannot be evaluated on how anthopomorphic
> they may seem, and yet one should always work against arbitrarily human
> biases. Most are not arbitrary, however, as we have little choice but to
> think the way we think. I think the problem is when the bias is
> demonstrably uniquely human, not because it is wrong, but because then
> we may not have paid enough attention to generalizing it. On that point,
> Rosen says the entire physical world view has such an anthropogenic
> bias, namely the perception of states. Also, if you'll pardon an
> additional comment - not meant to get in the last word but just related
> to the question of metaphores: The use of human metaphores to explain an
> idea is a teaching technique that certainly should not be used to judge
> the amount of human bias in the idea itself in its technical use. Animal
> behaviorists were plagued with these kinds of criticisms to no
> particular benefit. If physicists had a meaningful human analogy for
> spin, I'm sure they would use it. Einstein described relativity in terms
> of trains. Schrodinger was famous for his cat metaphore, etc. The idea
> of cause is embedded in logic itself. "If A then B" is commonly
> interpreted as a statement of causality. By arguing against causality
> language, in essence one is arguing against asking any "why" questions -
> which is the basis of the Rosennean view. However, I do find the deeper
> philosophical discussion, as in your paper, quite interesting.
>