Re: The Rosennean Paradigm

[Howard Pattee <***>]

Judith,
Your concise summary of the development of Rosen?s thoughts is largely consistent with my 
own discussions with him. I can add some comments about how his ideas on quantum theory 
developed and where it might be crucial for biology, because I discussed this with him at 
length. These issues are technical and far from settled, so I will try to summarize that 
in another post.

Judith wrote: Once the organization of a material system was acknowledged as a real and 
scientific aspect of that system, all sorts of other scientific truths began to be 
visible about so called "material reality" as well. For example, it became obvious that 
the importance of organization as an integral aspect of a system was as true of the atom 
as it was of an organism.

When I said I saw no basic disagreement, I meant that many physicists (add von Neumann to 
those I mentioned) agree that Newtonian state-determined dynamics is inadequate for 
modeling life, and that the abstract organization may be more explanatory than any 
specific material description or realization of life. Also, modern particle physics is 
about abstract organization in the form of mathematical models, and not about material 
particles as conceived in the classical Newtonian/Cartesian paradigm. In fact, today no 
physicist knows what matter is except as abstract relational metaphorical models. I agree 
that unfortunately many applied physicists are either not interested in these problems or 
considered them just philosophy. I also agree with Rosen that biologists are the worst 
case of classical thinking, but with significant exceptions.

I also do not consider different definitions as a basic disagreement. Definitions are 
assessed by their usefulness in a particular context often by their communication value 
or in constructing specific models to answer specific questions. I agree that Rosen?s 
definition of complexity is different from von Neumann?s as well as Chaitin?s and others, 
but I do not see them as inconsistent with each other. They are all useful for models 
that answer different questions.

Von Neumann?s logical model of self-replication was a completely organizational or 
relational model. All the matter, energy, space, time and physics were intentionally 
excluded. He warned that this exclusion was ?throwing half the problem out the window? 
and I think the same warning is valid for Rosen?s relational models. Experimental tests 
require more than logic. In agreement with Rosen, we find that complementary models are 
necessary. Most important, in agreement with Rosen, Von Neumann?s reasoning led to the 
conclusion that a Newtonian state-determined dynamics alone would not work. There must be 
non-dynamical descriptions that functioned as constraints on the dynamics. This 
complementary irreducible, inequivalent concept of information was the origin of these 
genetic program constraints that formed his ?threshold of complication.?

Rosen?s paper, ?Causal structures in brains and machines? in J. General Systems, 12, 
107-126, 1986 is the best discussion I know of the physics of this type of genetic 
program constraints. The big problem with the paper is that he again misinterprets von 
Neumann and claims his model ?fails,? and he also misstates my conclusion, saying that I 
claim that evolution entails the maximum amount of these program constraints rather than 
the minimum amount, which is what I had proposed. Needless to say, this makes a 
difference in what he concluded and creates two apparent basic disagreements where there 
is actually none.

Again, I agree that there are differences in approaches, in definitions, in the questions 
that we focus on, but I still fail to see any profound disagreements. What often appear 
as irreconcilable differences results only from the irreducibility or inequivalence of 
the necessary complementary models of complex systems.

Howard