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Re: Inconsistency, natural vs formal
- From: John M <***>
- Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2004 11:04:24 -0400
Howard,
the fog is in my mind. You discussion with Dan is exciting yet I have some
foggy questions (maybe due to my poor knowledge):
> HP: A natural system in QT is thought be objectively indeterminate, but I
would say that uncertain and ambiguous more often refer to our models, not
what is modeled. ...<
Sounds perfect to me, excepte a minor questionmark. I guess QT stands for
Quantum Theory. A 'natural system' as far as I know is the unlimitedly
interconnected maximum model (RR?) and so I wonder how it occurs in the
linear-mathematical science modelQT?
Even the UP is limited to limitedly modelled quantities.
I find Einstein's quote (again accepting the 'unknowable' reality term) :
> "In so far as the propositions of mathematics are certain they do not
apply to reality; and in so far as they apply to reality they are not
certain." [Einstein]<
conform with RR's vues (not a surprise though). This is what I 'visioned'
into the reductionism of
the formalistic sciences based on applied (equational) mathematics. OUR
limited models.
John M
----- Original Message -----
From: "Howard Pattee" <***>
To: <***>
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 10:15 PM
Subject: Re: Inconsistency, natural vs formal
> Dan,
>
> You ask:
> What about indeterminate or uncertain or ambiguous? Can't a
> natural system have/be these? And if so, aren't these in essence
> indistinguishable from inconsistentcy?
>
> HP: A natural system in QT is thought be objectively indeterminate, but I
would say that uncertain and ambiguous more often refer to our models, not
what is modeled. This is a matter of usage. The dictionary says inconsistent
means incompatible, self-contradictory, not in agreement. I don't think
indeterminate or ambiguous imply this.
>
> Dan: Is it possible that this unmodelability is both formal and natural?
> Does the "problem" we hit with complexity and complementarity
> reflect a real aspect of nature?
>
> HP: All we know, all we can know, is whether our models are in conformity
in some sense with our experience, as in the modeling commutation relation.
I believe Hertz: "For our purpose it is not necessary that they [our models]
should be in conformity with the [real] things in any other respect
whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of
knowing, whether our conception of things [our models] are in conformity
with them [reality] in any other than this one fundamental respect."
>
> Could it also be that this natural indeterminacy, ambiguity, wiggle room
(if it is real) is fundamentally involved in making the hard to model
features, like life, what they are?
>
> HP: In physics, especially quantum theory, I think that is the case.
>
> What if these hard to model "things" are precisely that, even on purpose
or by design or for survival needs - ambiguous, indeterminate, uncertain,
unpredictable?
>
> HP: What do you mean "on purpose"? Whose purpose?
>
> Dan: And maybe the converse is likewise antithetical to life - to be
modelable or determinate or certain or predictable in an inherently
uncertain
> environment could be the surest way to fail, the guaranteed way
> not to be able to adapt, anticipate, deal with utter surprise and
> true novelty and still survive and thrive.
>
> HP: Of course evolution would not work if models were "certain" if you
mean error-free. Models are never exact or certain. They are always just
approximations to reality and to survive we must continually adapt by
changing our models.
>
> "In so far as the propositions of mathematics are certain they do not
apply to reality; and in so far as they apply to reality they are not
certain." [Einstein]
>
> Howard