Re: Physics and Metaphysics - systems and environment

John M wrote:

If you are within the same setup as I and we both look at "the same" environment (including both of us) we will have not-matching connotations of "it", pertinent to the two different experiential mindcontents interpreting it.

Is this in some contradiction with RR or anybody here?

You are in agreement with RR.

From page 40 of Life, Itself:

"Science is built on dualities. Indeed, every mode of discrimination creates one. But the most fundamental dualism, which all others presuppose, is of course, the one a discriminator makes between self and everything else."

Other dualities that my father has discussed are the dualities between hard and soft sciences, theoretical and experimental science, qualitative and quantitative...

From page 3 of Life, Itself:

"Can arbitrary qualities (the stuff of perception) be equivalently expressed in terms of a certain limited subset of elementary qualities (those we can measure numerically)? If so, how? If not, what does it mean to have a science of such qualities? What relationships can exist between such sciences (if indeed, any at all)? It is clear that these issues and others like them involve the deepest aspects of the relation between the perceiving mind and the perceptual universe."

Judith

----- Original Message -----

From: John M

To: ***

Sent: Tuesday, August 10, 2004 3:21 PM

Subject: Re: [ROSEN] Physics and Metaphysics - systems and environment

Tim,

[thanks for extracting this relevant part of Jamie's post, which, in its entirety, was to long and complicated for me to comprehend in all its details. What you wrote is not much better: when you start using formalized expressions instead of just verbalized explanations I am out. (Not that the verbalized features (briefly: WORDS) would always be within my vocabulary). Parts prone to my 'rethinking' are colored in teal. ]

*

Now for environment: IMO "I" belong to (into) MY environment

('am within') so if I look 'at it' I have to include myself.

That has a double consequence:

1. I am part of it, not a spectator, and

2. I 'see' it adjusted to my own viewing.

If you are within the same setup as I and we both look at "the same" environment (including both of us) we will have not-matching connotations of "it", pertinent to the two different experiential mindcontents interpreting it.

Is this in some contradiction with RR or anybody here?

John M

----- Original Message -----

From: Tim Gwinn

To: ***

Sent: Tuesday, August 10, 2004 2:23 PM

Subject: Re: Physics and Metaphysics - systems and environment

Jamie,

Your remarks about the relationship between self and environment reminded me of some remarks by Rosen about the nature of the (M,R)-system, the partition between system and environment, and complexity. This is from his chapter "The Roles of Necessity in Biology" in Casti & Karlqvist's Newton to Aristotle (1989).

In the basic (M,R)-system, we have:

    f: A ® B

followed by:

    F: B ® H(A,B)

Rosen notes that:

"The mapping f represents a respectable Newtonian procedure, which entails material structures or processes in B from corresponding ones in A. Thus the elements of A and B can be thought of as states in the traditional Newtonian sense; the inferential rule or operator f is an equation of motion which sends states (in A) onto states (in B) along traditional trajectories.

    But now we have the new inferential rule F. If F were a traditional Newtonian process, then the image of F would also have to be states of something; call it X. But, by hypothesis, the "states" x in this image must also be identified with operators or inferential rules in H(A,B). As we have emphasized earlier, however, inferential rules or equations of motions do not get state descriptions in general; they are themselves descriptions of environments (of A and B); they represent forces imposed on A by an otherwise unspecified environment which is itself left bereft of necessity or entailment.

    Thus, the hypothetical state set X has to be identified with a (Newtonian) model of the environment of A. The essential part of this model must be an identification between the properties of states x  Î X and the generation of the forces f which operate on A. We can already see that this is an unusual situation; the concept of state is designed to describe the operation of entailment within a system, not to generate entailment in another system. It is, in fact, precisely at this point that non-simulability enters the picture."[p.34-35, ital. orig.]

Regards,

Tim

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ROSEN Forum [mailto:***]On Behalf Of James N
> Rose
> Sent: Tuesday, August 10, 2004 9:39 AM
> To: ***
> Subject: Re: Physics and Metaphysics - imminent causality
>
>
> from: 'FIRE WITHOUT, FIRE WITHIN.'
>
>
> --snip--
>
> But, "what" I am - whatever qualities and essences may or may not
> be expressed - requires that I "Be", before I can act out the
> characteristics of "what-ness", of "Being". And, what is "thought"
> and "thinking" and how much thought is necessary to qualify and
> admit to this thing we recognize as "am-ness"? Is one flicker of
> perception sufficient? Are several moments of self-consciousness
> necessary? Or thousands? Can one singular moment of recognition
> in the vast ocean of temporal oblivion be satisfactory? And even
> then, "am" in comparison to what else? To Think and to Be requires
> not just my own (or any extant's) presence, but an environment of
> continuous consistent interaction. An environment that sends back
> information, that confirms and reinforces co-existence. If all of
> that ceases, "I" cease. And it makes no difference if "I" disappear,
> or the environment does ... the result is identical; existence
> truly being what the theologian Martin Buber called: the "I-Thou".
> Each "self" is nothing without an "other"... force or sentience.
> Self-consciousness alone is not sufficient to confirm "existence".]
>--snip--