Re: A contradiction? Not.

> John K. wrote: So then I would conclude that the words "formal system" are referenced
> to human inventions primarily because that kind of formal system is the
> only one that is directly experiencable by us; and thus the only one
> that can be directly known by us. But this does not exclude the
> theoretical existence of formal systems of perhaps vastly different
> types (also referred to as functions, purposes, meanings, etc.) that
> must necessarily be part of other organisms in order for them to develop
> and be said to have an internal model. That would work, I think.

I think it comes down to a language-based distinction between "a model" and "a formal model", in which the word "formal" refers to human volition/creation. What I would suggest is a rewording of your sentence above to read: "This does not preclude the theoretical existence of models in naturally occurring systems, meaning systems that are part of the natural world, but outside the realm of formal systems." Formalisms are the stuff of science, of language, of mathematics. What my father was attempting to do was formalize the science of living systems-- but in order to do that, he ended up having to do a lot more than just that.

I have been working on my father's book, Anticipatory Systems, since I got home (that is-- when I've been able to get away from the endless mundane details of life that all scream for attention after two weeks away!) and there is a very succinct set of statements on page three:

Robert Rosen wrote: "My professional activities have been concerned with the theory of biological systems, roughly motivated by trying to discover what it is about certain natural systems that makes us recognize them as organisms, and characterize them as being alive. It is precisely on this recognition that biology as an autonomous science depends, and it is a significant fact that it has never been formalized. As will be abundantly seen in the ensuing pages, I am persuaded that our recognition of the living state rests on the perception of homologies between the behaviors exhibited by organisms, homologies which are absent in non-living systems. The physical structures of organisms play only a minor and secondary role in this; the only requirement which physical structure must fulfill is that it allows the characteristic behaviors themselves to be manifested. Indeed, if this were not so, it would be impossible to understand how a class of systems as utterly diverse in physical structure as that which comprises biological organisms could be recognized as a unity at all."