I'm fairly new to Rosen and like many on this list I'm struggling to
understand the concept of closure under efficient causation as described in
Life Itelf. It would help me greatly if the more enlightened ones than me
could comment on why the machine in the following example would not qualify
as an organism by Rosen's definition. Intuitively, it seems to me that it's
not an MR systems but I can't find a specific flaw in the argument.
Example:
It's faily easy to imagine a machine (built with currently available
technologies) that can repair itself. It consists of CPUs, motors, levers
etc. Everything is redunant so for instance when one CPU fails another one
is available to execute the repair program. When one of the components
fails the diagnostic software automatically detects it (e.g. a motor failed
or a cpu failed) and initiates a program for replacement of the component.
Say, the program says that the machine has to walk over to a certain box
take the a new cpu and replace the broken one.
Of course, this is a very crude example and it can immediately be noticed
that it's not closed under efficient cause since the question "why CPU?" is
not anwserable within the organism. The answer is "because such an such
company made it" leads out of the proposed organism and thus it's not
closed under efficient cause.
So, far so good. But the same criticism on a different level can be applied
to the human body. The answer to "Why such and such amino acid or why such
and such protein?" leads out of the organism. The answer to "why such
protein?" can be "because this beefsteak the human just consumed" so this
particular substance was manufactured outsite the organism. In Rosen's
terminology the proteins from the beefsteak will be the material cause,
the "A" from "f:A-->B".
Here is my question: why can we not consider the CPU in the above example
as the material cause the same way we consider the beefsteak the material
cause? Granted the CPU is very complex but then again protein molecule from
the beefsteak is probably a lot more complex than the CPU.
Why can we not regard CPUs, mortors etc of the machine as the material
causes and thus consider the machine described above an organism?
Why the is the program that tells the machine to walk over to the box and
replace the broken component not equivalent to the "program" that tells the
fox to go and get replacements for its broken components by eating a rabbit?
Thank you for your help!
- steve